Jeffrey S. Banks

“A major piece of work . . . a classic. There is noother book like it.”—Norman Schofield, Washington University“The authors succeed brilliantly in tackling a largenumber of important questions concerning theinteraction among voters and elected representativesin the political arena, using a common, rigorouslanguage.”—Antonio Merlo, University of PennsylvaniaPositive Political Theory II: Strategy and Structureis the second volume in Jeffrey Banks and DavidAusten-Smith’s monumental study of the linksbetween individual preferences and collective choice.The book focuses on representative systems, includingboth elections and legislative decision-makingprocesses, clearly connecting individual preferences tocollective outcomes. This book is not a survey. Rather,it is the coherent, cumulative result of the authors’brilliant efforts to indirectly connect preferences tocollective choice through strategic behaviors such asagenda-selection and voting.The book will be an invaluable reference and teachingtool for economists and political scientists, and anessential companion to any scholar interested in thelatest theoretical advances in positive political theory.

“A major piece of work . . . a classic. There is noother book like it.”—Norman Schofield, Washington University“The authors succeed brilliantly in tackling a largenumber of important questions concerning theinteraction among voters and elected representativesin the political arena, using a common, rigorouslanguage.”—Antonio Merlo, University of PennsylvaniaPositive Political Theory II: Strategy and Structureis the second volume in Jeffrey Banks and DavidAusten-Smith’s monumental study of the linksbetween individual preferences and collective choice.The book focuses on representative systems, includingboth elections and legislative decision-makingprocesses, clearly connecting individual preferences tocollective outcomes. This book is not a survey. Rather,it is the coherent, cumulative result of the authors’brilliant efforts to indirectly connect preferences tocollective choice through strategic behaviors such asagenda-selection and voting.The book will be an invaluable reference and teachingtool for economists and political scientists, and anessential companion to any scholar interested in thelatest theoretical advances in positive political theory.

Positive Political Theory I is concerned with the formal theory of preference aggregation for collective choice. The theory is developed as generally as possible, covering classes of aggregation methods that include such well-known examples as majority and unanimity rule and focusing in particular on the extent to which any aggregation method is assured to yield a set of "best" alternatives. The book is intended both as a contribution to the theory of collective choice and a pedagogic tool.Austen-Smith and Banks have made the exposition both rigorous and accessible to people with some technical background (e.g., a course in multivariate calculus). The intended readership ranges from more technically-oriented graduate students and specialists to those students in economics and political science interested less in the technical aspects of the results than in the depth, scope, and importance of the theoretical advances in positive political theory."This is a stunning book. Austen-Smith and Banks have a deep understanding of the material, and their text gives a powerfully unified and coherent perspective on a vast literature. The exposition is clear-eyed and efficient but never humdrum. Even those familiar with the subject will find trenchant remarks and fresh insights every few pages. Anyone with an interest in contemporary liberal democratic theory will want this book on the shelf." --Christopher Achen, University of MichiganDavid Austen-Smith is Professor of Political Science, Professor of Economics, and Professor of Management and Strategy, Northwestern University. Jeffrey S. Banks is Professor of Political Science, California Institute of Technology.

Positive Political Theory I is concerned with the formal theory of preference aggregation for collective choice. The theory is developed as generally as possible, covering classes of aggregation methods that include such well-known examples as majority and unanimity rule and focusing in particular on the extent to which any aggregation method is assured to yield a set of "best" alternatives. The book is intended both as a contribution to the theory of collective choice and a pedagogic tool.Austen-Smith and Banks have made the exposition both rigorous and accessible to people with some technical background (e.g., a course in multivariate calculus). The intended readership ranges from more technically-oriented graduate students and specialists to those students in economics and political science interested less in the technical aspects of the results than in the depth, scope, and importance of the theoretical advances in positive political theory."This is a stunning book. Austen-Smith and Banks have a deep understanding of the material, and their text gives a powerfully unified and coherent perspective on a vast literature. The exposition is clear-eyed and efficient but never humdrum. Even those familiar with the subject will find trenchant remarks and fresh insights every few pages. Anyone with an interest in contemporary liberal democratic theory will want this book on the shelf." --Christopher Achen, University of MichiganDavid Austen-Smith is Professor of Political Science, Professor of Economics, and Professor of Management and Strategy, Northwestern University. Jeffrey S. Banks is Professor of Political Science, California Institute of Technology.

"American public policy has had a long history of technological optimism. The success of the United States in research and development contributes to this optimism and leads many to assume that there is a technological fix for significant national problems. Since World War II the federal government has been the major supporter of commercial research and development efforts in a wide variety of industries. But how successful are these projects? And equally important, how do economic and policy factors influence performance and are these influences predictable and controllable?Linda Cohen, Roger Noll, and three other economists address these questions while focusing on the importance of R&D to the national economy. They examine the codependency between technological progress and economic growth and explain such matters as why the private sector often fails to fund commercially applicable research adequately and why the government should focus support on some industries and not others. They also analyze political incentives facing officials who enact and implement programs and the subsequent forces affecting decisions to continue, terminate, or redirect them. The central part of this book presents detailed case histories of six programs: the supersonic transport, communications satellites, the space shuttle, the breeder reactor, photovoltaics, and synthetic fuels. The authors conclude with recommendations for program restructuring to minimize the conflict between economic objectives and political constraints."