Kirjahaku

Animals obviously cannot have a right of free speech or a right to vote because they lack the relevant capacities. But their right to life and to be free of exploitation is no less fundamental than the corresponding right of humans, writes Julian H. Franklin. This theoretically rigorous book will reassure the committed, help the uncertain to decide, and arm the polemicist. Franklin examines all the major arguments for animal rights proposed to date and extends the philosophy in new directions. Animal Rights and Moral Philosophy begins by considering the utilitarian argument of equal respect for animals advocated by Peter Singer and, even more favorably, the rights approach that has been advanced by Tom Regan. Despite their merits, both are found wanting as theoretical foundations for animal rights. Franklin also examines the ecofeminist argument for an ethics of care and several rationalist arguments before concluding that Kant's categorical imperative can be expanded to form a basis for an ethical system that includes all sentient beings. Franklin also discusses compassion as applied to animals, encompassing Albert Schweitzer's ethics of reverence for life. He concludes his analysis by considering conflicts of rights between animals and humans.

Animals obviously cannot have a right of free speech or a right to vote because they lack the relevant capacities. But their right to life and to be free of exploitation is no less fundamental than the corresponding right of humans, writes Julian H. Franklin. This theoretically rigorous book will reassure the committed, help the uncertain to decide, and arm the polemicist. Franklin examines all the major arguments for animal rights proposed to date and extends the philosophy in new directions. Animal Rights and Moral Philosophy begins by considering the utilitarian argument of equal respect for animals advocated by Peter Singer and, even more favorably, the rights approach that has been advanced by Tom Regan. Despite their merits, both are found wanting as theoretical foundations for animal rights. Franklin also examines the ecofeminist argument for an ethics of care and several rationalist arguments before concluding that Kant's categorical imperative can be expanded to form a basis for an ethical system that includes all sentient beings. Franklin also discusses compassion as applied to animals, encompassing Albert Schweitzer's ethics of reverence for life. He concludes his analysis by considering conflicts of rights between animals and humans.

The St Bartholomew's Day Massacre of 1572 polarised French constitutional ideas. Appearing on one side was a radicalised version of the French constitution. On the other side was the theory of royal absolutism systematically developed by Bodin. The central thesis of this book is that Bodin's absolutism was as unprecedented as the doctrine it opposed. Prior to the 1570s the mainstream of the French tradition had been tentatively constitutionalist and Bodin himself had given strong expression to that tendency in his Methodus of 1566. His earlier theory of sovereignty, elaborated in that work, was implicitly adapted to a notion of limited supremacy. Professor Franklin's aim is to explain how this absolutist view was formed. In doing so, he has clarified many of the notorious obscurities in Bodin's thought and since much of the absolutist doctrine of the seventeenth century was either based on Bodin's theory or relied on similar assumptions, this study will be of great importance and interest to scholars of a later period.

This volume is a sequel to the author's earlier work on the development of European theories of sovereignity and constitutionalism. Professor Franklin here explains a major innovation associated with the English Civil Wars. It was only now, he shows, that there finally emerged a theory of sovereignity and resistance that was fully compatible with a mixed constitution. The new conception of resistance in a mixed constitution was to enter the main tradition via Locke, who stood alone among major writers of the 1680s in holding that the effect of tyranny by any constituted power, even by the King alone, was entire dissolution of the government and the reversion of power to the general community. When this familiar position is read against the background of preceding constitutionalist theory, the Second Treatise reveals a new dimension of novelty and historical significance.