Kirjahaku

It is a trite fact that changes do occur, yet is it logically contradictory to deny that they do? If Zeno and McTaggart were right, then there is no logical contradiction in such a denial, although this is incompatible with the way in which we normally think of the world. Supporters of the `block view' of the universe believe that there is a sense in which all events may be said to be contemporaneous, like episodes in a book, so that there is no `objective' past or future. The aim of this book is not to demolish belief in the existence of objective change, but to elucidate the conditions under which it makes sense to suppose that changes occur. The book pays particular attention to the existence of selves as one such condition, and concludes that the naturalistic account of change is defective and leaves the sceptic victorious.

Since its first publication in 1970 this book has become one of the most widely read introductory books on phenomenology and is used as a standard text in many universities from Germany to Korea and China. Praised for its accessibility and clarity the book has attracted a wide readership both within and outside the academia. Its author has over the years published a number of other books on Philosophy in which he has developed important theories of his own. This clear and elegant introduction traces Husserl’s philosophical development from his early preoccupation with numbers and his conflict with Frege to the transcendental phenomenology of his mature period. There is also a brief critical exposition of the views of Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre and other philosopher influenced by Husserl.

We share the capacity for knowledge with animals, but it is the nature and the scope of what we may rationally believe that makes us human. Yet what kind of beliefs do qualify as ‘rational’? This challenging and refreshingly innovative book addresses certain fundamental questions concerning rational legitimacy of some widely held beliefs and provides argument-based answers to such questions, while at the same time encouraging the reader to actively engage with the views put forward and form his/her own judgement. The book is typically discursive rather than simply informative, and introduces philosophy by doing it.

To know that something is the case, if closely considered, turns out to be no more than to believe with good evidence that something is the case, and beliefs, however well supported by evidence, do not yield certainty. So the question is, what kind of evidence is sufficient to justify a ‘knowledge claim’? And most important of all: What kind of beliefs do qualify as rational? This challenging and refreshingly innovative book addresses certain fundamental questions concerning the rational legitimacy of some widely held beliefs, and provides argument-based answers to such questions, while at the same time encouraging the reader to actively engage with the views put forward and form his/her own judgment. The book is typically discursive rather than merely informative, and introduces philosophy by doing it.

First published in 1997, this volume advances the view that the nature of truth, in so far as truth has a ‘nature’, lies in the manner of its occurrence. Edo Pivcevicì argues that truth is an vent, i.e. it does not exist until it occurs, and survives only as long as the requisite conditions for its occurrence are in place. Positing that language sets traps for the unwary, Pivcevicì states that calling ‘x’ true involves a property ascription does so only in the sense that ‘x’ enters into truth and is part of a ‘truth event’.

First published in 1997, this volume advances the view that the nature of truth, in so far as truth has a 'nature', lies in the manner of its occurrence. Edo Pivc evici argues that truth is an vent, i.e. it does not exist until it occurs, and survives only as long as the requisite conditions for its occurrence are in place. Positing that language sets traps for the unwary, Pivc evici states that calling 'x' true involves a property ascription does so only in the sense that 'x' enters into truth and is part of a 'truth event'.

Since its first publication in 1970 this book has become one of the most widely read introductory books on phenomenology and is used as a standard text in many universities from Germany to Korea and China. Praised for its accessibility and clarity the book has attracted a wide readership both within and outside the academia. Its author has over the years published a number of other books on Philosophy in which he has developed important theories of his own. This clear and elegant introduction traces Husserl’s philosophical development from his early preoccupation with numbers and his conflict with Frege to the transcendental phenomenology of his mature period. There is also a brief critical exposition of the views of Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre and other philosopher influenced by Husserl.