Kirjahaku

"Anyone interested in 'good government' should read Jerry Mashaw's new book on how the social Security Administration implements congressionally mandated policy for controlled consistent distribution of disability benefits. . . . He offers an important perspective on bureaucracy that must be considered when devising procedures for not only disability determinations but also other forms of administrative adjudication."—Linda A. O'Hare, American Bar Association Journal"A major contribution to the ongoing debate about administrative law and mass justice."—Lance Liebman and Richard B. Stewart, Harvard Law Review"Profound implications for the future of democratic government. . . . Practical, analytical policymaking for a complex decision system of great significance to many Americans."—Paul R. Verkuil, Yale Law Journal"An exceptionally valuable book for anyone who is concerned about the role of law in the administrative state. Mashaw manages to range broadly without becoming superficial, and to present a coherent and challenging theory in lively, readable prose. Bureaucratic Justice seems certain to become a standard reference work for administrative lawyers, and for anyone else who seeks the elusive goal of developing more humane and more effective public bureaucracies."—Barry Boyer, Michigan Law Review"Strongly recommended for use in graduate seminars in public policy or law. . . . If we are to develop a positive model of bureaucratic competence, we must answer the insightful questions rased in this cogent book."—David L. Martin, American Political Science Review"Mashaw provides an excellent analysis of middle range processes of decision making."—Gerald Turkel, Qualitative Sociology"Stimulating and provocative and . . . makes a contribution to the ongoing dialogue about due process in public administration.... It is tightly organized, cogently argued, and full of pithy historical illustrations. . . . One of the best such works in many years." —Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science"A thoughtful, challenging, and very useful book."—Choice"Inspires a new direction in administrative law scholarship."—A.I. Ogus, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies

Public choice theory should be taken seriously—but not too seriously. In this thought-provoking book, Jerry Mashaw stakes out a middle ground between those who champion public choice theory (the application of the conventional methodology of economics to political science matters, also known as rational choice theory) and those who disparage it. He argues that in many cases public choice theory's reach has exceeded its grasp. In others, public choice insights have not been pursued far enough by those who are concerned with the operation and improvement of legal institutions. While Mashaw addresses perennial questions of constitutional law, legislative interpretation, administrative law, and the design of public institutions, he arrives at innovative conclusions. Countering the positions of key public choice theorists, Mashaw finds public choice approaches virtually useless as an aid to the interpretation of statutes, and he finds public choice arguments against delegating political decisions to administrators incoherent. But, using the tools of public choice analysts, he reverses the lawyers' conventional wisdom by arguing that substantive rationality review is not only legitimate but a lesser invasion of legislative prerogatives than much judicial interpretation of statutes. And, criticizing three decades of "law reform," Mashaw contends that pre-enforcement judicial review of agency rules has seriously undermined both governmental capacity and the rule of law.

This groundbreaking book is the first to look at administration and administrative law in the earliest days of the American republic. Jerry Mashaw demonstrates that from the very beginning Congress delegated vast discretion to administrative officials and armed them with extrajudicial adjudicatory, rulemaking, and enforcement authority. The legislative and administrative practices of the U.S. Constitution’s first century created an administrative constitution hardly hinted at in its formal text. This book, in the author’s words, will "demonstrate that there has been no precipitous fall from a historical position of separation-of-powers grace to a position of compromise; there is not a new administrative constitution whose legitimacy should be understood as not only contestable but deeply problematic."

Reasoned Administration and Democratic Legitimacy: How Administrative Law Supports Democratic Government explores the fundamental bases for the legitimacy of the modern administrative state. While some have argued that modern administrative states are a threat to liberty and at war with democratic governance, Jerry L. Mashaw demonstrates that in fact reasoned administration is more respectful of rights and equal citizenship and truer to democratic values than lawmaking by either courts or legislatures. His account features the law's demand for reason giving and reasonableness as the crucial criterion for the legality of administrative action. In an argument combining history, sociology, political theory and law, this book demonstrates how administrative law's demand for reasoned administration structures administrative decision-making, empowers actors within and outside the government, and supports a complex vision of democratic self-rule.

Reasoned Administration and Democratic Legitimacy: How Administrative Law Supports Democratic Government explores the fundamental bases for the legitimacy of the modern administrative state. While some have argued that modern administrative states are a threat to liberty and at war with democratic governance, Jerry L. Mashaw demonstrates that in fact reasoned administration is more respectful of rights and equal citizenship and truer to democratic values than lawmaking by either courts or legislatures. His account features the law's demand for reason giving and reasonableness as the crucial criterion for the legality of administrative action. In an argument combining history, sociology, political theory and law, this book demonstrates how administrative law's demand for reasoned administration structures administrative decision-making, empowers actors within and outside the government, and supports a complex vision of democratic self-rule.