John Baylis

Nuclear alliances are high stakes partnerships with the potential to enhance security, goodwill, scientific and technical innovation, and economic well-being; or, they risk a state's very existence, generate social and political unrest, and fracture frameworks for international cooperation and jeopardize global reputations. Now entering its eighth decade, the Anglo-American nuclear alliance is the oldest and most complex in the world. Sharing Nuclear Secrets is the first comprehensive single-volume study of the Anglo-American nuclear relationship, illuminating both its fragility and durability. It has waxed and waned based on the preferences of presidents and prime ministers, weathered war scares, overcome isolationist impulses and imperial decline, persisted despite public antipathy, and has survived and been strengthened by scientific rivalries. Trust and ambiguity are entangled at the core of the Anglo-American nuclear relationship. The interplay between trust and ambiguity has influenced the way the nuclear partnership has been institutionalized at bureaucratic and technical levels, but also the ways in which political actors and private citizens have maintained the relationship through periods of crisis, moments of triumph, and through decades of cultural reckoning with nuclear weapons. From the days of the Manhattan Project, through the crisis of Suez and criticism of Dr. Strangelove, to the end of the Cold War, and into present day circumstances brought about by the JCPOA, AUKUS, and Russian nuclear threats over Ukraine, Sharing Nuclear Secrets reveals that ambiguity is key to keeping the balance between sentiment and interests and the corresponding equilibrium between trust and mistrust in the special relationship.

This book, first published in 1975, is a comprehensive examination of specialised strategic studies, and deals with the theoretical and policy aspects of the topic. It argues that military power is an intrinsic part of the international system, with strategy being the means by which military power may be used to achieve political objectives. Hence, given the destructiveness of modern weapons it is the prime aim of the strategic doctrines of the major powers not to wage war, but to use their military potential to further their interests by less catastrophic means. However, outside the Cold War superpower confrontation, strategy exhibits many of its traditional aspects. This book analyses both types of strategy variations.

This book, first published in 1975, is a comprehensive examination of specialised strategic studies, and deals with the theoretical and policy aspects of the topic. It argues that military power is an intrinsic part of the international system, with strategy being the means by which military power may be used to achieve political objectives. Hence, given the destructiveness of modern weapons it is the prime aim of the strategic doctrines of the major powers not to wage war, but to use their military potential to further their interests by less catastrophic means. However, outside the Cold War superpower confrontation, strategy exhibits many of its traditional aspects. This book analyses both types of strategy variations.

A value pack compiled for University of Lincoln Politics students for their first year of study.

The main focus of this book is on the contribution of Welsh scientists, engineers and facilities in Wales to the British nuclear programme – especially the military programme – from the Second World War through to the present day. After the war, a number of Welsh scientists at Harwell played an important role in the development of civil nuclear power, and subsequently also at Aldermaston where Welsh scientists and engineers were a key part of William Penney’s team producing the first UK nuclear device tested at Monte Bello in 1952. This book highlights the scientific and engineering contribution made by Welsh scientists and engineers, and, where possible, it considers their backgrounds, education, personalities and interests. Many, for example, were sons of miners from the Welsh valleys, whose lives were changed by their teachers and education at Wales’s university institutions – which responds in part to the question, ‘Why so many Welshmen?’

Based on a detailed analysis of archives and high level interviews this book looks at the role of beliefs, culture and identity in the making of British nuclear policy from 1945 through to the present day. This book also examines Britain's nuclear experience by moving away from traditional interpretations of why states develop and maintain nuclear weapons by adopting a more contemporary approach to political theory. Traditional mainstream explanations tend to stress the importance of factors such as the 'maximization of power', the pursuit of 'national security interests' and the role of 'structure' in a largely anarchic international system. This book does not dismiss these approaches, but argues that British experience suggests that focusing on 'beliefs', 'culture' and 'identity', provides a more useful insight and distinctive interpretation into the process of British nuclear decision making than the more traditional approaches.

Taking the 'special relationship' as a central theme, the book explores the public and private diplomacy between Britain and the United states in periods of war and peace. Using recently released archives as well as contemporary sources, the areas both of cooperation and conflict are revealed. What emerges is a much more complexed relationship than the one normally portrayed in much of the secondary literature on the subject. The documents also reveal the way the concepts of the 'special relationship' was used as a 'tool of diplomacy' on both sides of the Atlantic.

Ambiguity and Deterrence focuses on the role of competing strategic beliefs in the formulation of British nuclear strategy between 1945 and 1964. Based on recently released documents, it is argued that the British approach to nuclear weapons during this formative period was characterized by paradox and ambiguity. The paradox was that while there was a widespread consensus in political and military circles in favour of nuclear deterrence, there were constant disagreements over the requirements of an effective deterrent policy. These disagreements centred on six main questions: whether deterrence was best achieved through `punishment' or `denial'; whether deterrence necessitated nuclear superiority; whether preparations had to be made for a long war or a short war; what strategic implications followed from nuclear stalemate; whether limited nuclear wars could be fought without escalation to all-out nuclear war; and whether pre-emption was politically acceptable and militarily necessary. It is argued that the failure of successive governments to provide clear political direction on these issues meant that British nuclear strategy was more ambiguous and much less coherent than is usually supposed.

An examination of nuclear arms control and defence containing papers that present opposing sides of the debate. Nuclear deterrence, Britain's defence budget, the state of Anglo-American relations, NATO strategies and Mr Gorbachev's security arrangements in Europe proposals are discussed.

This study attempts to bring the debate about nuclear weapons and arms control up to date by assessing the reasons for the recent superpower agreement, the decline of the peace movements, the new threats to international stability and the prospects for further detente.

'... strongly recommended to anyone with an interest in the current problems of defence ...' British Army Review