Kirjahaku

In this volume, distinguished neurologist Jason W. Brown extends the microgenetic theory of the mind by offering a new approach to the problem of time and free will. Brown bases his work on a unitary process model of brain and behavior. He examines the problem of subjective time and free will, the experiential present, the nature of intentionality, and the creative properties of physical growth and mental process.

This book is an account of the psychology of romantic love in the context of a theory of emotions. The account develops out of studies in brain psychology and the extension to topics in process-philosophy, such as the nature of value and belief, and the central role of feeling in mental process. The approach is subjectivist, that is, from the internal standpoint, and in this respect it differs greatly from the externalist and objectivist trends in modern cognitive science and empiricist philosophy. Love is the ultimate in value, so that a theory of love is also a theory of the nature of value and its relation to feeling, belief, and to drive and desire. The role of intention, reason, and appraisal is critiqued. The relation to other feelings, such as jealousy, envy, anger, loss and grief is discussed in terms of a general theory of emotion and the basis in a process account of the mind/brain state.

This detailed look at the development of microgenetic theory provides a comprehensive and coherent model of cognitive processing in the brain, based on patterns of breakdown in pathology. In so doing, it illustrates the clinical record that supports and documents microgenetic theory, and presents a basis for future work in the study of the brain. Coverage includes topics in language and dominance, the function of the right hemisphere, action, perception, memory, and the concept of time.

First Published in 1988. The reader is invited to explore this collection of early German papers and not to analyze the work through a comparison with the present but to approach it with a relaxation of bias that extends a new hearing to old ideas. The reader may be surprised to see how little has changed in the association or callosal theory of apraxia since this review by Liepmann. Of interest is the care with which Liepmann studied his patients and the ingenious anatomical accounts.

This detailed look at the development of microgenetic theory provides a comprehensive and coherent model of cognitive processing in the brain, based on patterns of breakdown in pathology. In so doing, it illustrates the clinical record that supports and documents microgenetic theory, and presents a basis for future work in the study of the brain. Coverage includes topics in language and dominance, the function of the right hemisphere, action, perception, memory, and the concept of time.

This book asks where ideas, objects and feelings come from and how they arise via an exploration of the nature of subjective experience and its relation to the world. Seeking an explanation for the experience of subjective duration and the present and in contrast to the conception of mental events as non-temporal logical solids, it explores a diachronic processual theory founded on psychological data and clinical observation that provides an explanatory “system” of thought adequate to the phenomena it is called on to explain. The author focuses on the intra-psychic sources and nature of subjective experience, with the intent of examining a variety of phenomena from the standpoint of microgenetic theory. The chapters deal with the origins of human subjectivity and the epochal nature of time and duration, change and the relevance of a theory of the mental state to dream and the waking present. Based on speculative psychology that flows from case studies in neuropsychology and concepts in process philosophy, it advances a theory of mind and brain that brings together previous, fragmentary research studies on this topic.

First Published in 1988. The reader is invited to explore this collection of early German papers and not to analyze the work through a comparison with the present but to approach it with a relaxation of bias that extends a new hearing to old ideas. The reader may be surprised to see how little has changed in the association or callosal theory of apraxia since this review by Liepmann. Of interest is the care with which Liepmann studied his patients and the ingenious anatomical accounts.

In this volume, distinguished neurologist Jason W. Brown extends the microgenetic theory of the mind by offering a new approach to the problem of time and free will. Brown bases his work on a unitary process model of brain and behavior. He examines the problem of subjective time and free will, the experiential present, the nature of intentionality, and the creative properties of physical growth and mental process.

Every step forward, in life and in thought, is a return to a beginning in that it empties that much more the plan by which the journey is directed. The journey that began this work was with the recondite lore of aphasia. This early work led to a psychology of language, perception, action, and feeling based on the principle of microgenesis. This psychology and its corre­ sponding brain process are detailed in my book, Life of the Mind, a vade mecum for the ideas that are developed further in this work. Now this psychology, a single thought exposed at progressively deeper levels, is extended to the problems of time awareness, consciousness and the nature of the self. It is astonishing, is it not, that an aphasic error, a slip of the tongue, can be a peephole on some of the ultimate mysteries of life? Over the last few years I have had the occasion to present portions of this work at various conferences and to different audiences, and have found, to my dismay, that the theory is often difficult for many to grasp.

This book is an account of the psychology of romantic love in the context of a theory of emotions. The account develops out of studies in brain psychology and the extension to topics in process-philosophy, such as the nature of value and belief, and the central role of feeling in mental process. The approach is subjectivist, that is, from the internal standpoint, and in this respect it differs greatly from the externalist and objectivist trends in modern cognitive science and empiricist philosophy. Love is the ultimate in value, so that a theory of love is also a theory of the nature of value and its relation to feeling, belief, and to drive and desire. The role of intention, reason, and appraisal is critiqued. The relation to other feelings, such as jealousy, envy, anger, loss and grief is discussed in terms of a general theory of emotion and the basis in a process account of the mind/brain state.

The chapters in this volume attempt to establish some foundational principles of a theory of the mind/brain grounded in evolutionary and process theory. From this standpoint, the book discusses some main problems in philosophical psychology, including the nature and origins of the mind/brain state, experience and consciousness, feeling, subjective time and free will. The approach — that of microgenesis — holds that formative phases in the generation of the mental state are the primary focus of explanation, not the assumed properties of logical solids. For microgenesis, the process leading to a conscious end point is, together with the final content, part of an epochal state, the outcome of which, an act, object or word, incorporates earlier segments of that series, such as value, meaning and belief.

Many are fascinated by the phenomenon of genius and search for an understanding of its nature. Modern research is not especially helpful in elucidating the inner process or its relation to ordinary thought. The present work comes from clinical studies of focal brain injuries that dissect unconscious cognition to reveal sub-surface lines of processing. The outcome is a process (microgenetic) theory of the mental state that differs markedly from mainstream (cognitive) psychology, but with the potential to clarify many features of thought and imagery, normal and exceptional. Creativity is not an isolated problem but touches many central issues in philosophical psychology.

The thesis advanced in this book is that feeling and cognition actualize through a process that originates in older brain formations and develops outward through limbic and cortical fields through the self-concept and private space into (as) the world. An iteration of this transition deposits acts, objects, feelings and utterances. Value is a mode of conceptual feeling that depends on the dominant phase in this transition: from desire through interest to object worth. Among the topics covered are subjective time and change, the epochal nature of objects and their temporal extensibility and the evolution of value from inorganic matter into organic form. The theory of microgenesis informs this work. According to this theory, acts and objects evolve in milliseconds through phases that replicate patterns in forebrain evolution. The progression in the actualization of the mind/brain state is from archaic to recent in brain formation, from unity to diversity, from past to present and from mind to world. An account is given of the diversity of felt experience avoiding the reductionist moves characteristic of biological materialism and the inherent dualism of psychoanalytic and related theories. This book is intended for any reader interested in the psychology of the inner life and philosophy of mind, including philosophers, psychologists, psychiatrists and others with an interest in problems of value and moral feeling.

Diese hochst eigenstandige Arbeit erweitert Browns mikrogenetische Theorie auf Probleme des Gedachtnisses in Relation zum Zustand des Geistes/Gehirns und die subjektive Zeit, auf das Handeln als Umsetzung des Triebes und auf die Handlungsfahigkeit, sowie die intrinsische Basis des Gefuhls. Wahrend die Beitrage in dieser finalen Sammlung die ausserste Reichweite der Theorie und vorerst ihre konzeptionelle Grenze darstellen, durfte die Ausrichtung einer qualitativen Neuropsychologie auf einige Hauptprinzipien der Prozessphilosophie zu aufschlussreicheren Uberlegungen in beiden Denkrichtungen fuhren.