Kirjahaku

Constitutional Democracy systematically examines how the basic constitutional structure of governments affects what they can accomplish. This relationship is especially important at a time when Americans are increasingly disillusioned about government's fundamental ability to reach solutions for domestic problems, and when countries in the former Soviet bloc and around the world are rewriting their constitutions. Political economist Mueller illuminates the links between the structure of democratic government and the outcomes it achieves by drawing comparisons between the American system and other government systems around the world. Working from the "public choice" perspective in political science, the book analyses electoral rules, voting rules, federalism, bicameralism, citizenship, and separation of powers.

Constitutional Democracy systematically examines how the basic constitutional structure of governments affects what they can accomplish. This relationship is especially important at a time when Americans are increasingly disillusioned about government's fundamental ability to reach solutions for domestic problems, and when countries in the former Soviet block and around the world are rewriting their constitutions. Political economist Mueller illuminates the links between the structure of democratic government and the outcomes it achieves by drawing comparisons between the American system and other government systems around the world. Working from the "public choice" perspective in political science, the book analyzes electoral rules, voting rules, federalism, bicameralism, citizenship, and separation of powers. It will be of great interest to students and scholars of political economy.

Why have modern corporations grown to such unprecedented sizes? This volume explores this crucial question, emphasising the roles of diversification and mergers.

Why have modern corporations grown to such unprecedented sizes? This volume explores this crucial question, emphasising the roles of diversification and mergers.

Profits in the Long Run asks two questions: Are there persistent differences in profitability across firms? If so, what accounts for them? This book answers these questions using data for the 1000 largest US manufacturing firms in 1950 and 1972. It finds that there are persistent differences in profitability and market power across large US companies. Companies with persistently high profits are found to have high market shares and sell differentiated products. Mergers do not result in synergistic increases in profitability, but they do have an averaging effect. Companies with above normal profits have their profits lowered by mergers. Companies with initially below normal profits have them raised. In addition, the influence of other variables on long-run profitability, including risk, sales, diversification, growth and managerial control, is explored. The implications of antitrust policy are likewise addressed.

This book also emphasizes the difference between religion and science as means for understanding causal relationships, but it focuses much more heavily on the challenge religious extremism poses for liberal democratic institutions. The treatment contains a discussion of human psychology, describes the salient characteristics of all religions, and contrasts religion and science as systems of thought. Historical sketches are used to establish a link between modernity and the use of the human capacity for reasoning to advance human welfare. The book describes the conditions under which democratic institutions can advance human welfare, and the nature of constitutional rights as protectors of individual freedoms. Extremist religions are shown to pose a threat to liberal democracy, a threat that has implications for immigration and education policies and the definition of citizenship.

This book also emphasizes the difference between religion and science as means for understanding causal relationships, but it focuses much more heavily on the challenge religious extremism poses for liberal democratic institutions. The treatment contains a discussion of human psychology, describes the salient characteristics of all religions, and contrasts religion and science as systems of thought. Historical sketches are used to establish a link between modernity and the use of the human capacity for reasoning to advance human welfare. The book describes the conditions under which democratic institutions can advance human welfare, and the nature of constitutional rights as protectors of individual freedoms. Extremist religions are shown to pose a threat to liberal democracy, a threat that has implications for immigration and education policies and the definition of citizenship.

Profits in the Long Run asks two questions: Are there persistent differences in profitability across firms? If so, what accounts for them? This book answers these questions using data for the 1000 largest US manufacturing firms in 1950 and 1972. It finds that there are persistent differences in profitability and market power across large US companies. Companies with persistently high profits are found to have high market shares and sell differentiated products. Mergers do not result in synergistic increases in profitability, but they do have an averaging effect. Companies with above normal profits have their profits lowered by mergers. Companies with initially below normal profits have them raised. In addition, the influence of other variables on long-run profitability, including risk, sales, diversification, growth and managerial control, is explored. The implications of antitrust policy are likewise addressed.

This book represents a considerable revision and expansion of Public Choice II (1989). Six new chapters have been added, and several chapters from the previous edition have been extensively revised. The discussion of empirical work in public choice has been greatly expanded. As in the previous editions, all of the major topics of public choice are covered. These include: why the state exists, voting rules, federalism, the theory of clubs, two-party and multiparty electoral systems, rent seeking, bureaucracy, interest groups, dictatorship, the size of government, voter participation, and political business cycles. Normative issues in public choice are also examined including a normative analysis of the simple majority rule, Bergson-Samuelson social welfare functions, the Arrow and Sen impossibility theorems, Rawls’s social contract theory and the constitutional political economy of Buchanan and Tullock.

The Public Choice Approach to Politics presents some of Dennis Mueller's most important contributions to public choice and public economics. Employing the contractarian-constitutional methodology of public choice, Professor Mueller examines the properties of several voting methods and representation systems as well as questions of equity and justice. Constitutional issues, such as the nature of constitutional rights and the elements for an ideal constitution, are also addressed. The essays in this collection include discussions of Pareto optimal redistribution, the redistribution over time of the benefits from collective action, Rawls's social contract, the social discount rate, and the relationship between contractarianism and different concepts of morality. The volume also includes chapters on the methodology of public choice, the work of James Buchanan and the Virginia School and a survey of the public choice literature.This book brings together in one place Dennis Mueller's key articles and papers on public choice, making it of interest to all economists and political scientists working in this area, as well as to sociologists, philosophers and lawyers.