Kirjahaku

An inside account of the U.S. military operation to restore Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power in 1994, this study demonstrates progress made in joint warfighting in the period following the end of the Cold War, including improvements in command and control, joint force integration, and techniques for successful humanitarian operations.^L With ties to Haiti that date back over one hundred years, the United States could not stand by as a coup ousted Aristide in 1990. When the coup leaders refused to leave peacefully, forces authorized by the U.N. Security Council deployed toward Haiti. Diplomatic efforts by former President Carter, General Powell, and Senator Nunn eventually obtained the cooperation of coup leaders in the final hour, and on September 19, 1994, the first of over 50,000 U.S. military personnel arrived to ensure security, facilitate Aristide's return, and professionalize the Haitian security forces.^L General Henry Shelton, later the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, commanded the joint task force that entered Haiti under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter during one of the few recent instances of U.N. intervention without the concurrence of the host nation. While the operation was unique, its innovations will benefit planners for decades as humanitarian actions around the world continue to be important. This book illustrates the challenges of remaining engaged in support of the United Nations and of conducting modern military operations, which are highly dependent on close interagency and multinational coordination.

The vicious urban battle for the insurgent-controlled city of Fallujah in November 2004 was a turning point in the ongoing counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq. It demonstrated the resolve of the Iraqi government to fight terrorists domestically, using both multinational and Iraqi forces, and its results included a returning population willing to vote in national elections held in January 2005. Ballard tells the story of the Fallujah campaign, beginning with the horrific deaths of the American Blackwater contractors in March 2004, and continuing through the battle, the painstaking reconstruction of the city, and the precedent-setting elections that followed. Based on first-person accounts, interviews, and official documents, this book gives readers rare insight into the significant actions and innovative techniques of the year-long fight for the city.Opening with a historical overview of the initial crisis in Fallujah and the similar coalition battle in Najaf, the book includes a detailed account of the planning and execution of the operation to retake the city. Finally, it describes the political and military lessons proven in Fallujah, including coalition force integration, information operations, urban combat techniques, interagency coordination and innovative reconstruction procedures. This is the story of real combat in Iraq—told in a way every American should understand.

The long government service of Francois Boissy d'Anglas from 1789 to 1826 is unique, and his abundant writing provides a new look at the great drama of the French Revolution era. A moderate politician who served during the Revolution, the Empire, and the Restoration, Boissy d'Anglas's political views remained consistent during several critical periods when the fate of France was at stake. His political philosophy, based firmly on religious tolerance, freedom of expression, strong constitutional government and equality before the law, made it possible for him to weather the revolutionary storm and retain positions of influence in each of the regimes during the period. This book sheds new light on the role of moderates in the French Revolution and illuminates the changing political currents of the Revolution from Boissy's moderate perspective.A political moderate during a period of extremes, Boissy served for so long because he was committed to ideals, rather than to groups. Yet, during several periods in his career, Boissy also placed himself in danger by acting on his ideals. He held political beliefs that were both appropriate to his time and effective in application. He made many enemies, but the greatest testament to Boissy's life was the constant call of the French people for him to serve.

Based on first-person accounts, interviews, declassified documents, and secondary background sources, this book gives readers insight into the significant actions and innovative techniques of the struggle for East Timorese independence from 1999 to 2006. The book begins with a two-chapter historical overview of the circumstances that caused the United Nations to intervene in East Timor in 1999, and then continues with a detailed account of the referendum on independence and the military operations required to restore order after the Timorese people decided upon freedom from Indonesia. In the final three chapters, Ballard describes the actions taken to support the first national elections, the writing of a constitution, and the formation of a new national government in East Timor. The final chapter compares UN operations in East Timor to previous operations in Somalia, Eastern Europe and Haiti, and outlines key lessons for the future, including the critical importance of economic development and good governance in fledgling states

From Kabul to Baghdad and Back provides insight into the key strategic decisions of the Afghan and Iraq campaigns as the United States attempted to wage both simultaneously against al-Qaeda and its supporting affiliates. It also evaluates the strategic execution of those military campaigns to identify how well the two operations were conducted in light of their political objectives. The book identifies the elements that made the 2001 military operation to oust the Taliban successful, then with combat operations in Iraq as a standard of comparison, the authors analyse the remainder of the Afghan campaign and the essential problems that plagued that effort, from the decision to go to war with Iraq in 2002, through the ill-fated transition to NATO lead in Afghanistan in 2006, the dismissal of Generals McKiernan and McChrystal, the eventual decision by President Obama to make the Afghan campaign the main effort in the war on extremism, and the final development of drawdown plans following the end of the war in Iraq. No other book successfully compares and contrasts the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan from a national strategic perspective, analysing the impact of fighting the Iraq War on the success of the United States campaign in Afghanistan. It is also the first book to specifically question several key operational decisions in Afghanistan including: the decision to give NATO the lead in Afghanistan, the decisions to fire Generals McKiernan and McChrystal and the decision to conduct an Iraq War-style surge in Afghanistan. It also compares the Afghan campaigns fought by the Soviet Union and the United States, the counterinsurgency campaigns styles in Iraq and Afghanistan and the leadership of senior American officials in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In the final chapter, the key lessons of the two campaigns are outlined, including the importance of effective strategic decision-making, the utility of population focused counterinsurgency practices, the challenges of building partner capacity during combat, and the mindset required to prosecute modern war.