Kirjahaku

The Bush Administration conducted a review of US nuclear weapons force posture during its first year in office. Although the review sought to adjust US nuclear posture to address changes in the international security environment at the start of the new century, it continued many of the policies and programs that had been a part of the US nuclear posture during the previous decades and during the Cold War. This book provides an overview of the US nuclear posture to highlight areas of change and areas of continuity. During the Cold War, the United States sought to deter the Soviet Union and its allies from attacking the United States and its allies by convincing the Soviet Union that any level of conflict could escalate into a nuclear exchange and, in that exchange, the United States would plan to destroy the full range of valued targets in the Soviet Union. Other nations were included in US nuclear war plans due to their alliances with the Soviet Union. After the Cold War, the United States maintained a substantial nuclear arsenal to deter potential threats from Russia. It would not forswear the first use of nuclear weapons in conflicts with other nations, armed with chemical or biological weapons, and formed contingency plans for such conflicts. The Bush Administration has emphasised that the United States and Russia are no longer enemies and that the United States will no longer plan or size its nuclear force to deter a 'Russian threat'. Instead, the United States will maintain a nuclear arsenal with the capabilities needed to counter capabilities of any potential adversary, focusing on 'how we will fight' rather than 'who we will fight'. Furthermore, US nuclear weapons will combine with missile defences, conventional weapons, and a responsive infrastructure in seeking to assure US allies, dissuade US adversaries, deter conflict, and defeat adversaries if conflict should occur. Analysts and observers have identified several issues raised by the Administration's Nuclear Posture Review. These include the role of nuclear weapons in US national security policy, how to make the US nuclear deterrent 'credible', the relationship between the US nuclear posture and the goal of discouraging nuclear proliferation, plans for strategic nuclear weapons, and the future of non-strategic nuclear weapons.

Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar amendment, authorizing U.S. threat reduction assistance to the former Soviet Union, in November 1991, after a failed coup in Moscow and the disintegration of the Soviet Union raised concerns about the safety and security of Soviet nuclear weapons. The annual program has grown from $400 million in the DOD budget around $1.1 billion across three agencies -- DOD, DOE and the State Department. It has also evolved from an emergency response to impending chaos in the Soviet Union, to a more comprehensive threat reduction and nonproliferation effort, to a broader program seeking to keep nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons from leaking out of the former Soviet Union and into the hands of rogue nations or terrorist groups. The Department of Defense manages the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, which provides Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan with assistance in transporting, storing, and dismantling nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. U.S. assistance has helped these nations eliminate the delivery systems for nuclear weapons under the START I Treaty, secure weapons storage areas, construct a storage facility for nuclear materials removed from weapons, construct a destruction facility for chemical weapons, and secure biological weapons materials. The State Department manages the International Science and Technology Centers in Moscow and Kiev. These centers provide research grants to scientists and engineers so that they will not sell their knowledge to other nations or terrorist groups. The State Department has also provided assistance with export and border control programs in the former Soviet states. The Department of Energy manages programs that seek to improve the security of nuclear materials at civilian, naval, and nuclear weapons complex facilities. It also funds programs that help nuclear scientists and engineers find employment in commercial enterprises. DOE is also helping Russia dispose of plutonium removed from nuclear weapons and shut-down its remaining plutonium-producing reactors by replacing them with fossil-fuel plants. Analysts have debated numerous issues related to U.S. nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance. These include questions about the coordination of and priority given to these programs in the U.S. government, questions about Russia's willingness to provide the United States with access to its weapons facilities, questions about the President's ability to waive certification requirements so that the programs can go forward, and questions about the need to expand the efforts into a global program that receives funding from numerous nations and possibly extends assistance to others outside the former Soviet Union.