Astrid Kjeldgaard-Pedersen

De juridiske metoder – ti bud giver en systematisk indføring i de mange forskellige metoder, der bruges i retsvidenskaben og i den juridiske praksis. Dermed bryder bogen med idéen om, at der kun findes én juridisk metode. Med udgangspunkt i konkrete og illustrative eksempler introducerer bogen ti forskellige juridiske metoder og beskriver, hvordan de kan bruges til at studere og forstå forskellige juridiske og retsvidenskabelige problemer. Ved at tydeliggøre den gode brug af juridiske metoder vil De juridiske metoder – ti bud især være relevant og brugbar for jurastuderende, der arbejder selvstændigt med retlige og retsvidenskabelige problemstillinger. Bogen vil desuden være relevant for studerende, forskere og undervisere inden for andre fag, hvis arbejde ofte kommer i berøring med juraen. Endelig vil bogen også være relevant for praktikere, der har et ønske om at holde sig opdateret om metodiske udviklinger inden for juraen. De juridiske metoder – ti bud er skrevet af juridiske forskere og undervisere med særlig ekspertise inden for de forskellige metoder, der fremlægges og diskuteres i de enkelte kapitler.

This is the first monograph to scrutinize the relationship between the concept of international legal personality as a theoretical construct and the position of the ultimate subject, the individual, as a matter of positive international law. By testing the four main theoretical conceptions of international legal personality against historical and existing norms of positive international law that regulate the conduct of individuals, the book argues that the common narrative in contemporary scholarship about the development of the role of the individual in the international legal system is flawed. Contrary to conventional wisdom, international law did not apply to states alone until World War II, only to transform during the second half of the 20th century so as to include individuals as its subjects. Rather, the answer to the question of individual rights and obligations under international law is - and always was - strictly empirical. It follows, of course, that the entities governed by a particular norm tell us nothing about the legal system to which that norm belongs. Instead, the distinction between international law and national law turns exclusively on whether the source of the norm in question is international or national in kind. Against the background of these insights, the book shows how present-day international lawyers continue to allow an idea, which was never more than a scholarly invention of the 19th century, to influence the interpretation and application of international law. This state of affairs has significant real-world ramifications as international legal rights and obligations of individuals (and other non-state entities) are frequently applied more restrictively than interpretation without presumptions regarding 'personality' would merit.