Jacob L. Heim

China's approach to nuclear deterrence has been broadly consistent since its first test in 1964, but it has recently accelerated nuclear force modernization. China's strategic environment is likely to grow more complex, and nuclear constituencies are gaining a larger bureaucratic voice. Beijing is unlikely to change official nuclear policies but will probably increase emphasis on nuclear deterrence and may adjust the definition of key concepts.

This report describes a modeling framework and lexicon for conducting a detailed analysis of future Air Force operational resilience in an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) environment. The authors describe the Operational Resilience Analysis Model, which they built to model the impact of different courses of action for improved resilience from an operational standpoint.

A RAND study analyzed Chinese and U.S. military capabilities in two scenarios (Taiwan and the Spratly Islands) from 1996 to 2017, finding that trends in most, but not all, areas run strongly against the United States. While U.S. aggregate power remains greater than China s, distance and geography affect outcomes. China is capable of challenging U.S. military dominance on its immediate periphery and its reach is likely to grow in the years ahead."

The return of great-power competition has highlighted the risks of conflict with nuclear-armed great powers. Such a conflict would entail escalation risks that the United States has not seriously considered since the Cold War. Using three historical case studies, the authors examine decisionmakers' ability to identify adversary thresholds and to apply this information to control escalation during militarized crises between nuclear-armed states.