Kirjahaku

A game-theoretical analysis of interactions between a human being and an omnipotent and omniscient godlike being highlights the inherent unknowability of the latter's superiority.In Divine Games, Steven Brams analyzes games that a human being might play with an omnipotent and omniscient godlike being. Drawing on game theory and his own theory of moves, Brams combines the analysis of thorny theological questions, suggested by Pascal's wager (which considers the rewards and penalties associated with belief or nonbelief in God) and Newcomb's problem (in which a godlike being has near omniscience) with the analysis of several stories from the Hebrew Bible. Almost all of these stories involve conflict between God or a surrogate and a human player; their representation as games raises fundamental questions about God's superiority.In some games God appears vulnerable (after Adam and Eve eat the forbidden fruit in defiance of His command), in other games his actions seem morally dubious (when He subjects Abraham and Job to extreme tests of their faith), and in still other games He has a propensity to hold grudges (in preventing Moses from entering the Promised Land and in undermining the kingship of Saul). If the behavior of a superior being is indistinguishable from that of an ordinary human being, his existence would appear undecidable, or inherently unknowable. Consequently, Brams argues that keeping an open mind about the existence of a superior being is an appropriate theological stance.

This illuminating and instructive survey demonstrates both the insights and the pitfalls that result from applying game theoretic models to the analysis of problems in political science. Using real-life examples, it shows how game theory can explain and elucidate complex political situations, from warfare to presidential vetoes. 1975 edition. 24 figures.

Steven J. Brams’ Theory of Moves, though based on the classical theory of games, proposes changes in its rules to render it a truly dynamic theory. By postulating that players think ahead not just to the immediate consequences of making moves, but also to the consequences of countermoves to these moves, counter-countermoves, and so on, it extends the strategic analysis of conflicts into the more distant future. It elucidates the role that different kinds of power - moving, order and threat - may have on conflict outcomes, and it also shows how misinformation affects player choices. Applied to a series of cases drawn from politics, economics, sociology, fiction and the Bible, the theory provides not only a parsimonious explanation of their outcomes, but also shows why they unfolded as they did. This book, which assumes no prior knowledge of game theory or special mathematical background, will be of interest to scholars and students throughout the social sciences.

Voters today often desert a preferred candidate for a more viable second choice to avoid wasting their vote. Likewise, parties to a dispute often find themselves unable to agree on a fair division of contested goods. In Mathematics and Democracy, Steven Brams, a leading authority in the use of mathematics to design decision-making processes, shows how social-choice and game theory could make political and social institutions more democratic. Using mathematical analysis, he develops rigorous new procedures that enable voters to better express themselves and that allow disputants to divide goods more fairly. One of the procedures that Brams proposes is "approval voting," which allows voters to vote for as many candidates as they like or consider acceptable. There is no ranking, and the candidate with the most votes wins. The voter no longer has to consider whether a vote for a preferred but less popular candidate might be wasted. In the same vein, Brams puts forward new, more equitable procedures for resolving disputes over divisible and indivisible goods.

The Presidential Election Game may change the way you think about presidential elections and, for that matter, American politics in general. It is not filled with statistics about the voting behavior of citizens, nor does it give detailed histories of past campaigns. Rather, it is an analytic treatment of strategy in the race for the presidency, from the primaries to the general election. Using modern game theory and decision theory, Brams demonstrates why certain campaign strategies are more effective than others and supports his analysis with historical evidence.

From Simon & Schuster, Paradoxes in Politics is Steven J. Brams' introduction to the nonobvious in political science.Steven J. Brams is Professor of Politics at New York University and the author, co-author, or co-editor of 17 books and more than 250 articles. Paradoxes in Politics is his exploration of the modern political system.

The Presidential Election Game may change the way you think about presidential elections and, for that matter, American politics in general. It is not filled with statistics about the voting behavior of citizens, nor does it give detailed histories of past campaigns. Rather, it is an analytic treatment of strategy in the race for the presidency, from the primaries to the general election. Using modern game theory and decision theory, Brams demonstrates why certain campaign strategies are more effective than others and supports his analysis with historical evidence.