Bruce I. Oppenheimer

In this book, Bruce I. Oppenheimer and the late Robert L. Peabody analyze the 1976 House majority leader race and present the result of their unrivaled insider access to this turning point in congressional history. This fierce contest among the Democratic leadership marked the transition of the House of Representatives into the party-dominated institution that is so familiar today.The 1976 election, in which the Democrats consolidated the gains made in 1974, led to two important changes in House Democratic leadership. After Carl Albert’s retirement, Majority Leader Thomas “Tip” O’Neill, Jr., of Massachusetts advanced unopposed to the Speakership. This led to a contest between four formidable candidates for the position of majority leader: Rules Committee Spokesman Richard Bolling of Missouri, Caucus Chairman Phillip Burton of California, Majority Whip John McFall of California, and Representative James C. Wright, Jr., of Texas. It was arguably the most competitive contest for a major leadership position in congressional history. Ultimately, it took extensive campaigning and three ballots before Wright emerged victorious.During the race, Oppenheimer and Peabody conducted lengthy interviews with the candidates and their principal supporters, resulting in their eye-opening analysis of this contest as a key stepping stone between committee government and conditional party government in the House of Representatives that continues to the present day. The authors first presented their original research on the 1976 House majority leader contest at the 1977 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. With that original groundbreaking paper at its core, this book adds new chapters by Oppenheimer that evaluate the accuracy of the study and provide richer historical context, showing how congressional politics changed in the years after the 1976 contest. Their original study was the result of the greatest access that political scientists have ever had to a congressional leadership race, and it has enduring value for understanding our current political crisis.

This collection includes the most recent scholarship on the U.S. Senate. Whereas most books simply assume that research about the House of Representatives holds equally well when applied to the Senate, this volume takes as its point of departure research about the Senate itself. This gives the reader a clear understanding of the particular nature of the institution and opens the door for further, refining research. Drawing on diverse methodologies, this book's synthesizing work will be essential reading for all scholars of U.S. politics. The chapters are written by leading congressional scholars and cover topics including representation, elections, committees, party leadership, policy influence, and constitutional powers. Contributors: Alan I. Abramowitz John R. Alford David T. Canon Joseph Cooper Lawrence C. Dodd Robert S. Erikson C. Lawrence Evans Richard Fenno Jr. Gerald Gamm John R. Hibbing Kim Fridkin Kahn Patrick J. Kenney Frances D. Lee Burdett Loomis Bruce I. Oppenheimer David W. Rohde Elizabeth Rybicki Wendy J. Schiller Patrick J. Sellers Barbara Sinclair Steven Smith Charles Stewart III

We take it for granted that every state has two representatives in the United States Senate. Apply the "one person, one vote" standard, however, and the Senate is the most malapportioned legislature in the democratic world. But does it matter that California's 32 million people have the same number of Senate votes as Wyoming's 480,000? Frances Lee and Bruce Oppenheimer systematically show that the Senate's unique apportionment scheme profoundly shapes legislation and representation. The size of a state's population affects the senator-constituent relationship, fund-raising and elections, strategic behaviour within the Senate, and, ultimately, policy decisions. They also show that less populous states consistently receive more federal funding than states with more people. In sum, Lee and Oppenheimer reveal that Senate apportionment leaves no aspect of the institution untouched. This book raises questions about one of the key institutions of American government and should be of interest to anyone concerned with issues of representation.

We take it for granted that every state has two representatives in the United States Senate. Apply the "one person, one vote" standard, however, and the Senate is the most malapportioned legislature in the democratic world. But does it matter that California's 32 million people have the same number of Senate votes as Wyoming's 480,000? Frances Lee and Bruce Oppenheimer systematically show that the Senate's unique apportionment scheme profoundly shapes legislation and representation. The size of a state's population affects the senator-constituent relationship, fund-raising and elections, strategic behaviour within the Senate, and, ultimately, policy decisions. They also show that less populous states consistently receive more federal funding than states with more people. In sum, Lee and Oppenheimer reveal that Senate apportionment leaves no aspect of the institution untouched. This book raises questions about one of the key institutions of American government and should be of interest to anyone concerned with issues of representation.