Kirjahaku

No critical analysis has ever examined the specific reasons for the Ottoman defeat. Erickson's study fills this gap by studying the operations of the Ottoman Army from October 1912 through July 1913, and by providing a comprehensive explanation of its doctrines and planning procedures. This book is written at an operational level that details every campaign at the level of the army corps. More than 30 maps, numerous orders of battle, and actual Ottoman Army operations orders illustrate how the Turks planned and fought their battles. Of particular note is the inclusion of the only detailed history in English of the Ottoman X Corps' Sarkoy amphibious invasion. Also included are definitive appendix about Ottoman military aviation and a summary of the Turks' efforts to incorporate the lessons learned from the war into their military structure in 1914. The Ottoman Empire fought the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 against the joint forces of Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia—and was decisively defeated. The Ottoman Army is frequently depicted as a mob of poorly clad, faceless Turks inept in their attempts to fight a modern war. Yet by 1912, the Ottoman Army, which was constructed on the German model, was in many ways more advanced than certain European armies.

The first general history in English of the Ottoman Army in the First World War, Ordered to Die is based on newly available Turkish archival and official sources. Outnumbered and outgunned, the Ottoman Army performed astonishingly well in the field and managed to keep fighting until the end of the war, long after many other armies had quit the field. It fought a multi-front war against sophisticated and capable enemies, including Great Britain, France, and Russia. Erickson challenges conventional thinking about Ottoman war aims, Ottoman military effectiveness, and the influence of German assistance. Written at the strategic and operational levels, this study frames the Turkish military contributions in a unitary manner by establishing linkages between campaigns and theaters. It also contains the first detailed discussion of Ottoman operations in Galicia, Romania, and Macedonia. Erickson provides a wealth of information on Ottoman Army organization, deployments, strategy, and staff procedures. He examines with particular attention the army's role in the Armenian deportations and the intelligence available to the Turks in 1914 and 1915. Appendixes include biographies of important commanders, the efforts of the Ottoman Air Force, Ottoman casualties, as well as a wartime chronology.

This volume examines how the Ottoman Army was able to evolve and maintain a high level of overall combat effectiveness despite the primitive nature of the Ottoman State during the First World War. Structured around four case studies, at the operational and tactical level, of campaigns involving the Ottoman Empire and the British Empire: Gallipoli in 1915, Kut in 1916, Third Gaza-Beersheba in 1917, and Megiddo in 1918. For each of these campaigns, particular emphasis is placed on examining specific elements of combat effectiveness and how they affected that particular battle.The prevalent historiography attributes Ottoman battlefield success primarily to external factors - such as the presence of German generals and staff officers; climate, weather and terrain that adversely affected allied operations; allied bumbling and amateurish operations; and inadequate allied intelligence. By contrast, Edward J. Erickson argues that the Ottoman Army was successful due to internal factors, such as its organizational architecture, a hardened cadre of experienced combat leaders, its ability to organize itself for combat, and its application of the German style of war.Ottoman Army Effectiveness in World War I will be of great interest to students of the First World War, military history and strategic studies in general.

This volume examines how the Ottoman Army was able to evolve and maintain a high level of overall combat effectiveness despite the primitive nature of the Ottoman State during the First World War. Structured around four case studies, at the operational and tactical level, of campaigns involving the Ottoman Empire and the British Empire: Gallipoli in 1915, Kut in 1916, Third Gaza-Beersheba in 1917, and Megiddo in 1918. For each of these campaigns, particular emphasis is placed on examining specific elements of combat effectiveness and how they affected that particular battle.The prevalent historiography attributes Ottoman battlefield success primarily to external factors - such as the presence of German generals and staff officers; climate, weather and terrain that adversely affected allied operations; allied bumbling and amateurish operations; and inadequate allied intelligence. By contrast, Edward J. Erickson argues that the Ottoman Army was successful due to internal factors, such as its organizational architecture, a hardened cadre of experienced combat leaders, its ability to organize itself for combat, and its application of the German style of war.Ottoman Army Effectiveness in World War I will be of great interest to students of the First World War, military history and strategic studies in general.

Covering the period from 1878-1915, Ottomans and Armenians is a military history of the Ottoman army and the counterinsurgency campaigns it waged in the last days of the Ottoman empire. Although Ottomans were among the most active practitioners of counterinsurgency campaigning in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, in the vast literature available on counterinsurgency in the early twenty-first century, there is very little scholarly analysis of how Ottomans reacted to insurgency and then went about counterinsurgency. This book presents the thesis that the Ottoman government developed an evolving, 35-year, empire-wide array of counterinsurgency practices that varied in scope and execution depending on the strategic importance of the affected provinces.

Covering the period from 1878-1915, Ottomans and Armenians is a military history of the Ottoman army and the counterinsurgency campaigns it waged in the last days of the Ottoman empire. Although Ottomans were among the most active practitioners of counterinsurgency campaigning in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, in the vast literature available on counterinsurgency in the early twenty-first century, there is very little scholarly analysis of how Ottomans reacted to insurgency and then went about counterinsurgency. This book presents the thesis that the Ottoman government developed an evolving, 35-year, empire-wide array of counterinsurgency practices that varied in scope and execution depending on the strategic importance of the affected provinces.

Covering the period from 1878-1915, Ottomans and Armenians is a military history of the Ottoman army and the counterinsurgency campaigns it waged in the last days of the Ottoman empire. Although Ottomans were among the most active practitioners of counterinsurgency campaigning in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, in the vast literature available on counterinsurgency in the early twenty-first century, there is very little scholarly analysis of how Ottomans reacted to insurgency and then went about counterinsurgency. This book presents the thesis that the Ottoman government developed an evolving, 35-year, empire-wide array of counterinsurgency practices that varied in scope and execution depending on the strategic importance of the affected provinces.

The dramatic story of the turbulent birth of modern Turkey, which rose out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire to fight off Allied occupiers, Greek invaders, and internal ethnic groups to proclaim a new republic under Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk).It is exceedingly rare to run across a major historical event that has no comprehensive English-language history, but such was the case until The Turkish War of Independence brought together all the main strands of the story, including the chaotic ending of World War I in Asia Minor and the numerous military fronts on which the Turks defied odds, fighting off several armies to create their own state from the defeated ashes of the Ottoman Empire.This important book culminates Erickson's three-part series on the early 20th-century military history of the Ottomans and Turkey. Making wide use of specialized, hard-to-find Western and Turkish memoirs and military sources, it presents a narrative of the fighting, which eventually brought the Turkish Nationalist armies to victory. Often termed the "Greco-Turkish War," an incomplete description that misses its geographic and multinational scope, this war pitted Greek, Armenian, French, British, Italian, and insurgent forces against the Nationalists; the narrative shows these conflicts to have been distinct and separate to Turkey's opponents, while the Turkish side saw them as an interconnected whole.

Mustafa Kemal was one of the 20th century’s greatest combat commanders.Born in Salonika to a middle-class family, this book follows the life of a great commander who served in the Italo–Turkish War of 1911–12 and the Balkan Wars of 1912–13 before taking command of the 19th Division based in Gallipoli during World War l. His sterling service led to his promotion to corps command during the fighting against the Russians in the Caucasus.Following the end of the war he took command of the nationalist forces struggling against the occupation of Turkey, and managed to defeat Greek forces that sought to occupy Smyrna, thus preserving Turkey’s territorial integrity. Labelled as the ‘Man of Destiny’ by Winston Churchill, his services in Gallipoli and the War of Independence were pivotal to the success of his armies.After leading the nationalist army to victory, he established the modern Turkish Republic and became Turkey’s first ever president taking the name Atatürk, meaning Father of the Turks, as his own.

The Ottoman Army won a historic victory over the Allied forces at Gallipoli in 1915. This was one of the most decisive and clear-cut campaigns of the Great War. Yet the performance of the Ottomans, the victors, has often received less attention than that of the Allied army they defeated. Edward Erickson, in this perceptive study, now released in PB, concentrates on the Ottoman side of the campaign. He looks in detail at the Ottoman Army - its structure, tactics and deployment - and at the conduct of the commanders who served it so well. His pioneering work complements the extensive literature on other aspects of the Gallipoli battle, in particular those accounts that have focused on the experience of the British, Australians and New Zealanders. This highly original reassessment of the campaign will be essential reading for students of the Great War, especially the conflict in the Middle East. Endorsements 'Superb new book on the Ottoman perspective of Gallipoli. Erickson has provided extensive insights into the preparations for and execution of the defense of Gallipoli. He has drawn on multiple Turkish sources, including detailed maps...[ His] insights place the campaign into a clearer perspective, dousing many of the traditional views of the Ottoman Army that have been perpetrated in the English literature...Highly recommended.' Great War Forum 'Many modern and contemporary military analysts assert that the [Gallipoli] campaign was ill-fated from the start. In this crisply drafted monograph. Ed Erickson helps us understand why.' Stand To! 'This book is a must for every reader about Gallipoli...in order to see how the Ottoman Fifth Army fought a successful and prolonged campaign against an enemy with far greater resources.' The Gallipolian

The war in the Middle East was a struggle between the Ottoman Turks, British, French and Russians for control of the lands and peoples held by the Ottoman Empire since the 1400s. Although known as the 'Sick Man of Europe', the empire still controlled significant parts of the Middle East. Intense diplomatic pressure from Germany culminated in a decision to join the Central Powers in October 1914. Russia had long coveted Ottoman territory, and the two empires clashed in the Caucasus. The Turks suffered a major defeat at Sarakamis, and their lack of success continued into 1916. However the Russian revolutions of 1917 led to the Russian forces in the area dissipating, and the following year the new Muslim-only 'Army of Islam' was sent to claim oil-rich Baku for the Turks, ousting the British-led defenders. In Mesopotamia (modern Iraq) the Ottoman defenders were at first defeated by the British, but General Townshend's decision to stay in Kut-al-Amara resulted in his eventual surrender in April 1916, a huge blow to Allied morale. The loss prompted the despatch of a much larger British force, and the subsequent capture of Baghdad and Mosul by the war's end. The persistent Ottoman threat to the Suez Canal led to the British offensive in Palestine. The capture of Jerusalem by General Allenby in 1917 was a welcome Christmas present for the Allies, while his subsequent victory at Megiddo, combined with the Arab Revolt inspired by Lawrence of Arabia, resulted in the capture of Damascus. However the defining struggle in this theatre was Gallipoli, the first time in over 200 years that Ottoman forces stood toe-to-toe with European troops and prevailed. The Gallipoli campaign had a profound effect not only on the Turks, but on the British, Australian and New Zealand troops who fought there, and marked the beginning of the end of European military supremacy in the region. With the aid of over 300 photographs, complemented by full-colour maps, Gallipoli and the Middle East provides a detailed guide to the background and conduct of World War I in all the theatres in which Ottoman forces were engaged.