Kirjahaku

During the 2008 election season, the Democratic and Republican presidential candidates both aspired to be understood as foreign policy "realists" in the mold of Henry Kissinger. Kissinger, who is distrusted on the neoconservative right for his skepticism about American exceptionalism and on the liberal left for his amoral, realpolitik approach, once again stood as the sage of foreign relations and the wise man who rises above partisan politics. In The Eccentric Realist, Mario Del Pero questions this depiction of Kissinger. Lauded as the foreign policy realist par excellence, Kissinger, as Del Pero shows, has been far more ideological and inconsistent in his policy formulations than is commonly realized. Del Pero considers the rise and fall of Kissinger's foreign policy doctrine over the course of the 1970s—beginning with his role as National Security Advisor to Nixon and ending with the collapse of détente with the Soviet Union after Kissinger left the scene as Ford's outgoing Secretary of State. Del Pero shows that realism then (not unlike realism now) was as much a response to domestic politics as it was a cold, hard assessment of the facts of international relations. In the early 1970s, Americans were weary of ideological forays abroad; Kissinger provided them with a doctrine that translated that political weariness into foreign policy. Del Pero argues that Kissinger was keenly aware that realism could win elections and generate consensus. Moreover, over the course of the 1970s it became clear that realism, as practiced by Kissinger, was as rigid as the neoconservativism that came to replace it. In the end, the failure of the détente forged by the realists was not the defeat of cool reason at the hands of ideologically motivated and politically savvy neoconservatives. Rather, the force of American exceptionalism, the touchstone of the neocons, overcame Kissinger's political skills and ideological commitments. The fate of realism in the 1970s raises interesting questions regarding its prospects in the early years of the twenty-first century.

In 1948, joining the wave of post-World War II evangelical missionary activism, the small, non-denominational Church of Christ from Lubbock, Texas, decided to establish its own mission in Italy. The missionaries believed that by promoting religious freedom, they would help spread democracy and American values. But they were also motivated by fervent anti-Catholicism and a conviction that they could challenge the Vatican's near monopoly on religion in Italy. Their zeal and naivety were met with a harsh response from the Catholic Church and its allies within the Italian government. At the same time, the omnipresent Cold War soon forced all the actors involved to adapt their strategies and rhetoric to leverage the situation to their advantage. A long-overlooked story, Mario Del Pero offers a compelling lens through which to explore the early history of the Cold War and the complex dynamics between geopolitical alignments, ideological integration, and national sovereignty.