John Peddie

John Peddie expertly examines the scale and intent of the relentless threat of conquest by the Viking sea-raiders, the military and logistical problems that beset both sides, and the strategies devised by King Alfred of Wessex which led to the reconquest of his Wessex homeland and the creation of England itself.

The story of the Claudian Conquest of Britain was only partly recorded by ancient historians. Tacitus' Annals breaks off at the death of Tiberius, while the narrative of Cassius Dio survives only as a collection of selected pieces. Much of this missing knowledge has been recaptured by archaeological research.As a result, we have a better understanding of the tribal society which then existed in Britain, and this can help us to appreciate the courses of military action open to Aulus Plautius, the commanding Roman general. There are other important military factors which would have affected Plautius' choice of options: logistical, geographical, political.In this innovative and much acclaimed study John Peddie argues that the organisation and supply problems of a task force of some 40,000 men and several thousand animals would broadly have dictated Roman tactics. He discusses what these may have been, examines the reason's for Vespasian's seemingly isolated foray into the West Country, and suggests that Caratacus' guerilla campaign (AD 43-52) denied the Romans their hope of a speedy conquest

Here, John Peddie provides a challenging re-evaluation of the Carthaginian's generalship of Hannibal, and asks how was it that a man so often described by historians as a military genius and a brilliant tactician could have plunged so deeply into a situation in which he was, almost inevitably, to fail?John Peddie questions the role of the war-elephant, Hannibal's choice of route over the Alps, re-examines the purpose of the campaign and suggests the purpose of the campaign was not so much the destruction of Rome but the re-conquest of Sicily. Exploring the Carthaginian's generalship he concludes that Hannibal's War was lost at sea, not on land.

The history of Hannibal's war

In this wide-ranging account of the military and naval structure of the late Republic and early Empire, John Peddie draws on first-hand sources to reveal the true nature of events on the battlefield. In addition, he also examines an area hinted at but but almost exclusively overlooked by classical writers - the logistical and operational techniques which made the success of the German armies possible. The coverage includes an examination of the communication problems of handling large armies on the battlefield, the vulnerability of baggage trains on the march, siege tactics and the technique of the marching camp, as well as the themes of Roman generalship, command and control, supply trains, supporting arms and weaponry and waterborne operations. This book challenges contemporary interpretations of Roman military campaigns as haphazard affairs and emphasises the problems of control which confronted commanders in ancient times, while suggesting the logistical and tactical solutions they may have pursued.