Gail Fine

Focusing primarily on Plato, Aristotle, and the Pyrrhonian skeptics, Fine discusses the following questions, among others: does Socrates, in the Apology, claim to know that he knows nothing? How do Plato and Aristotle conceive of doxa and epistêmê? Are doxa and epistêmê belief and knowledge as we conceive of them nowadays? Do Plato and Aristotle allow us to have doxa of everything about which we can have epistêmê? How does Plato conceive of perception in the Phaedo and in Theaetetus 184-6? How should we understand his theory of recollection in the Phaedo? Do the Pyrrhonian skeptics disavow all beliefs? Do they have a conception of purely subjective experience? Do they take anything to be subjective? Are they external world skeptics? How do their views of subjectivity and skepticism compare with Descartes'? Taken as a whole, the essays explain why ancient epistemology is instructive and illuminating for us today.

Gail Fine presents an original interpretation of a compelling puzzle in ancient philosophy. Meno's Paradox, which is first formulated in Plato's Meno, challenges the very possibility of inquiry. Plato replies with the theory of recollection, according to which we all had prenatal knowledge of some range of things, and what we call inquiry involves recollecting what we previously knew; he also illustrates this with his famous cross-examination of an untutored slave about a geometry problem, whose solution the slave is able to discover through inquiry. Hence, contrary to the paradox, inquiry is possible after all. Plato is not the only philosopher to grapple with Meno's Paradox: so too do Aristotle, the Epicureans, the Stoics, and Sextus. How do their various replies compare with one another, and with Plato's? How good are any of their replies? In a fascinating fragment preserved in Damascius' Commentary on the Phaedo, Plutarch briefly considers these questions (though for obvious chronological reasons he doesn't discuss Sextus). But Fine's book is the first full-length systematic treatment of the paradox and responses to it. Among the topics discussed are the nature of knowledge; how knowledge differs from mere true belief; the nature of inquiry; varieties of innatism; concepts and meaning; the scope and limits of experience. The Possibility of Inquiry will be of interest to anyone interested in ancient epistemology, in ancient philosophy, or in epistemology.

Gail Fine presents an original interpretation of a compelling puzzle in ancient philosophy. Meno's Paradox, which is first formulated in Plato's Meno, challenges the very possibility of inquiry. Plato replies with the theory of recollection, according to which we all had prenatal knowledge of some range of things, and what we call inquiry involves recollecting what we previously knew; he also illustrates this with his famous cross-examination of an untutored slave about a geometry problem, whose solution the slave is able to discover through inquiry. Hence, contrary to the paradox, inquiry is possible after all. Plato is not the only philosopher to grapple with Meno's Paradox: so too do Aristotle, the Epicureans, the Stoics, and Sextus. How do their various replies compare with one another, and with Plato's? How good are any of their replies? In a fascinating fragment preserved in Damascius' Commentary on the Phaedo, Plutarch briefly considers these questions (though for obvious chronological reasons he doesn't discuss Sextus). But Fine's book is the first full-length systematic treatment of the paradox and responses to it. Among the topics discussed are the nature of knowledge; how knowledge differs from mere true belief; the nature of inquiry; varieties of innatism; concepts and meaning; the scope and limits of experience. The Possibility of Inquiry will be of interest to anyone interested in ancient epistemology, in ancient philosophy, or in epistemology.

Plato on Knowledge and Forms brings together a set of connected essays by Fine, written over a period of twenty-five years, on Plato's metaphysics and epistemology. It also includes a previously unpublished introductory essay, which pulls together connected threads, responds to some criticisms of the original essays, and revises or modifies some of her earlier views. The essays cover a broad range of Plato's works, from the Meno to the Theaetetus. Fine discusses his views on the nature of knowledge; on how knowledge differs from belief and from true belief; and on the extent of knowledge (whether, for example, knowledge is restricted to forms ). She also asks whether forms are particulars and/or universals; whether they are separate and/or immanent; and whether they are causes. Several essays consider connections between Plato's metaphysics and epistemology; and some essays compare Plato's metaphysics with Aristotle's. She also addresses some issues in philosophy of language, such as Plato's views on the correctness of names in the Cratylus. The result is a synoptic view of some of Plato's most basic and enduring ideas about knowledge and reality. This volume showcases a quarter century of work by one of the most respected scholars in this field, and will reward the attention of anyone interested in Plato or in ancient metaphysics and epistemology.

This text brings together a set of connected essays by Gail Fine, in her main area of research since the late 1970s: Plato's metaphysics and epistemology. She discusses central issues in Plato's metaphysics and epistemology, issues concerning the nature and extent of knowledge, and its relation to perception, sensibles, and forms; and issues concerning the nature of forms, such as whether they are universals or particulars, separate or immanent, and whether they are causes. A specially written introduction draws together the themes of the volume, which will reward the attention of anyone interested in Plato or in ancient metaphysics and epistemology.

Drawn from the translations and editorial aids of Irwin and Fine's Aristotle, Selections (Hackett Publishing Co., 1995), this anthology will be most useful to instructors who must try to do justice to Aristotle in a semester-long ancient-philosophy survey, but it will also be appropriate for a variety of introductory-level courses. Introductory Readings provides accurate, readable, and integrated translations that allow the reader to follow Aristotle's use of crucial technical terms and to grasp the details of his argument. Included are adaptations of the glossary and notes that helped make its parent volume a singularly useful aid to the study of Aristotle.

The Peri ideon (On Ideas) is the only work in which Aristotle systematically sets out and criticizes arguments for the existence of Platonic forms. Gail Fine presents the first full-length treatment in English of this important but neglected work . She asks how, and how well, and why and with what justification he favours an alternative metaphysical scheme. She also examines the significance of the Peri ideon for some central questions about Plato's theory of forms - whether, for example, there are forms corresponding to every property or only to some, then to which ones; whether forms are universals, particulars, or both; and whether they are meanings, properties, or both. In addition to discussing the Peri ideon and its sources in Plato's dialogues, Fine also provides a general discussion of Plato's theory of forms, and of our evidence about the date, scope, and aims of the Peri ideon. While she pays careful attention to the details of the text, she also relates the issues to current philosophical concerns. The book will be valuable for anyone interested in metaphysics ancient or modern.