Jerrold J. Katz

Sense, Reference, and Philosophy develops the far-reaching consequences for philosophy of adopting non-Fregean intensionalism, showing that long-standing problems in the philosophy of language, and indeed other areas, that appeared intractable can now be solved. Katz proceeds to examine some of those problems in this new light, including the problem of names, natural kind terms, the Liar Paradox, the distinction between logical and extra-logical vocabulary, and the Raven paradox. In each case, a non-Fregean intentionalism provides a philosophically more satisfying solution.

Arguing that the problem with Descartes' Cogito ergo sum - a famous but controversial philosopical dictum - lies in a deficiency in the theory of logic and language that Cartesian scholars have brought to the study of the Cogito, Katz here proposes that the Cogito be understood as an example of 'analytical entailment', a thesis according to which a statement can be a formally valid inference without depending on a law of logic.

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