Dan Egonsson

This title was first published in 28/11/2001: The broad label ’practical philosophy’ brings together such topics as ethics and metaethics as well as philosophy of law, society, art and religion. In practical philosophy, theory of value and action is basic, and woven into our understanding of all practical and ethical reasoning. New essays from leading international philosophers illustrate that substantial results in the subdisciplines of practical philosophy require insights into its core issues: the nature of actions, persons, values and reasons. This anthology is published in honour of Ingmar Persson on his fiftieth birthday.

This title was first published in 28/11/2001: The broad label ’practical philosophy’ brings together such topics as ethics and metaethics as well as philosophy of law, society, art and religion. In practical philosophy, theory of value and action is basic, and woven into our understanding of all practical and ethical reasoning. New essays from leading international philosophers illustrate that substantial results in the subdisciplines of practical philosophy require insights into its core issues: the nature of actions, persons, values and reasons. This anthology is published in honour of Ingmar Persson on his fiftieth birthday.

Is it important to our quality of life that the preferences we satisfy are rational and well-informed? Standard preferentialist theories allege that a person's preferences and their satisfaction are the correct measure of well-being. In preference-sensitive theories, preferences are important but do not count for everything. This raises the question of whether we ought to make demands on these preferences. In this book Egonsson presents a critical analysis of the 'Full Information Account of the Good', which claims that only the satisfaction of rational and fully informed preferences has value for a person. The problems he deals with include: how is an information requirement to be formulated and shaped? Is it possible to design a requirement that is both neutral to the agent's epistemic situation and reasonable? Is the requirement reasonable? Does it make sense to claim that some are better off if we satisfy the preferences they would have had in some merely hypothetical circumstances? This is an important new book on preference rationality which will be of great interest to academics and students of ethics, quality of life, and rationality.

Vad menar vi när vi kallar en åsikt för politiskt korrekt? Är det bra eller dåligt att vara politiskt korrekt? Förmodligen kan man inte hitta en definition av begreppet som fångar allt väsentligt hos fenomenet och heller inte bara en sanning om hur vi ska förhålla oss till det. Man kan ringa in begreppet genom att diskutera olika användningar och på samma sätt kan man ringa in situationer där den politiska korrektheten blir diskutabel. Boken tar upp det politiskt korrekta som begrepp och fenomen och diskuterar ett urval politiskt känsliga problemområden, som rör det mänskliga rasbegreppet, eugenik, ifrågasättandet av demokratiska ideal, pornografins skadlighet, kvinnors ansvar för sexuellt våld som de utsätts för samt tolerans mot hederskulturen. Dan Egonsson är praktisk filosof vid Lunds universitet och har på Nya Doxa gett ut Filosofiska essäer om människovärde

Is it important to our quality of life that the preferences we satisfy are rational and well-informed? Standard preferentialist theories allege that a person's preferences and their satisfaction are the correct measure of well-being. In preference-sensitive theories, preferences are important but do not count for everything. This raises the question of whether we ought to make demands on these preferences. In this book Egonsson presents a critical analysis of the 'Full Information Account of the Good', which claims that only the satisfaction of rational and fully informed preferences has value for a person. The problems he deals with include: how is an information requirement to be formulated and shaped? Is it possible to design a requirement that is both neutral to the agent's epistemic situation and reasonable? Is the requirement reasonable? Does it make sense to claim that some are better off if we satisfy the preferences they would have had in some merely hypothetical circumstances? This is an important new book on preference rationality which will be of great interest to academics and students of ethics, quality of life, and rationality.

Vardagsmoralen uppfattar egenskapen att vara människa som ett egenvärde. Hur ska detta förstås och vad följer av det? Man tänker sig vanligen att idén om människovärdet har två delar: en första del som säger att människor har ett värde som djuren inte har, och en andra del som säger att alla människor har detta värde i samma utsträckning. Bokens första del försvarar människovärdet enligt den första idén. Sedan behandlas den andra idén likavärdestanken i frågor kring t ex positiv särbehandling av underrepresenterat kön, prostitution och världssvälten.