Jeffrey J P Tsai

With the rapid growth of networking and high-computing power, the demand for large-scale and complex software systems has increased dramatically. Many of the software systems support or supplant human control of safety-critical systems such as flight control systems, space shuttle control systems, aircraft avionics control systems, robotics, patient monitoring systems, nuclear power plant control systems, and so on. Failure of safety-critical systems could result in great disasters and loss of human life. Therefore, software used for safety­ critical systems should preserve high assurance properties. In order to comply with high assurance properties, a safety-critical system often shares resources between multiple concurrently active computing agents and must meet rigid real-time constraints. However, concurrency and timing constraints make the development of a safety-critical system much more error prone and arduous. The correctness of software systems nowadays depends mainly on the work of testing and debugging. Testing and debugging involve the process of de­ tecting, locating, analyzing, isolating, and correcting suspected faults using the runtime information of a system. However, testing and debugging are not sufficient to prove the correctness of a safety-critical system. In contrast, static analysis is supported by formalisms to specify the system precisely. Formal verification methods are then applied to prove the logical correctness of the system with respect to the specification. Formal verifica­ tion gives us greater confidence that safety-critical systems meet the desired assurance properties in order to avoid disastrous consequences.

This important book introduces the concept of intrusion detection, discusses various approaches for intrusion detection systems (IDS), and presents the architecture and implementation of IDS. It emphasizes on the prediction and learning algorithms for intrusion detection and highlights techniques for intrusion detection of wired computer networks and wireless sensor networks. The performance comparison of various IDS via simulation will also be included.

A mobile agent system could be attacked by malicious agents, platforms and third parties. Mobile agents simply offer greater opportunities for abuse and misuse, which broadens the scale of threats significantly. In addition, since mobile agents have some unique characteristics such as their mobility, security problems have become more complicated in these systems. These security problems have become a bottleneck in the development and maintenance of mobile agent systems, especially in security sensitive applications such as electronic commerce. This book introduces the concept and structure of mobile agent systems and discusses various attacks and countermeasures. The emphasis is on the formal modeling and analysis of secure mobile agent systems and their applications.

With the rapid growth of networking and high-computing power, the demand for large-scale and complex software systems has increased dramatically. Many of the software systems support or supplant human control of safety-critical systems such as flight control systems, space shuttle control systems, aircraft avionics control systems, robotics, patient monitoring systems, nuclear power plant control systems, and so on. Failure of safety-critical systems could result in great disasters and loss of human life. Therefore, software used for safety­ critical systems should preserve high assurance properties. In order to comply with high assurance properties, a safety-critical system often shares resources between multiple concurrently active computing agents and must meet rigid real-time constraints. However, concurrency and timing constraints make the development of a safety-critical system much more error prone and arduous. The correctness of software systems nowadays depends mainly on the work of testing and debugging. Testing and debugging involve the process of de­ tecting, locating, analyzing, isolating, and correcting suspected faults using the runtime information of a system. However, testing and debugging are not sufficient to prove the correctness of a safety-critical system. In contrast, static analysis is supported by formalisms to specify the system precisely. Formal verification methods are then applied to prove the logical correctness of the system with respect to the specification. Formal verifica­ tion gives us greater confidence that safety-critical systems meet the desired assurance properties in order to avoid disastrous consequences.

The interplay of artificial intelligence and software engineering has been an interesting and an active area in research institution and industry. This book covers the state of the art in the use of knowledge-based approaches for software specification, design, implementation, testing and debugging. Starting with an introduction to various software engineering paradigms and knowledge-based software systems, the book continues with the discussion of using hybrid knowledge representation as a basis to specify software requirements, to facilitate specification analysis and transformation of real-time distributed software systems. A formal requirements specification language using non-monotonic logic, temporal logic, frames and production systems for new software engineering paradigms (such as rapid prototyping, operational specification and transformational implementation) is also discussed in detail. Examples from switching and other applications are used to illustrate the requirements language. Finally, the development, specification and verification of knowledge-based systems are investigated.