Kirjahaku

If the United States Army is to maintain land dominance in the future, it must think boldly and act aggressively at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The United States cannot afford to defer research, development, or fielding of new systems capable of leveraging our technological advancements. The active duty force must be the nation's global '911' force. It must be capable of rapidly projecting combat power, quickly winning a major theater conflict, and then turn this re-shaped theater over to the Army National Guard for post-conflict stability and support operations (SASO). Upon completing this transition, the active component must immediately be prepared and postured to fight another major theater conflict. The monograph suggests that the Army's National Guard must be organized, trained, and prepared to handleall domestic and international humanitarian and disaster relief operations. It must be capable of augmenting other federal agencies for anti-drug and anti-terrorist efforts. It must be capable of satisfying requirements for long-term international peacekeeping operations. Most importantly, it must execute these missions with little to no active duty support. The monograph concludes that a United States Army with these capabilities will be able to execute peace keeping and other MOOTW operations without degrading its ability to execute two nearly simultaneous (or overlapping) major theater wars as part of the joint service team. Fixing shape, respond, and prepare responsibilities allows each component of the Army to build on their traditional strengths. It allows for a smaller, capable projection force while attempting to reduce the burden of funding on the American taxpayer. The solution is clear. National Guard citizen-soldiers must take care of the home-front and shape the international security environment in order to allow the active force to focus on responding to the full spectrum of crises when called to do so. By doing this, the Army can prepare now to meet the challenges of an uncertain future. The Army's AC/RC integration program during the early 1990s was named "Bold Shift" it is time once again for the Army to make a bold shift for the future

Given ongoing conflicts and the likelihood of executing counterinsurgency in the future, it is vital to conduct effective campaign planning for counterinsurgency. Additionally, effective campaign planning is essential for rapid and effective operational and tactical adaptation. Center of gravity analysis is a tool that can be useful to support these activities. This book validated the hypothesis that there are multiple centers of gravity in counterinsurgency that vary by insurgent purpose, location, approach, and phase.Leaders and planners need to place centers of gravity in their proper context. Countering an insurgency requires understanding the operational environment, which this work often refers to as a mosaic. Fighting an insurgency or multiple insurgencies is fighting a mosaic war, and centers of gravity determine the nature of tactical areas of operation. Center of gravity analysis can help avoid the historical conceptual planning problems, such as improperly focusing on just the insurgents or just protecting the population. The population is not a center of gravity. Rather, the support of the population is often a critical requirement and a critical vulnerability. Support of the population should therefore be a strategic, operational, and tactical objective for both insurgents and counterinsurgents. There must be a balance of enemy-centric and population-centric activities that suits the current environment.