David M. Barrett

D.B. Hardeman PrizeFrom its inception more than half a century ago and for decades afterward, the Central Intelligence Agency was deeply shrouded in secrecy, with little or no real oversight by Congress—or so many Americans believe. David M. Barrett reveals, however, that during the agency’s first fifteen years, Congress often monitored the CIA’s actions and plans, sometimes aggressively.Drawing on a wealth of newly declassified documents, research at some two dozen archives, and interviews with former officials, Barrett provides an unprecedented and often colorful account of relations between American spymasters and Capitol Hill. He chronicles the CIA’s dealings with senior legislators who were haunted by memories of our intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor and yet riddled with fears that such an organization might morph into an American Gestapo. He focuses in particular on the efforts of Congress to monitor, finance, and control the agency’s activities from the creation of the national security state in 1947 through the planning for the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961.Along the way, Barrett highlights how Congress criticized the agency for failing to predict the first Soviet atomic test, the startling appearance of Sputnik over American air space, and the overthrow of Iraq’s pro-American government in 1958. He also explores how Congress viewed the CIA’s handling of Senator McCarthy’s charges of communist infiltration, the crisis created by the downing of a U-2 spy plane, and President Eisenhower’s complaint that Congress meddled too much in CIA matters. Ironically, as Barrett shows, Congress itself often pushed the agency to expand its covert operations against other nations.The CIA and Congress provides a much-needed historical perspective for current debates in Congress and beyond concerning the agency’s recent failures and ultimate fate. In our post-9/11 era, it shows that anxieties over the challenges to democracy posed by our intelligence communities have been with us from the very beginning.

In the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, questions persisted about how the potential cataclysm had been allowed to develop. A subsequent congressional investigation focused on what came to be known as the “photo gap”: five weeks during which intelligence-gathering flights over Cuba had been attenuated.In Blind over Cuba, David M. Barrett and Max Holland challenge the popular perception of the Kennedy administration’s handling of the Soviet Union’s surreptitious deployment of missiles in the Western Hemisphere. Rather than epitomizing it as a masterpiece of crisis management by policy makers and the administration, Barrett and Holland make the case that the affair was, in fact, a close call stemming directly from decisions made in a climate of deep distrust between key administration officials and the intelligence community.Because of White House and State Department fears of “another U-2 incident” (the infamous 1960 Soviet downing of an American U-2 spy plane), the CIA was not permitted to send surveillance aircraft on prolonged flights over Cuban airspace for many weeks, from late August through early October. Events proved that this was precisely the time when the Soviets were secretly deploying missiles in Cuba. When Director of Central Intelligence John McCone forcefully pointed out that this decision had led to a dangerous void in intelligence collection, the president authorized one U-2 flight directly over western Cuba—thereby averting disaster, as the surveillance detected the Soviet missiles shortly before they became operational.The Kennedy administration recognized that their failure to gather intelligence was politically explosive, and their subsequent efforts to influence the perception of events form the focus for this study. Using recently declassified documents, secondary materials, and interviews with several key participants, Barrett and Holland weave a story of intra-agency conflict, suspicion, and discord that undermined intelligence-gathering, adversely affected internal postmortems conducted after the crisis peaked, and resulted in keeping Congress and the public in the dark about what really happened.Fifty years after the crisis that brought the superpowers to the brink, Blind over Cuba: The Photo Gap and the Missile Crisis offers a new chapter in our understanding of that pivotal event, the tensions inside the US government during the cold war, and the obstacles Congress faces when conducting an investigation of the executive branch.

Lyndon Johnson, when it comes to his role in the Vietnam war, is popularly portrayed as an irrational ""hawkish"" leader who bullied his advisers and refused to solicit a wide range of opinions. That depiction, David Barrett, argues, is simplistic and far from accurate. Johnson zealously worked to shroud his advisory system in secrecy, fearing leaks that might prematurely foreclose his options. The result, says Barrett, is that Johnson appeared to ignore diverse and dissenting opinions, relying instead on a few like-minded advisers. Barrett contends that this insistence on secrecy, plus Johnson's colourful personality, has overshadowed his approach to policymaking and his consideration of a wide spectrum of opinion from a variety of formal and informal advisers. In this book, Barrett presents evidence showing Johnson developed a complex system of consultation. He systematically assesses Johnson's encounters with his advisers and records how the president, the advisers, and outside observers viewed the adviser/advisee relationships. Following a paper trail of memoranda, letters, diaries and notes, Barrett not only examines how Johnson dealt with his advisers and developed an advisory system, but delves into Johnson's personality and style to show their impact on his decisions. Despite Johnson's willingness to consider opposing viewpoints, Barrett concedes, his rational advisory system nevertheless produced a flawed and fatal set of policies because they were based on an increasingly outdated world view.