John Arquilla

The information revolution is leading to the rise of network forms of organization, with unusual implications for how societies are organized and conflicts are conducted. "Netwar" is an emerging consequence. The term refers to societal conflict and crime, short of war, in which the antagonists are organized more as sprawling "leaderless" networks than as tight-knit hierarchies. Many terrorists, criminals, fundamentalists, and ethno-nationalists are developing netwar capabilities. A new generation of revolutionaries and militant radicals is also emerging, with new doctrines, strategies, and technologies that support their reliance on network forms of organization. Netwar may be the dominant mode of societal conflict in the 21st century. These conclusions are implied by the evolution of societies, according to a framework presented in this RAND study. The emergence of netwar raises the need to rethink strategy and doctrine to conduct counternetwar. Traditional notions of war and low-intensity conflict as a sequential process based on massing, maneuvering, and fighting will likely prove inadequate to cope with nonlinear, swarm-like, information-age conflicts in which societal and military elements are closely intermingled.

The factors leading to the defeat of the Axis Powers in World War II have been debated for decades. One prevalent view is that overwhelming Allied superiority in materials and manpower doomed the Axis. Another holds that key strategic and tactical blunders lost the war--from Hitler halting his panzers outside Dunkirk, allowing more than 300,000 trapped Allied soldiers to escape, to Admiral Yamamoto falling into the trap set by the U.S. Navy at Midway. Providing a fresh perspective on the war, this study challenges both views and offers an alternative explanation: the Germans, Japanese and Italians made poor design choices in ships, planes, tanks and information security--before and during the war--that forced them to fight with weapons and systems that were too soon outmatched by the Allies. The unprecedented arms race of World War II posed a fundamental "design challenge" the Axis powers sometimes met but never mastered.

Contrary to widely held views of Ronald Reagan as a reflexive man of action, John Arquilla’s sharply revisionist study argues that he was drawn to and driven by ideas. In Mr. Arquilla’s view, Reagan during his presidency articulated important new concepts that fundamentally reshaped American foreign policy. He saw the effort simply to contain Soviet expansion as too defensive in nature, so he replaced it with a doctrine designed to help others free themselves from totalitarian rule. He objected to the notion of mutual nuclear deterrence on practical and ethical grounds, a stand that led him to negotiate arms reductions as well as explore the possibility of missile defense. On these issues, as Mr. Arquilla shows, Reagan overturned a long-standing consensus of public and expert opinion, helping achieve a favorable end to the cold war and the arms race that came with it. Yet there were also areas in which Reagan‘s policies played out less successfully—his inattention to the consequences of nuclear proliferation by smaller powers like Pakistan; his indecision in launching a preventive war against terrorism in the mid-1980s—with consequences that continue to haunt us today. In an incisive and balanced critique, Mr. Arquilla has set new standards of measurement for Reagan's foreign policy accomplishments and shortcomings. The Reagan Imprint is likely to be a source of lively debate within the establishment and outside it for years to come. With 15 explanatory graphs.

Recent bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa remind us that U.S. citizens and U.S. interest are not immune to terrorism. Featuring the works of world-renowned experts, this book traces the recent evolution of international terrorism against civilian and U.S. military targets, looks ahead to where terrorism is going, and assesses how it might be contained.

This book includes essays about conflict in the information age that show how the information revolution is altering the nature of conflict.

This report assesses the requirements of a deterrence strategy for application to potential regional adversaries. The authors argue that states content with their status quo should be easy to deter, especially from seeking gain, because they are likely to be risk-averse decisionmakers.

Since the end of World War II, the United States has been the world's preeminent military power. Yet it has suffered as much failure as it has experienced victory. The bloody stalemate in Korea, defeats in Vietnam and Afghanistan, and difficulties fighting Iraqi insurgents, reflect persistent problems with U.S. military strategy. Beyond these conflicts, soldiers and civilian analysts have flirted, since Hiroshima, with highly dangerous ideas about waging and winning a nuclear war. In this astute critique, leading defense expert John Arquilla identifies the blind spots preventing the U.S. from achieving sustained military success. Drawing on a range of sources, including high-level insiders, he argues that the U.S. has fixated on three aspects of military affairs – strategic air power, nuclear weaponry, and informational/computational analytics – to its detriment and at the expense of effective innovation. This matters not only for the U.S. and its allies, but for its broader impact on the future of war. Given the continuing challenges posed by insurgents and terrorists, a new round of great-power competition, and increasing reliance on AI, the troubled American way of war urgently needs redesigning. At stake is the stability and security of global order.

New technologies are changing how we protect our citizens and wage our wars. Among militaries, everything taken for granted about the ability to maneuver and fight is now undermined by vulnerability to “weapons of mass disruption”: cutting-edge computer worms, viruses, and invasive robot networks. At home, billions of household appliances and other “smart” items that form the Internet of Things risk being taken over, then added to the ranks of massive, malicious “zombie” armies. The age of Bitskrieg is here, bringing vexing threats that range from the business sector to the battlefield. In this new book, world-renowned cybersecurity expert John Arquilla looks unflinchingly at the challenges posed by cyberwarfare – which he argues have been neither met nor mastered. He offers fresh solutions for protecting against enemies that are often anonymous, unpredictable, and capable of projecting force and influence vastly disproportionate to their size, strength, or wealth. The changes called for require radical rethinking of military and security affairs, diplomacy, and even the routines of our daily lives.

New technologies are changing how we protect our citizens and wage our wars. Among militaries, everything taken for granted about the ability to maneuver and fight is now undermined by vulnerability to “weapons of mass disruption”: cutting-edge computer worms, viruses, and invasive robot networks. At home, billions of household appliances and other “smart” items that form the Internet of Things risk being taken over, then added to the ranks of massive, malicious “zombie” armies. The age of Bitskrieg is here, bringing vexing threats that range from the business sector to the battlefield. In this new book, world-renowned cybersecurity expert John Arquilla looks unflinchingly at the challenges posed by cyberwarfare – which he argues have been neither met nor mastered. He offers fresh solutions for protecting against enemies that are often anonymous, unpredictable, and capable of projecting force and influence vastly disproportionate to their size, strength, or wealth. The changes called for require radical rethinking of military and security affairs, diplomacy, and even the routines of our daily lives.

Why do leaders initiate wars they are destined to lose? This study shows that imperfect understanding of land-sea wars was at the root of defeats for leaders from Louis XIV to Saddam Hussein.

From the small bands of wilderness warriors who battled in 18th-century North America to the "Chechen Lion," and the contemporary conflict in Chechnya, John Arquilla chronicles the deadly careers of the greatest masters of irregular warfare over the past 250 years. Their impact on events has been profound, with irregulars playing crucial roles in such epochal struggles as the Anglo-French duel for North America, the defeat of Napoleon in Spain and Russia, the American Civil War, both world wars, and the current era of terrorism. Seeing the world through the eyes of guerrillas, raiders and bandits, Arquilla has written an alternative history that provides lessons for warfare in our time that must not be ignored.

This study discusses the opportunities that may be raised by the emergence of noopolitik - ranging from construction of noosphere to recommendations.

Special operations, though most commonly associated with the period from the Second World War to the present, have played a key role throughout the history of conflict from the Trojan War to the great arms struggles of the 20th century. This volume introduces the reader to the broad sweep of the history of special operations, and also includes several excerpts from the classic literature on the subject. Contents: Origins: Robert Graves, 'The Wooden Horse', 'The Sack of Troy'; Raiding in the Age of Sail: G.M. Thomson, 'The Damage Done by this Corsair', 'The Wind Commands Me Away'; Ian Grimble, 'The Imp,^Rrieuse'; The Early American Tradition: Kenneth Roberts, 'The Raid on St. Francis'; Fred Cook, 'Struggle for the South'; R.E. Dupuy and W.H. Baumer, 'Wars With the Barbary Pirates'; 19th Century Colonial Warfare; Leo Tolstoy, The Raid; Wyatt Blassingame, 'How the Legion Began', 'The Legion Fights in Algeria'; The Civil War: Archer Hines, 'Military Means, Political Ends'; Bruce Catton, 'Total War and an Election'; World War I: Lowell Thomas, 'Trapped by a G-Ship..'; T.E. Lawrence, 'The Raid Upon the Bridges'; World War II in Western Europe and North Africa: Cajus Bekker, 'The Coup de Main at Eben Emael', 'The Blood-Bath of Crete'; Paul Carell, 'A British Commando Attempt to Capture Rommel', 'The British Raid on Tobruk', 'Brandenburgers in Action Behind the Front'; John Lodwick, Raiders from the Sea, Chapters 16-18; The Pacific War: Walter Lord, 'A Very Private War';Ronald Spector, 'The Road to Myitkyina'; Milton E. Miles, 'Chinese Pirates and the SACO Dragon'; Algeria, Round II: Jean Lart,^Rguy, 'The Leap of Leucadia'; The Ultimate Rescue: Chaim Herzog, 'Entebbe'; Bibliography; Index.

Why do leaders initiate wars they are destined to lose? This study shows that imperfect understanding of land-sea wars was at the root of defeats for leaders from Louis XIV to Saddam Hussein.