Kirjahaku

The cancellation of the CF-105 Arrow in 1959 holds such a grip on the imagination of Canadians that earlier developments in defence procurement remain in the shadows.Randall Wakelam corrects this oversight – and offers fresh insight into the AVRO saga and contemporary procurement issues – by detailing the complexities Canada's air force faced in buying fighter aircraft and by showing how the RCAF grew by leaps and bounds. Wakelam shows that cabinet members, chiefs of staff, and air marshals were forced to negotiate competing pressures to arm the air force, please allies, and save money. Their decisions resulted in the CF-100 Canuck and the F-86 Sabre, Canada's front-line defensive aircraft in the coldest years of the Cold War. Although historians assume that the Arrow arrived on the heels of these successes, Wakelam reveals that neither the air force nor the government believed AVRO could manufacture even the CF-100 on budget.

The cancellation of the CF-105 Arrow in 1959 holds such a grip on the imagination of Canadians that earlier developments in defence procurement remain in the shadows.Randall Wakelam corrects this oversight – and offers fresh insight into the AVRO saga and contemporary procurement issues – by detailing the complexities Canada's air force faced in buying fighter aircraft and by showing how the RCAF grew by leaps and bounds. Wakelam shows that cabinet members, chiefs of staff, and air marshals were forced to negotiate competing pressures to arm the air force, please allies, and save money. Their decisions resulted in the CF-100 Canuck and the F-86 Sabre, Canada's front-line defensive aircraft in the coldest years of the Cold War. Although historians assume that the Arrow arrived on the heels of these successes, Wakelam reveals that neither the air force nor the government believed AVRO could manufacture even the CF-100 on budget.

After suffering devastating losses in the early stages of the Second World War, the United Kingdom's Royal Air Force established an Operational Research Section within bomber command in order to drastically improve the efficiency of bombing missions targeting Germany. In The Science of Bombing, Randall Wakelam explores the work of civilian scientists who found critical solutions to the navigational and target-finding problems and crippling losses that initially afflicted the RAF. Drawing on previously unexamined files that re-assess the efficacy of strategic bombing from tactical and technical perspectives, Wakelam reveals the important role scientific research and advice played in operational planning and how there existed a remarkable intellectual flexibility at Bomber Command. A fascinating glimpse into military strategy and decision-making, The Science of Bombing will find a wide audience among those interested in air power history as well as military strategists, air force personnel, and aviation historians.