Kirjahaku

The extent to which humanitarian intervention has become a legitimate practice in post-cold war international society is the subject of this book. It maps the changing legitimacy of humanitarian intervention by comparing the international response to cases of humanitarian intervention in the cold war and post-cold war periods. Crucially, the book examines how far international society has recognised humanitarian intervention as a legitimate exception to the rules of sovereignty and non-intervention and non-use of force. While there are studies of each case of intervention - in East Pakistan, Cambodia, Uganda, Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo - there is no single work that examines them comprehensively in a comparative framework. Each chapter tells a story of intervention that weaves together a study of motives, justifications and outcomes. The legitimacy of humanitarian intervention is contested by the 'pluralist' and 'solidarist' wings of the English school, and the book charts the stamp of these conceptions on state practice. Solidarism lacks a full-blown theory of humanitarian intervention and the book supplies one. A key focus is to examine how is humanitarian intervention legitimate in present diplomatic dialogues. In exploring how far there has been a change of norm in the society of states in the 1990s, the book defends the broad based constructivist claim that state actions will be constrained if they cannot be legitimated, and that new norms enable new practices but do not determine these. The book concludes by considering how far contemporary practices of humanitarian intervention support a new solidarism, and how far this resolves the traditional conflict between order and justice in international society.

Examines the extent to which humanitarian intervention has become a legitimate practice in international society and maps the changing legitimacy of humanitarian intervention by comparing the international response to cases of humanitarian intervention in the cold war and post-cold war periods.

How can two states with enemy relations transform their relationship? Nicholas Wheeler argues that the discipline of International Relations has not done a good job of answering this question because its focus has been on the state and the individual levels of analysis. In this ground-breaking book, he argues for the importance of a new level of analysis in trust research the interpersonal relationships between state leaders. In doing so, he makes two key contributions. Firstly, developing a new theory of interpersonal trust that can be applied to the international level, and secondly, showing how this theory contributes to the literature on signalling in IR. The theory of interpersonal trust developed in the book provides a novel response to the central problem identified by signalling theory in IR: whether the receivers of signals interpret them in the way intended by their senders. The author argues that, in fact, trust between two leaders is causally prior to the accurate interpretation of the signals they send with the aim of communicating peaceful intent. Trust, therefore, does away with the problem of the ambiguity of signal interpretation. He goes on to examine exactly how a new relationship of trust emerges between two leaders who represent states with enemy relations: through face-to-face interaction and the crucial process of bonding between them that this makes possible. This powerful new theory of interpersonal trust is applied to three cases: the personal interactions between US and Soviet leaders Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in ending the Cold War; the face-to-face interactions between Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in reducing conflict between India and Pakistan in 1998-1999; and the interactions in 2009-10 between Barack Obama and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei that failed to achieve a breakthrough in US-Iran nuclear relations.