Kirjahaku

This major study provides the first comprehensive assessment of an important European institution, the Stadholderate of the Dutch Republic. Professor Rowen looks at the career of each Prince of Orange in turn, from William I (‘The Silent‘), to the last and saddest, William V, examining their roles as Stadholder and interweaving their personal lives and characters with the development of the institution. Without engaging in psycho-history, Rowen treats the individual personality of each Stadholder as a significant factor, and shows how the Stadholderate contributed to a distinctive political and constitutional coloration that rendered the United Provinces unique in Europe. The work assesses the contribution of the Stadholderate to the rise and subsequent fall of the Dutch Republic as one of the great powers of early modern Europe, and analyses each prince within his contemporary context, avoiding the highly present-minded approach of many of the Republic’s subsequent historians. The Princes of Orange is thus neither a work of hagiography, glorifying the Dutch royal house, nor a piece of destructive iconoclasm, but an authoritative account of a most unusual political, dynastic and diplomatic institution.

If the combination of superb political skills and a powerful intelligence were enough to make a ‘philosopher-king’ such as Plato dreamed of, the Dutch ‘Grand Pensionary’ John de Witt (1625–72) would fit the prescription as well as any statesman in history. Manoeuvring among the powers of Europe in the period of France’s growing ascendancy, and facing the bitter commercial and political rivalry of the English, he managed to preserve the eminent position the United Provinces had reached when Spain recognized their independence at Munster in 1648. Not until the kings of France and England combined against the Republic in 1672 did De Witt’s political system, called the ‘True Freedom’ and consisting of the maximum autonomy of the provinces and the exclusion of Prince William III of Orange from high office, collapse during the French invasion, an event accompanied by the horrific assassination of De Witt and his brother Cornelius.

The scope of this study is narrow-the activities of a single ambas­ sador for little more than two years. The problem it treats is wide and universal-the origins of a great war. There can be no adequate history of the relations between states whieh does not take into account the knowledge, judgment and deci­ sions of individual statesmen. Diplomatie history, though only a part, is a necessary part of the history of international relations. Within a more or less c10sely circumscribed range of possibilities, men in power choose between alternative policies, with results they may or may not have anticipated. The historian therefore can and should describe the past, present and future, as it were, of the historical persons whom he studies: the past whieh provides them with oppor­ tunities and limitations, both objective and subjective; the present in whieh they act; the future in whieh the consequences of their actions appear, for the most part beyond their control. This is a study of the part played by a great diplomat-the perfect ambassador, his own age called hirn-in the formation of policy. My task has been a dual one. First, I have observed Arnauld de Pomponne at work. Second, I have attempted to evaluate the French plans for war against the Dutch republic, with particular attention to Pom­ ponne's contribution to them.