Kirjahaku

Nature's Metaphysics argues that a satisfactory philosophy of science requires a metaphysics that is based on the understanding that natural properties are essentially dispositional. Alexander Bird develops a dispositional essentialist account of the laws of nature, defending the claim that laws are metaphysically necessary. Professional philosophers and advanced students working in metaphysics and the philosophy of science will find this book both provocative and stimulating.

Nature's Metaphysics argues that a satisfactory philosophy of science requires a metaphysics that is based on the understanding that natural properties are essentially dispositional. Alexander Bird develops a dispositional essentialist account of the laws of nature, defending the claim that laws are metaphysically necessary. Professional philosophers and advanced students working in metaphysics and the philosophy of science will find this book both provocative and stimulating.

In Knowing Science, Alexander Bird presents an epistemology of science that rejects empiricism and gives a central place to the concept of knowledge. Science aims at knowledge and progresses when it adds to the stock of knowledge. That knowledge is social knowing--it is known by the scientific community as a whole. Evidence is that from which knowledge can be obtained by inference. From this, it follows that evidence is knowledge, and is not limited to perception, nor to observation. Observation supplies evidence that is basic relative to a field of enquiry and can be highly non-perceptual. Theoretical knowledge is typically gained by inference to the only explanation, in which competing plausible hypotheses are falsified by the evidence. In cases where not all competing hypotheses are refuted, scientific hypotheses are not known but instead possess varying degrees of plausibility. Plausibilities in the light of the evidence are probabilities and link eliminative explanationism to Bayesian conditionalization. Bird argues that scientific realism and anti-realism as global metascientific claims should be rejected-the track record gives us only local metascientific claims.

Thomas S. Kuhn (1922-1996) transformed the philosophy of science. His seminal 1962 work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, sold over one million copies and was translated into more than a dozen languages. It introduced the term "paradigm shift" into the vernacular and remains a fundamental text in the study of the history and philosophy of science. This introduction to Kuhn's ideas situates The Structure of Scientific Revolutions within the development of his thought over time. Alexander Bird explains Kuhn's central distinction between normal and revolutionary science and then examines in detail the role played by the key notion of a paradigm in his account of radical scientific change. The book considers Kuhn's claim that the scientist's world changes when paradigms change and relates this thought to his views on perception, incommensurability, and meaning. The author engages with the main criticisms of Kuhn's philosophy. Examining Kuhn's thought in relation to its historical context as well as other more recent philosophies of science, Alexander Bird argues that Kuhn's thinking betrays a residual commitment to many theses characteristic of the empiricists he set out to challenge. His book concludes by looking at Kuhn's influence on the history and philosophy of science and asks where the field may be heading in the wake of Kuhn's ideas. Accessible to those with little formal philosophy training, this is an assured and engaging read for anyone interested in Kuhn's pivotal ideas.

An up-to-date, clear but rigorous introduction to the philosophy of science offering an indispensable grounding in the philosophical understanding of science and its problems. The book pays full heed to the neglected but vital conceptual issues such as the nature of scientific laws, while balancing and linking this with a full coverage of epistemological problems such as our knowledge of such laws.

An up-to-date, clear but rigorous introduction to the philosophy of science offering an indispensable grounding in the philosophical understanding of science and its problems. The book pays full heed to the neglected but vital conceptual issues such as the nature of scientific laws, while balancing and linking this with a full coverage of epistemological problems such as our knowledge of such laws.

Thomas Kuhn (1922-96) transformed the philosophy of science. His seminal 1962 work "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" introduced the term 'paradigm shift' into the vernacular and remains a fundamental text in the study of the history and philosophy of science. This introduction to Kuhn's ideas covers the breadth of his philosophical work, situating "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" within Kuhn's wider thought and drawing attention to the development of his ideas over time. Kuhn's work is assessed within the context of other philosophies of science notably logical empiricism and recent developments in naturalized epistemology. The author argues that Kuhn's thinking betrays a residual commitment to many theses characteristic of the empiricists he set out to challenge. Kuhn's influence on the history and philosophy of science is assessed and where the field may be heading in the wake of Kuhn's ideas is explored.

Thomas Kuhn (1922-96) transformed the philosophy of science. His seminal 1962 work "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" introduced the term 'paradigm shift' into the vernacular and remains a fundamental text in the study of the history and philosophy of science. This introduction to Kuhn's ideas covers the breadth of his philosophical work, situating "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" within Kuhn's wider thought and drawing attention to the development of his ideas over time. Kuhn's work is assessed within the context of other philosophies of science notably logical empiricism and recent developments in naturalized epistemology. The author argues that Kuhn's thinking betrays a residual commitment to many theses characteristic of the empiricists he set out to challenge. Kuhn's influence on the history and philosophy of science is assessed and where the field may be heading in the wake of Kuhn's ideas is explored.