Duncan Pritchard

An alphabetically arranged guide to all the major epistemological debates and positions. Epistemology A-Z introduces undergraduate and post-graduate students in philosophy (and epistemology in particular) to the main problems and positions in epistemology. It shows where these problems and positions connect and where they part thereby providing a valuable resource both for following connections between ideas and for appreciating the place of key figures and concepts in the subject. The book includes entries on some of the most important historical and contemporary contributors to the field. And all the entries are cross-referenced so that each item is placed within the context of the wider debate, resulting in a multi-layered treatment of all of the main epistemological positions and figures. Key features * Coverage of all major positions and figures; * Clear and concise entries; * All entries are cross-referenced.

One of the key supposed 'platitudes' of contemporary epistemology is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. One can see the attraction of such a claim, in that knowledge is something that one can take credit for - it is an achievement of sorts - and yet luck undermines genuine achievement. The problem, however, is that luck seems to be an all-pervasive feature of our epistemic enterprises, which tempts us to think that either scepticism is true and that we don't know very much, or else that luck is compatible with knowledge after all. In this book, Duncan Pritchard argues that we do not need to choose between these two austere alternatives, since a closer examination of what is involved in the notion of epistemic luck reveals varieties of luck that are compatible with knowledge possession and varieties that aren't. Moreover, Pritchard shows that a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between luck and knowledge can cast light on many of the most central topics in contemporary epistemology. These topics include: the externalism/internalism distinction; virtue epistemology; the problem of scepticism; metaepistemological scepticism; modal epistemology; and the problem of moral luck. All epistemologists will need to come to terms with Pritchard's original and incisive contribution.