Detlef Vogel

By the spring of 1943, after the defeat at Stalingrad, the writing was on the wall. But while commanders close to the troops on Germany's various fronts were beginning to read it, those at the top were resolutely looking the other way. This seventh volume in the magisterial 10-volume series from the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt [Research Institute for Military History] shows both Germany and her Japanese ally on the defensive, from 1943 into early 1945. It looks in depth at the strategic air war over the Reich and the mounting toll taken in the Battles of the Ruhr, Hamburg, and Berlin, and at the "Battle of the Radar Sets" so central to them all. The collapse of the Luftwaffe in its retaliatory role led to hopes being pinned on the revolutionary V-weapons, whose dramatic but ultimately fruitless achievements are chronicled. The Luftwaffe's weakness in defence is seen during the Normandy invasion, Operation overlord, an account of the planning, preparation and execution of which form the central part of this volume together with the landings in the south of France, the setback suffered at Arnhem, and the German counter-offensive in the Ardennes. The final part follows the fortunes of Germany's ally fighting in the Pacific, Burma, Thailand, and China, with American forces capturing islands ever closer to Japan's homeland, and culminates in her capitulation and the creation of a new postwar order in the Far East. The struggle between internal factions in the Japanese high command and imperial court is studied in detail, and highlights an interesting contrast with the intolerance of all dissent that typified the Nazi power structure. Based on meticulous research by MGFA's team of historians at Potsdam, this analysis of events is illustrated by a wealth of tables and maps covering aspects ranging from Germany's radar defence system and the targets of RAF Bomber Command and the US 8th Air Force, through the break-out from the Normandy beachhead, to the battles for Iwo Jima and Okinawa.

By the spring of 1943, after the defeat at Stalingrad, the writing was on the wall. But while commanders close to the troops on Germany's various fronts were beginning to read it, those at the top were resolutely looking the other way. This seventh volume in the magisterial 10-volume series from the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt [Research Institute for Military History] shows both Germany and her Japanese ally on the defensive, from 1943 into early 1945. It looks in depth at the strategic air war over the Reich and the mounting toll taken in the Battles of the Ruhr, Hamburg, and Berlin, and at the "Battle of the Radar Sets" so central to them all. The collapse of the Luftwaffe in its retaliatory role led to hopes being pinned on the revolutionary V-weapons, whose dramatic but ultimately fruitless achievements are chronicled. The Luftwaffe's weakness in defence is seen during the Normandy invasion, Operation overlord, an account of the planning, preparation and execution of which form the central part of this volume together with the landings in the south of France, the setback suffered at Arnhem, and the German counter-offensive in the Ardennes. The final part follows the fortunes of Germany's ally fighting in the Pacific, Burma, Thailand, and China, with American forces capturing islands ever closer to Japan's homeland, and culminates in her capitulation and the creation of a new postwar order in the Far East. The struggle between internal factions in the Japanese high command and imperial court is studied in detail, and highlights an interesting contrast with the intolerance of all dissent that typified the Nazi power structure. Based on meticulous research by MGFA's team of historians at Potsdam, this analysis of events is illustrated by a wealth of tables and maps covering aspects ranging from Germany's radar defence system and the targets of RAF Bomber Command and the US 8th Air Force, through the break-out from the Normandy beachhead, to the battles for Iwo Jima and Okinawa.

War Deutschland schon mit der britischen und französischen Kriegserklärung vom 3. September 1939 besiegt? Oder mit den Schlachten um Stalingrad und den Brückenkopf Tunesien? Oder erst mit der geglückten alliierten Landung in Nordfrankreich und dem Zusammenbruch der Heeresgruppe Mitte im Sommer 1944? Die strategische Initiative war bis zum Frühjahr 1943 von den Achsenmächten endgültig auf die Anti-Hitler-Koalition übergegangen. Band 7 behandelt den Luftkrieg über Europa, den Krieg in Westeuropa von der alliierten Invasion bis zur gescheiterten Ardennen-Offensive sowie als Exkurs den Krieg in Ostasien bis zur japanischen Niederlage. Deutschland wie Japan sahen sich einer feindlichen Koalition gegenüber, auf deren Kriegführung sie nur noch reagieren konnten. Ihnen fehlten zusehends die benötigten personellen und materiellen Mittel. Beide Mächte hatten Vabanque gespielt und ihre Möglichkeiten überschätzt. Hitler stand mit dem Rücken zur Wand. Die Autoren zeigen, in welche ausweglose Situation die deutsche Kriegführung durch Hitlers sozialdarwinistisch durchsetzte Devise des "Alles oder nichts" geraten war. Es wäre seine Pflicht gewesen, dem Sterben auf beiden Seiten der Fronten, von Soldaten wie von Zivilpersonen, ein Ende zu setzen. Aber Menschlichkeit und Verantwortung waren keine Kategorien, die Hitler für sein Handeln gelten ließ.

This is the third in the comprehensive ten-volume Germany and the Second World War. The five volumes so far published in German take the story to the end of 1941, and have achieved international acclaim as a major contribution to historical study. Under the auspices of the Militargeschichtliches Forschungsamt (Research Institute for Military History), a team of renowned historians has combined a full synthesis of existing material with the latest research to produce what will be the definitive history of the Second World War. Volume 3 explores the conduct of the war in the Mediterranean region and examines the dramatic military events of this period. It shows how German policy in this area was largely determined by the attitude of the German leadership, especially Hitler, towards Mussolini's Italy, and the volume thus sheds important new light on the alliance policy of theThird Reich. The comprehensive analysis, based on detailed scholarly research, is underpinned by a full apparatus of maps, diagrams, and tables. Intensively researched and documented, Germany and the Second World War is an undertaking of unparalleled scope and authority. It will prove indispensable to all historians of the twentieth century.

Von der 'non belligeranza' Italiens bis zum Kriegseintritt der Vereinigten Staaten.