Kirjahaku

Our words and ideas refer to objects and properties in the external world; this phenomenon is central to thought, language, communication, and science. But great works of fiction are full of names that don't seem to refer to anything! In this book Kenneth A. Taylor explores the myriad of problems that surround the phenomenon of reference. How can words in language and perturbations in our brains come to stand for external objects? Reference is essential to truth, but which is more basic: reference or truth? How can fictional characters play such an important role in imagination and literature, and how does this use of language connect with more mundane uses? Taylor develops a framework for understanding reference, and the theories that other thinkers-past and present-have developed about it. But Taylor doesn't simply tell us what others thought; the book is full of new ideas and analyses, making for a vital final contribution from a seminal philosopher.

Meaning Diminished examines the complex relationship between semantic analysis and metaphysical inquiry. Kenneth A. Taylor argues that we should expect linguistic and conceptual analysis of natural language to yield far less metaphysical insight into what there is - and the nature of what there is - than many philosophers have imagined. Taking a strong stand against the so-called linguistic turn in philosophy, Taylor contends that philosophers as diverse as Kant, with his Transcendental Idealism, Frege, with his aspirational Platonism, Carnap with his distinction between internal and external questions, and Strawson, with his descriptive metaphysics, have placed too much confidence in the ability of linguistic and conceptual analysis to achieve deep insight into matters of ultimate metaphysics. He urges philosophers who seek such insight to turn away from the interrogation of language and concepts and back to the more direct interrogation of reality itself. In doing so, he maps out the way forward toward a metaphysically modest semantics, in which semantics carries less weighty metaphysical burdens, and toward a revisionary and naturalistic metaphysics, untethered to the a priori analysis of ordinary language.

Referentialism has underappreciated consequences for our misunderstanding of the ways in which mind, language and world relate to one another. In exploring these consequences, this book defends a version of referentialism about names, demonstratives and indexicals, in a manner appropriate for scholars and students in philosophy or the cognitive sciences. To demonstrate his view, Kenneth A. Taylor offers original and provocative accounts of a wide variety of semantic, pragmatic and psychological phenomena, such as empty names, proportional attitude contexts, the nature of concepts, and the ultimate source and nature of normativity.

Referentialism has underappreciated consequences for our misunderstanding of the ways in which mind, language and world relate to one another. In exploring these consequences, this book defends a version of referentialism about names, demonstratives and indexicals, in a manner appropriate for scholars and students in philosophy or the cognitive sciences. To demonstrate his view, Kenneth A. Taylor offers original and provocative accounts of a wide variety of semantic, pragmatic and psychological phenomena, such as empty names, proportional attitude contexts, the nature of concepts, and the ultimate source and nature of normativity.