Berthold Rittberger

Who is held responsible when EU policies fail? Which blame games resonate in the European public? European Blame Games challenges the conventional wisdom that the complexity of EU decision-making eschews clarity of responsibility, thereby rendering European blame games untargeted and diffuse. The book argues that the politicization of EU policies triggers a plausibility assessment of blame attributions in the public domain with the effect that European blame games gravitate towards true responsibilities, targeting those political actors involved in enacting a policy that is subsequently considered a policy failure. It distinguishes three kinds of European blame games. In scapegoat games, supranational EU institutions are held responsible for a policy failure. Renegade games occur when individual member state governments are considered the culprits for a failed policy. When responsibility for a policy failure is shared between EU institutions and member states, diffusion games prevail. The book also explores three conditions to explain when each of the three European blame games prevails: the type of policy failure, the type of policy making, and the type of policy implementation. To empirically probe these conditions, European Blame Games studies the blame games in ten instances of EU policy failures, including EU foreign policy, environmental policy, fiscal stabilization, and migration policy. Transformations in Governance is a major academic book series from Oxford University Press. It is designed to accommodate the impressive growth of research in comparative politics, international relations, public policy, federalism, and environmental and urban studies concerned with the dispersion of authority from central states to supranational institutions, subnational governments, and public-private networks. It brings together work that advances our understanding of the organization, causes, and consequences of multilevel and complex governance. The series is selective, containing annually a small number of books of exceptionally high quality by leading and emerging scholars. The series is edited by Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks of the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, and Walter Mattli of the University of Oxford. This is an open access title available under the terms of a [CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International] licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations.

Far from displaying a uniform pattern, European integration varies significantly across policy areas and individual countries. Why do some member states choose to opt out of specific EU policies? Why are some policies deeply integrated whereas others remain intergovernmental? In this updated second edition, the authors introduce the most important theoretical approaches to European integration and apply these to the trajectories of key EU policy areas. Arguing that no single theory offers a completely convincing explanation of integration and differentiation in the EU, this thought-provoking book provides a new synthesis of integration theory and an original way of thinking about what the EU is and how it works.

Far from displaying a uniform pattern of integration, the European Union varies significantly across policy areas, institutional development and individual countries. Why do some policies such as the Single Market attract non-EU member states, while some member states choose to opt out of other EU policies? In answering these questions, this innovative new text provides a state-of-the-art introduction to the study of European integration. The authors introduce the most important theories of European integration and apply these to the trajectories of key EU policy areas – including the single market, monetary policy, foreign and security policy, and justice and home affairs. Arguing that no single theory offers a completely convincing explanation of integration and differentiation in the EU, the authors put forward a new analytical perspective for describing and explaining the institutions and policies of the EU and their development over time. Written by a team of prominent scholars in the field, this thought-provoking book provides a new synthesis of integration theory and an original way of thinking about what the EU is and how it works.

Why have the national governments of EU member states successively endowed the European Parliament with supervisory, budgetary, and legislative powers over the past fifty years? Building Europe's Parliament sheds new light on this pivotal issue, and provides a major contribution to the study of the European Parliament. Rittberger develops a theory of delegation to representative institutions in international politics which combines elements of democratic theory and different strands of institutionalist theory. To test the plausibility of his theory, Rittberger draws on extensive archival material and offers theory-guided, in-depth case studies of three landmark decisions in the history of the European Parliament: the creation of the Common Assembly of the ECSC in 1951 and the concomitant acquisition of supervisory powers vis-à-vis the quasi-executive High Authority; the delegation of budgetary powers following the signing of the Treaty of Luxembourg in 1970; and the delegation of legislative powers resulting from the adoption of the Single European Act signed in 1986. This is followed by the charting of more recent key developments, culminating in the adoption of the Constitutional Treaty in 2004. The book provides a welcome addition to the literature on institutional design by reflecting on the conditions under which governments opt for the creation and empowerment of parliamentary institutions in international politics. It also makes a valuable contribution to the application of democratic theory to the study of the European Union by demonstrating that political elites shared the view that the new supranational polity which emerged from the debris of World War II suffered from 'democratic deficit' since its inception, thus disproving the claim that the lamented 'democratic deficit' is a recent phenomenon.

Why have the national governments of EU member states successively endowed the European Parliament with supervisory, budgetary, and legislative powers over the past fifty years? Building Europe's Parliament sheds new light on this pivotal issue, and provides a major contribution to the study of the European Parliament. Rittberger develops a theory of delegation to representative institutions in international politics which combines elements of democratic theory and different strands of institutionalist theory. To test the plausibility of his theory, Rittberger draws on extensive archival material and offers theory-guided, in-depth case studies of three landmark decisions in the history of the European Parliament: the creation of the Common Assembly of the ECSC in 1951 and the concomitant acquisition of supervisory powers vis-à-vis the quasi-executive High Authority; the delegation of budgetary powers following the signing of the Treaty of Luxembourg in 1970; and the delegation of legislative powers resulting from the adoption of the Single European Act signed in 1986. This is followed by the charting of more recent key developments, culminating in the adoption of the Constitutional Treaty in 2004. The book provides a welcome addition to the literature on institutional design by reflecting on the conditions under which governments opt for the creation and empowerment of parliamentary institutions in international politics. It also makes a valuable contribution to the application of democratic theory to the study of the European Union by demonstrating that political elites shared the view that the new supranational polity which emerged from the debris of World War II suffered from 'democratic deficit' since its inception, thus disproving the claim that the lamented 'democratic deficit' is a recent phenomenon. Winner of the European Union Studies Association Prize for Best Dissertation 2002-2004