Clint Reach

The 2022 National Defense Strategy calls for "integrated deterrence" in how the U.S. military uses its cyberspace forces to address the strategic challenges posed by revisionist powers, such as China. The authors apply the concept of selective overmatch to reevaluate current U.S. cyber operations in light of competition and possible conflict with China and show how this framework can provide a roadmap for U.S. Cyber Command's future operations.

This report describes the 2021 U.S. Air Force-sponsored Plan Blue game, which examined competition against Russia in the Arctic with a focus on the role of sensing in competition and featured robust participation from regional partners and allies. The purpose of the game was to increase understanding of the capabilities, postures, and alliance command, control, and communication relationships that may be called for in future Arctic operations.

In this report, RAND researchers examine the reasons behind Russia's evolution toward a unified strategic operation, as well as the capabilities that would be necessary to execute key conventional offensive tasks in such an operation. They focus on four capability areas: long-range conventional strikes against critical military and civilian targets, electronic warfare, counterspace actions, and cyberattacks against critical infrastructure.

This report is part of a larger RAND Corporation study on the societal foundations of national competitiveness. The authors surveyed Chinese and Russian thinking about the qualities of nations that tend to produce competitive advantage and found that both China and Russia hold starkly different views from most U.S. and Western officials and analysts about the societal sources of competitive advantage.

RAND researchers estimated the costs Russia is incurring as a result of its invasion of Ukraine: As of September 2022, military costs reached $40 billion, full-year 2022 gross domestic product losses amounted to between $81 billion and $104 billion, and direct military spending may amount to $132 billion through 2024. However, researchers also found that Russia can afford to sustain these costs for the next several years.

Russia's manipulation of Ukraine, which culminated in the 2022 invasion, demonstrated that Russia was willing to resort to all means necessary to secure a regional sphere of influence that included Ukraine. But events could have taken a different direction. Using the concept of national identity as a starting point, RAND researchers developed a framework to illuminate the underlying causes of the Russia-Ukraine war.

Russia perceives itself as the weaker power in the confrontation with the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The authors assess the orientation of Russian military strategy from a position of overall weakness based the following factors: the balance of power, Russian diplomacy with China, views on future war, and trends in force readiness and mobilization.

Military forecasting informs long-term military planning of the Russian Ministry of Defense. In this report, the authors draw on a framework developed by the Russian military science community to examine several key indicators related to military forecasting to gain insight into the likelihood and character of future war and the correlation of military potential between Russia and potential adversaries.

This translation volume compiles texts by Russian military experts and planners and covers key factors in Russian military forecasting that inform military planning decisions on force structure and training.

Russia has long used political, military, economic, informational, and clandestine tools against countries in the Black Sea region. In this report, the authors present elements of a Western strategy to counter Russian malign influence and aggression.

The authors of this report examine the methodological and practical evolution of the concept of correlation of forces and means--the military balance between two opponents at the global, regional, and local levels--in Russian military thinking, and they explore current definitions and applications in Russia's operational and military planning in response to changes in modern warfare.

In this report, RAND researchers analyze Russian core interests and views of the international order. The authors find that Russia sees the current international order as dominated by the United States and as a threat to some of Russia's interests. For several areas, U.S. and Russian interests overlap and cooperation is feasible. In other areas, U.S. and Russian interests conflict, and this report offers options for U.S. policy going forward.