Daniel Gonzales

A competition for digital infrastructure (DI) is underway between the United States and China, which has implications for military forces and operations that rely on this infrastructure in competition and conflict. This report summarizes an alternative futures analysis of how the global DI could evolve out to 2050 and the military implications of those futures for the United States and China.

This report presents an assessment of the quantum technology industrial bases of several U.S.-allied nations that are major players in the development of quantum technology, beginning with a global look and then focusing on the quantum industrial bases of Australia, the UK, Germany, and Japan. It gives recommendations for how the United States can promote strong ties with its allies in quantum technology research and development

This report describes fifth-generation (5G) network security, the 5G supply chain, competition in 5G equipment and mobile device markets, where the United States has security advantages over China, and how to preserve those advantages in the 5G competition between the United States and China. The report provides recommendations for securing 5G networks and mobile devices of the United States, its allies, and foreign partners.

The unclassified networks of defense industrial base firms have become an attractive entrance for adversaries seeking access to cutting-edge technologies and research and development efforts. This report describes a way for the U.S. Department of Defense to better secure such networks through the establishment of a cybersecurity program designed to strengthen their protections.

Current unmanned systems (UxSs) use different communication systems and have limited autonomy, which limit their ability to share information they collect with warfighters and other UxSs operating in the same area. UxSs may also face survivability and mission effectiveness challenges when they operate in contested environments. This report identifies an architectural approach that can improve system interoperability and autonomy.

The report presents the results of two studies: The first compares the capabilities and development approaches used in the Joint Tactical Radio System wideband networking waveform and the commercial long-term evolution waveform, and the second analyzes military acquisition programs that have exceeded certain cost thresholds more than once.

The Department of Defense (DoD) has developed new sensor technologies to support U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan; these technologies are potentially useful for counterdrug operations along the southern U.S. border, but there are legal questions regarding how they may be used and how sensor information may be shared between federal agencies in domestic operations. This report examines federal law and DoD policy to answer these questions.

This report presents an approach and framework for determining what parties have authority to issue interoperability policy, the legal and policy origins and implementation paths of the authority, and the extent of the authority. The approach includes rigorous analysis by researchers to identify pertinent authorities in federal law and a means to facilitate discovery of roles and responsibilities in Department of Defense and Service policies.

The authors present a framework and methodology to identify the roles and responsibilities of those implementing Department of Defense policies and also potential conflicts, ambiguities, gaps, inconsistencies, and redundancies in those policies. They introduce a new software tool that automates one step of the methodology--EPIC--and demonstrate its use with three case studies to illustrate the technique and also the tool's flexibility.

The roles and responsibilities of defense acquisition officers and chief information officers are governed both by U.S. laws and by Department of Defense (DoD) policy. The authors identify policy governing the design, acquisition, and integration of information technology (IT) and national security systems (NSS) that could lead to potential conflicts among these executives when they exercise their duties in the defense acquisition system, and suggest changes to DoD policy that can resolve these conflicts.

The challenge of securing U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) information systems has grown significantly. A new approach to information assurance certification and accreditation (IA C&A) is needed to effectively extend the IA C&A process to aggregations of systems and improve their security. An examination of current policy shows that a number of changes could enable the IA C&A of aggregations of DoD information systems on a common platform.

Compares three units that conducted stability operations in the same area in northern Iraq-the 101st Airborne Division (which had only limited digital communications), the 3/2 Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT), and the 1/25 SBCT (both equipped with digital networks) and finds that leadership, training, and tactics and procedures are just as important as networking capabilities for improving mission effectiveness in stability operations.

The Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) program-a U.S.-led international development program of Link 16 data communications terminals--is likely to present challenges to the U.S. Air Force and the MIDS International Program Office as it