David K. Henderson

David Henderson and Terence Horgan set out a broad new approach to epistemology, which they see as a mixed discipline, having both a priori and empirical elements. They defend the roles of a priori reflection and conceptual analysis in philosophy, but their revisionary account of these philosophical methods allows them a subtle but essential empirical dimension. They espouse a dual-perspective position which they call iceberg epistemology, respecting the important differences between epistemic processes that are consciously accessible and those that are not. Reflecting on epistemic justification, they introduce the notion of transglobal reliability as the mark of the cognitive processes that are suitable for humans. Which cognitive processes these are depends on contingent facts about human cognitive capacities, and these cannot be known a priori.

David Henderson and Terence Horgan set out a broad new approach to epistemology, which they see as a mixed discipline, having both a priori and empirical elements. They defend the roles of a priori reflection and conceptual analysis in philosophy, but their revisionary account of these philosophical methods allows them a subtle but essential empirical dimension. They espouse a dual-perspective position which they call iceberg epistemology, respecting the important differences between epistemic processes that are consciously accessible and those that are not. Reflecting on epistemic justification, they introduce the notion of transglobal reliability as the mark of the cognitive processes that are suitable for humans. Which cognitive processes these are depends on contingent facts about human cognitive capacities, and these cannot be known a priori.

Henderson examines the foundations of an analytic social science approach to develop a well-integrated account of the human sciences, focusing on the pivotal notions of interpretation and explanation. The author acknowledges the importance of interpretive understanding in the human sciences, and proposes a methodology that reflects both interpretive practice as well as scientific methodology. He refutes the methodological separatists who hold that the logic of explanation and testing in the human sciences is fundamentally different from that of the natural sciences, and examines in detail the constraints on interpretation. In providing an integrated treatment of these two central issues in social science, Henderson offers a thorough analysis of the adequacy of interpretation and the nature of explanation in the human sciences.