John C. Graser

The last F-22A aircraft is scheduled for delivery in early 2012, so decisions must be made as to what tooling will be retained and what will be disposed of. The authors find that, for a modest, one-time additional cost of $17 million and a very small additional annual recurring cost, the Air Force can retain all F-22A unique government tools. They also find a difference of less than $1 billion between the costs of two different restart options.

The U.S. Air Force is facing a number of challenges as a result of the current defense budget downturn along with the uncertainty of its timing and magnitude. RAND examined the challenge of modernizing the Air Force s aircraft fleet while trying to sustain the industrial base with limited funding, considering six budget strategies for aircraft procurement: from a new high-tech fleet to sustaining and modifying the existing one."

When a weapon system ceases production, the tooling not needed for sustainment that cannot be repurposed must either be disposed of or stored. Storage is not free, but system-specific tooling might become necessary for a restart, and starting from scratch can be expensive, although some tools cost more to store than they are worth. The authors examine these tooling retention issues for the C-17 cargo aircraft.

The U.S. Air Force asked RAND Project AIR FORCE to perform a congressionally required assessment of contractor versus organic management of F-22 air vehicle and F119 engine sustainment to determine the most cost-effective approach. The methodology involved the development of notional government sustainment organizations and a consideration of a variety of factors relevant to such a decision, including the asserted benefits of each approach.

The Air Force Medical Service (AFMS) currently runs three in-theater hospitals for severely injured or wounded personnel. Part of the practioners' preparation was treating DoD beneficiaries for a broad range of injuries and illnesses. Opportunities for this preparation are not as numerous in house as they once were, and AFMS does not always get proper credit for those gained elsewhere. Proper credit for that work is important for funding.

In April 2009, the Department of Defense decided to terminate production of the F-22A Raptor. In advance of the decision, the Air Force asked RAND Project AIR FORCE to identify the costs and the industrial base implications of various shutdown options. This monograph evaluates the implications of three shutdown options for the F-22A industrial capability: shutdown; shutdown and restart; and warm production, in which a small number of aircraft are produced until a decision is made to return to full-rate production.

Why have the costs of acquiring space systems been so high? What are the sources of the problem? To answer these questions, RAND undertook an extensive study of two space systems - the Space Based Infrared SystemHigh (SBIRS) and the Global Positioning System (GPS).This title analyzes the reason for the comparatively high growth in the cost of space systems by means of an in-depth study of two systems: SBIRS-High and GPS.

Congress asked RAND for an independent review of whether the estimated savings from proposed multiyear contracts for 60 F-22A aircraft over three years would yield the promised savings. Researchers found that a multiyear procurement of three lots of F-22A fighters would save an estimated $411 million-about 4.5 percent of the total contract value-and that savings attributed to the multiyear contract by the contractors appear to be reasonable.

Cost analysts must predict-sometimes very far-into the future how much money the military will spend on weapon systems. But these analysts do not have perfect knowledge about tomorrow's technology, economic conditions, or any other future event. This book looks at how estimates for future weapon systems can be more realistic than in the past and how cost uncertainty analyses can be more comprehensive and informative.

Analysis of findings from case studies and structured interviews focused on determining the potential benefits and challenges of using price-based acquisition for Department of Defense procurement of major military-unique systems. Price-based acquisition (PBA), a major acquisition reform measure being used by the Department of Defense (DoD), is claimed to reduce costs and enhance acquisition efficiency. This study presents findings based on structured interviews and case studies to determine whether the claims are true and what potential benefits PBA may hold for DoD.

One-liner: Analyzes the effects of materials and manufacturing techniques on airframe costs and explores the implications of these effects on acquisition policy. In recent years, a number of attempts have been made to estimate the cost of future weapon systems toward the goal of optimizing acquisition policy. This report focuses specifically on the effects of material mix, manufacturing techniques, and geometric part complexity on the cost of military airframes. It begins by offering background information on those materials that are most critical to airframe manufacture and on the relative advantages of both traditional and evolving part fabrication techniques. It then proceeds to a quantitative analysis of the cost implications of various materials and manufacturing techniques on airframe production, drawing both from an industry survey and from analysis of industry data. The data thus derived are then integrated with those of a comprehensive historical database. The report concludes that composites, while offering a number of advantages over metals in airframe manufacture, are generally associated with higher costs across a range of categories.At the same time, it concludes that while new manufacturing technologies hold the potential to diminish airframe manufacturing costs, the increased airframe complexity of future fighter aircraft may well offset this advantage. The report recommends that cost analysts remain abreast of changes in industry practice so that they may more accurately gauge the potential effects of such changes on future airframe costs. [AF]

Abstract text (initials) During the past couple of decades, many segments of U.S. industry have benefited from introducing new manufacturing techniques that save money by increasing efficiency and reducing overhead. Would U.S. military aircraft manufacturing benefit from these techniques as well? This report examines the package of new tools and techniques known as "lean production" to see if it would enable aircraft manufacturers to produce new weapon systems at costs below those predicted by historical cost estimating models. The authors give a broad overview of what "lean" is and what it can and cannot accomplish in cutting manufacturing costs. They also detail results of industry efforts in this regard, including specific examples and averages of claimed cost savings. The authors conclude by identifying areas where companies need to push harder in lean implementation and what the Defense Department can do to encourage this.