Jose Augusto Matos

On 25 April 1974, a movement of young captains brought down, with practically no resistance, the dictatorial regime that had been in power for over 40 years in Portugal. In the early hours of that day, a military movement unleashed a series of operations that, in less than 24 hours, defeated the forces loyal to the regime, neutralizing any possibility of reaction. Few forces resisted the insurgents, and the only resistance worthy of note came from the political police, who in the heat of the revolution opened fire on the surrounding crowd, causing four deaths.In the streets of Lisbon, the people enthusiastically joined the military revolt and started offering food, drinks and red carnations to the soldiers, who decided to stick them in the barrels of their rifles, making the revolt known as the Carnation Revolution. Although it began with a military coup d' tat, the 25th of April paved the way for democracy and there is no comparison to other similar revolutions. It was also a unique event in the European context of the time, that broke Portugal's isolation and brought it closer to other Western democracies.This work is part of a two-volume history. This first volume deals with the background to the revolution, namely the causes that led to the revolt of the captains and the situation in the Portuguese colonies in Africa, where a guerrilla war for the independence of the colonies had been going on for more than a decade. Finally, volume II will detail the final moments of the regime and the preparation of the coup d' tat by the military dissatisfied with the situation that would culminate in the revolution of April 25th, 1974.

From 1963 to 1974, Portugal and its nationalist enemies fought an increasingly intense war for the independence of "Portuguese" Guinea, then a colony but now the Republic of Guinea-Bissau. For most of the conflict, Portugal enjoyed virtually unchallenged air supremacy, and increasingly based its strategy on this advantage. The Portuguese Air Force (Força Aérea Portuguesa, abbreviated FAP) consequently played a crucial role in the Guinean war. Indeed, throughout the conflict, the FAP - despite the many challenges it faced - proved to be the most effective and responsive military argument against the PAIGC, which was fighting for Guinea's independence. The air war for Guinea is unique for historians and analysts for several reasons. It was the first conflict in which a non-state irregular force deployed defensive missiles against an organised air force. Moreover, the degree to which Portugal relied on its air power was such that its effective neutralisation doomed Lisbon's military strategy in the province. The FAP's unexpected combat losses initiated a cascade of effects that degraded in turn its own operational freedom and the effectiveness of the increasingly air-dependent surface forces, which felt that the war against the PAIGC was lost. The air war for Guinea thus represents a compelling illustration of the value - and vulnerabilities - of air power in a counter-insurgency context, as well as the negative impacts of overreliance on air supremacy.

In the early hours of 22 November 1970, six Portuguese warships surrounded Conakry, the capital of the Republic of Guinea, on the West African coast. Taking advantage of the darkness of the night, a military force landed on the northern and southern coasts of the sleeping city. At the head of these men was a young Portuguese marine officer, Commander Alpoim Calvão, who had been appointed to command this secret operation, codenamed Green Sea - Mar Verde in Portuguese. The main objective of the invasion was to promote a coup d'état in the former French colony and overthrow the regime of President Sékou Touré, who supported the guerrillas of the PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde), who were fighting for the independence of Portuguese Guinea. The invaders also sought to destroy the naval resources that the guerrillas and the Guinean navy had in the port of Conakry, capture the leader of the party, Amilcar Cabral, and rescue a group of Portuguese soldiers held in a PAIGC prison. The incursion would not have the expected success concerning the coup d'état, and Portugal would be condemned by international organizations for the invasion of a sovereign state, but this operation would remain in the memory of many as the most daring carried out during the colonial war in Africa, although the Portuguese regime never recognised its involvement.

War of Intervention in Angola, Volume 4, continues the coverage of the operational history of the Angolan Air Force and Air Defence Force (FAPA/DAA) as told by Angolan and Cuban sources, in the period 1985-1988. Many accounts of this conflict - better known in the West as the ‘Border War’ or the 'Bush War', as named by its South African participants - consider the operations of the FAPA/DAA barely worth commentary. At most, they mention a few air combats involving Mirage F.1 interceptors of the South African Air Force (SAAF) in 1987 and 1988, and perhaps a little about the activity of the FAPA/DAA’s MiG-23s. However, a closer study of Angolan and Cuban sources reveals an entirely different image of the air war over Angola in the 1980s: indeed, it reveals the extent to which the flow of the entire war was dictated by the availability - or the lack - of air power. These issues strongly influenced the planning and conduct of operations by the commanders of the Angolan and Cuban forces. Based on extensive research with the help of Angolan and Cuban sources, War of Intervention in Angola, Volume 4, traces the Angolan and Cuban application of air power between 1985-1988 - during which it came of age - and the capabilities, intentions, and the combat operations of the air forces. The volume is illustrated with 100 rarely seen photographs, half a dozen maps and 15 colour profiles, and provides a unique source of reference on this subject.