C. R. Snyder

The concept of self-handicapping can be legitimately anchored in a vari­ ety of intellectual contexts, some old and some newer. As this volume reminds us, Alfred Adler was perhaps the first to articulate the signifi­ cance of various self-defeating claims and gestures for protecting the self­ concept. Thus the apparent paradox of "defeat" in the interests of "pro­ tection. " More recently (but still more than 30 years ago), Heider's "naive psychology" added attributional rhetoric to the description of self-defeat­ ing strategies. While predominantly cognitive in its thrust, the attribu­ tional approach incorporated several motivational influences-especially those involving egocentric concerns. Heider hardly violated our common sense when he suggested that people are inclined to attribute their performances in a self-serving manner: the good things I caused; the bad things were forced upon me. The notion of self-handicapping strategies, proposed by Berglas and myself a little more than a decade ago, capitalized on these homely truths while adding a particular proactive twist. We not only make ex­ cuses for our blunders; we plan our engagements and our situational choices so that self-protective excuses are unnecessary. In doing so, we use our attributional understanding to arrange things so that flawed and failing performances will not be interpreted in ways that threaten our self-esteem.

My Red Shirt and Me The red shirt incident begins with a rather ordinary red shirt. Not a brightly colored red shirt, not a dramatic cherry or firehouse red, more like a faded burgundy. But, for several days, my very iden­ tity was bound up in its redness. It was me, and I wore it with the pride a matador takes in his splendid cape, a hero in his medals of bravery, or a nun in her religious habit. I'll never forget the bound­ less joy I felt wearing that simple, pullover, short-sleeved red shirt in the hospital--or the rush of relief that I experienced when, at last, I decided to surrender it. However, we are getting ahead of our story, which starts a short time earlier with a most unfortunate accident. A light flurry of wet snow had begun to fall as the university limousine turned the corner on its way from the Bronx campus of New York University to the downtown campus. Although eight of us were packed into the car and had resigned ourselves to the usual boring faculty meeting awaiting us, somehow a spontaneous air of joviality was created.

'In the two decades since this book was first published, excuse making has flourished—both as a practice and as a process inviting investigation and theory. Indeed, how could it be otherwise?' So write the authors in their new introduction. But they also maintain that excuse making is a critical element in what social psychologists refer to as 'reality negotiation.' Originally published by John Wiley in 1983.

Why do some people lead positive, hope-filled lives, while others wallow in pessimism? In The Psychology of Hope, a professor of psychology reveals the specific character traits that produce highly hopeful individuals. He offers a test to measure one's level of optimism and gives specific advice on how to become a more hopeful person.

The authors—professional psychologists who work with children and families—believe that adults can help children build hope and combat hopelessness, and use stories that children construct about themselves to document the hope-building process. Included are two useful appendixes and a new introduction, in which the authors respond to readers’ questions and reactions to the original edition, which was published by Westview Press in 1997. From the Introduction to the Percheron Press Edition . . . '[H]ope results when an adult spends the time and effort to convey hopeful thinking to a child. Hope is a highly personal experience. The power rests in the adult who is committed to raising a child’s hope.' From the Foreword . . . 'The authors . . . have captured and conveyed the preciousness of hope in human development throughout one’s life span. Here you will encounter numerous stories that illustrate the formidable power of positive possibilities in helping people to cope with and grow from the challenges of everyday life.' Michael J. Mahoney, University of North Texas and Saybrook Graduate Research Center

Social Cognitive Psychology is the first text to provide comprehensive coverage of the field, including thorough discussions of its historical foundations cross-referenced with significant recent developments. Highlights include ;the discipline's origins in pragmatic philosophy and the need for a second social psychology; the contributions of cognition, affect, and direct perception to social knowing, and the development of positive and negative self theories in social context. This valuable reference contains comprehensive chapter summaries, lists of key terms and concepts, and graphs of processing models from various theories.

A pragmatic social cognitive psychology covers a lot of territory, mostly in personality and social psychology but also in clinical, counseling, and school psychologies. It spans a topic construed as an experimental study of mechanisms by its natural science wing and as a study of cultural interactions by its social science wing. To learn about it, one should visit laboratories, field study settings, and clinics, and one should read widely. If one adds the fourth dimen­ sion, time, one should visit the archives too. To survey such a diverse field, it is common to offer an edited book with a resulting loss in integration. This book is coauthored by a social personality psychologist with historical interests (DFB: Parts I, II, and IV) in collaboration with two social clinical psychologists (CRS and JEM: Parts III and V). We frequently cross-reference between chapters to aid integration without duplication. To achieve the kind of diversity our subject matter represents, we build each chapter anew to reflect the emphasis of its content area. Some chapters are more historical, some more theoretical, some more empirical, and some more applied. All the chapters reflect the following positions.

The concept of self-handicapping can be legitimately anchored in a vari­ ety of intellectual contexts, some old and some newer. As this volume reminds us, Alfred Adler was perhaps the first to articulate the signifi­ cance of various self-defeating claims and gestures for protecting the self­ concept. Thus the apparent paradox of "defeat" in the interests of "pro­ tection. " More recently (but still more than 30 years ago), Heider's "naive psychology" added attributional rhetoric to the description of self-defeat­ ing strategies. While predominantly cognitive in its thrust, the attribu­ tional approach incorporated several motivational influences-especially those involving egocentric concerns. Heider hardly violated our common sense when he suggested that people are inclined to attribute their performances in a self-serving manner: the good things I caused; the bad things were forced upon me. The notion of self-handicapping strategies, proposed by Berglas and myself a little more than a decade ago, capitalized on these homely truths while adding a particular proactive twist. We not only make ex­ cuses for our blunders; we plan our engagements and our situational choices so that self-protective excuses are unnecessary. In doing so, we use our attributional understanding to arrange things so that flawed and failing performances will not be interpreted in ways that threaten our self-esteem.