John D Grainger

The story of Allied victory in the Holy Land, far from the carnage of the Western Front but a crucial, morale-boosting success under the aggressive and forward-thinking General Allenby. Three battles for the control of the key fortress-city of Gaza took place in 1917 between the `British' force [with units from across the Empire, most notably the ANZACs] and the Turks. The Allies were repulsed twice but on theirthird attempt, under the newly-appointed General Allenby, a veteran of the Western Front where he was a vocal critic of Haig's command, finally penetrated Turkish lines, captured southern Palestine and, as instructed by Lloyd George, took Jerusalem in time for Christmas, ending 400 years of Ottoman occupation. This third battle, similar in many ways to the contemporaneous fighting in France, is at the heart of this account, with consideration of intelligence, espionage, air-warfare, and diplomatic and political elements, not to mention the logistical and medical aspects of the campaign, particularly water. The generally overlooked Turkish defence, in the face of vastly superior numbers, is also assessed. Far from laying out and executing a pre-ordained plan, Allenby, who is probably still best remembered as T. E. Lawrence's commanding officer in Arabia, was flexible and adaptable, responding to developmentsas they occurred. JOHN D. GRAINGER is the author of numerous books on military history, ranging from the Roman period to the twentieth century.

An accessible and authoritative account of the battle of Yorktown (1781), the last major battle in the American War of Independence, where an outnumbered British Army surrendered to American forces under George Washington and their French allies. Yorktown [1781], where a British Army, commanded by Lord Cornwallis, surrendered to the American forces under George Washington and their French allies, has generally been considered one of the decisive battles of the American Warof Independence. This accessible and authoritative account of the battle and the wider campaign goes back to original source material [diaries, letters, speeches, and newspapers], offering both a narrative of the events themselves, and an analysis of how the defeat came about and why it came to be seen as crucial. It shows that the battle was really a siege, that it involved relatively few numbers, and relatively little fighting, and was not immediately seen as decisive, with the war continuing for a further two years. It sets the battle and campaign in the wider context of a war which included action in the West Indies, Europe, Africa, Asia, and at sea; shows how movements of theFrench and British navies were a crucial factor; and, overall, reassesses the causes and significance of the battle. JOHN D. GRAINGER, a former school-teacher, is the author of numerous books on military history, rangingfrom the Roman period to the twentieth century.

The imperial succession at Rome was notoriously uncertain, and where possible hereditary succession was preferred. John Grainger's detailed study looks at aperiod of intrigue and conspiracy. He explores how, why and by whom Domitian was killed, the rule of Nerva, chosen to succeed him, and finally Nerva's own choice of successor, Trajan, who became a strong and respected emperor against the odds.Perhaps most significantly Grainger investigates the effects of this dynastic uncertainty both inside and outside the ruling group in Rome, asking why civil war did not occur in this time of political upheaval.The last time a dynasty had failed, in AD 68, a damaging military conflict had resulted; at the next failure in AD 192, another war broke out; by the third century civil war was institutionalized, and was one of the main reasons for the eventual downfall of the entire imperial structure. Grainger argues that though AD 96-98 stands out as the civil war that did not happen, it was a perilously close-run thing.

A study of the hardening of British public opinion against Bonaparte and an examination of the events that caused it. In 1801 Britain and Bonaparte made an armistice, which became the Treaty of Amiens in March 1802. In the brief period of peace which followed, British attitudes underwent a major change, so that when war began again in May 1803 there was little or no dissent from the view that the war had to be fought to a finish and Bonaparte's power destroyed. This was partly the result of Bonaparte's underhand methods during negotiations; but it was also due to the conclusion reached by the many British visitors to France during the interval of peace that Bonaparte was extremely dangerous, anger at his stealthy political advances in Europe and America, and outrage at his detention and imprisonment of British civilians when war began again. The attitude of the British government headed by Henry Addington, and in particular the diplomatic methods of the Foreign Secretary Lord Hawkesbury (later the Prime Minister Lord Liverpool) were decisive in countering Bonaparte's methods; they receive their due in this first detailed examination of events, based on original materials.

The imperial succession at Rome was notoriously uncertain, and where possible hereditary succession was preferred. John Grainger's detailed study looks at aperiod of intrigue and conspiracy. He explores how, why and by whom Domitian was killed, the rule of Nerva, chosen to succeed him, and finally Nerva's own choice of successor, Trajan, who became a strong and respected emperor against the odds.Perhaps most significantly Grainger investigates the effects of this dynastic uncertainty both inside and outside the ruling group in Rome, asking why civil war did not occur in this time of political upheaval.The last time a dynasty had failed, in AD 68, a damaging military conflict had resulted; at the next failure in AD 192, another war broke out; by the third century civil war was institutionalized, and was one of the main reasons for the eventual downfall of the entire imperial structure. Grainger argues that though AD 96-98 stands out as the civil war that did not happen, it was a perilously close-run thing.

The Phoenicians have long been known for their trading, colonizing, and seafaring skills, but their history has too often seemed to stop short at the time of Alexander the Great. Alexander's destruction of the city of Tyre, however, only marked a new stage in Phoenician history, not its end. During the next three centuries this numerically small people had to live in a violent world dominated by Greeks and Macedonians. Their cities were destroyed, their land was reduced in size, and then divided up among mutually hostile kings. Yet they survived and enjoyed long periods of peace in which they evidently prospered. This is the first full account of Hellenistic Phoenicia. Within the basic chronological framework of their political history, the study pursues the themes of trade and economic history and the Hellenization of the Phoenicians' culture. The adaptation of the Phoenicians to life in the Hellenistic world shows a number of features common to that world as a whole, but also some which are distinctive to the Phoenicians themselves. A final chapter considers the changes in their role in the world outside their homeland.

This book is the first detailed study of the foundation, history, government, growth and decline of the cities founded in Syria by Seleukos I in 301BC shortly after the time of Alexander the Great. It throws new light on an important period in ancient history. In particular, Dr Grainger concentrates on the relationship between the kings and the cities in their kingdoms and reveals that former theories concerning such a relationship require drastic revision. Most importantly the relationship is shown to have been much more to the kings' advantage than previous discussions on Hellenistic states have supposed. He argues in fact that neither the kings nor the cities intended the cities to be autonomous or independent since they were far too reliant on royal support against the enmity of the surrounding population. Evidence for this can be seen in the actions of the cities on the collapse of the Seleukid dynasty in the first century BC; then they were forced to cast about for a new protector and eventually accepted Rome albeit reluctantly. Dr Grainger discusses the differing fate of the cities during this process when some failed altogether, most declined, and only one, Antioch, prospered.