Kirjahaku

Awareness of mortality is the price of intelligent consciousness. This book argues that a person is essentially an immaterial subject of conscious states who, though intimately linked by causal ties to the body, is nevertheless distinct from it. The book also examines apparently paranormal occurrences supporting the belief that some persons have survived bodily death. Cases of near-death experiences, apparitions, reincarnation experiences and mediumship phenomena are presented and discussed. Though it might seem contrary to natural law for a person to exist apart from a body and properly functioning brain, these cases suggest otherwise. Critical evaluation of alternative interpretations is provided.

Does bodily death constitute the complete destruction of a person? The first part of this scholarly book defends the view that the nature of man and the world he encounters implies survival of death as a conceptual possibility. The second part considers the empirical evidence for concluding that at least some persons have survived death. A new kind of understanding, among readers, might result from following the concepts logically developed in this work. It applies real life terminology and experience to the interpretation of death survival experiences.

The book is primarily a critique of a materialistic view of persons and their experiences. Its subject matter is quite broad, as it includes a consideration of not only whether there can be an adequate materialist treatment of sensations, consciousness, and intentionality of thought, but also of whether there can be such a treatment of perceptual experience, on the one hand, and of self-consciousness, on the other. It presents a case for concluding that the difficulties facing the materialist are overwhelming.

The book is primarily a critique of a materialistic view of persons and their experiences. Its subject matter is quite broad, as it includes a consideration of not only whether there can be an adequate materialist treatment of sensations, consciousness, and intentionality of thought, but also of whether there can be such a treatment of perceptual experience, on the one hand, and of self-consciousness, on the other. It presents a case for concluding that the difficulties facing the materialist are overwhelming.