Dahlia Anne Goldfeld

This report seeks to address how the U.S. Army can most effectively project and employ land power in the Indo-Pacific, during competition and conflict, with a focus on scenarios involving China. The authors developed three concepts to guide the Army's ground force role in the theater, offering the essential architecture of basing, information, relationships, and flexible combat power needed to make the joint force effective.

Because of the widespread use of the Global Positioning System (GPS) for positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT), concerns have been expressed that a disruption of GPS might require a national investment in backup capabilities. The authors assess the costs associated with realistic threats to domestic, nonmilitary uses of GPS, and review possible additions to the PNT ecosystem in light of those costs.

This report summarizes a series of reports on how U.S. joint long-range strike could better balance operational effectiveness, force survivability, and escalation management to achieve its objectives without triggering catastrophic escalation.

In this report-part of a larger study of prospective nuclear escalation risks in a U.S.-China military conflict-the authors explore potential escalation pathways that involve U.S. long-range strike and end with Chinese nuclear first use.

Using results from a literature review; expert discussions; operational, technical, and strategic modeling; and case studies, the authors evaluate the utility the U.S. Air Force (USAF) might get from electric vertical takeoff and landing (eVTOL) aircraft, how much influence the USAF has on technical development and supply chains, and options to transition emerging commercial technology to the USAF to recommend an eVTOL strategy for the USAF.

This report is the second of a four-volume study that examines the risk of a military conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan escalating to Chinese nuclear first use, providing background and context for the broader study.

An important consideration when deciding to mitigate or accept a risk from a cyber attack to a weapon system is how it affects operational missions. To analyze mission impact, the authors propose a methodology that aims to achieve two goals: to be comprehensive enough to be executed at the scale of each of the missions in the U.S. Air Force yet simple enough to be updated as needed to guide decisions to accept or to mitigate specific risks.