Kirjahaku

Virtue ethics in its contemporary manifestation is dominated by neo Aristotelian virtue ethics primarily developed by Rosalind Hursthouse. This version of eudaimonistic virtue ethics was ground breaking, but has been subject to considerable critical attention. Christine Swanton shows that the time is ripe for new developments and alternatives. The target centred virtue ethics proposed by Swanton is opposed to orthodox virtue ethics in two major ways. First, it rejects the 'natural goodness' metaphysics of Neo Aristotelian virtue ethics owed to Philippa Foot in favour of a 'hermeneutic ontology' of ethics inspired by the Continental tradition and McDowell. Second, it rejects the well -known 'qualified agent' account of right action made famous by Hursthouse in favour of a target centred framework for assessing rightness of acts. Swanton develops the target centred view with discussions of Dancy's particularism, default reasons and thick concepts, codifiability, and its relation to the Doctrine of the mean. Target Centred Virtue Ethics retains the pluralism of Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View (2003) but develops it further in relation to a pluralistic account of practical reason. This study develops other substantive positions including the view that target centred virtue ethics is developmental, suitably embedded in an environmental ethics of "dwelling"; and incorporates a concept of differentiated virtue to allow for roles, narrativity, cultural and historical location, and stage of life.

In Love and its Place in Virtue, Christine Swanton argues for an original position on the relations between love and virtue and love and virtue ethics. For this task the distinction between love as an emotion or emotional orientation and virtuous forms of love is central, as is the role of a conception of practical wisdom in virtuous love. How love features in virtue in general, including virtues which are not virtues of love, is the central theme. This book integrates virtue ethics with a renewed interest in the role of love in ethics. Until now virtue ethics and philosophical accounts of love have been separate fields. In Swanton's account of love she argues that there are many criteria for love which feature in various ways in the different forms of love. Central is the distinction between relational love between individuals and lovingness (in its various forms) as a fundamental emotional orientation towards the world as a whole (a Grundstimmung). Love and its Place in Virtue discusses "foundational" love (universal love, self-love and dwelling love), some of the impartial virtues of love, notably universal beneficence, impartial caring and forgiveness, as well as the relation between love and the personal virtue of justice, arguing that though justice is a virtue of respect it should be loving.

Christine Swanton offers a new, comprehensive theory of virtue ethics which addresses the major concerns of modern ethical theory from a character-based perspective. Discussion of many problems in moral theory, such as moral constraints, rightness of action, the good life, the demandingness of ethics, the role of the subjective, and the practicality of ethics, has been dominated by Kantian and Consequentialist theories, with their own distinctive conceptual apparatus. Virtue Ethics shows how a different framework can shed new light on these intractable issues. Swanton's approach is distinctive in that it departs in significant ways from classical versions of virtue ethics derived primarily from Aristotle. Employing insights from Nietzsche and other sources, she argues against both eudaimonistic virtue ethics and traditional virtue ethical conceptions of rightness. In developing a pluralistic view, she shows how different 'modes of moral acknowledgement' such as love, respect, appreciation, and creativity, are embedded in the very fabric of virtue, the moral life, and the good life.

Christine Swanton offers a new, comprehensive theory of virtue ethics which addresses the major concerns of modern ethical theory from a character-based perspective. Discussion of many problems in moral theory, such as moral constraints, rightness of action, the good life, the demandingness of ethics, the role of the subjective, and the practicality of ethics, has been dominated by Kantian and Consequentialist theories, with their own distinctive conceptual apparatus. Virtue Ethics shows how a different framework can shed new light on these intractable issues. Swanton's approach is distinctive in departing in siginificant ways from classical versions of virtue ethics derived primarily from Aristotle. Employing insights from Nietzsche and other sources, she argues against both eudaimonistic virtue ethics and traditional virtue ethical conceptions of rightness. In developing a pluralistic view, she shows how different 'modes of moral acknowledgement' such as love, respect, appreciation, and creativity, are embedded in the very fabric of virtue, the moral life, and the good life.

This ground-breaking and lucid contribution to the vibrant field of virtue ethics focuses on the influential work of Hume and Nietzsche, providing fresh perspectives on their philosophies and a compelling account of their impact on the development of virtue ethics. A ground-breaking text that moves the field of virtue ethics beyond ancient moral theorists and examines the highly influential ethical work of Hume and Nietzsche from a virtue ethics perspectiveContributes both to virtue ethics and a refreshed understanding of Hume’s and Nietzsche’s ethicsSkilfully bridges the gap between continental and analytical philosophyLucidly written and clearly organized, allowing students to focus on either Hume or NietzscheWritten by one of the most important figures contributing to virtue ethics today