Kevin C. M. Benson

This is the story of the first ten years of SAMS and the remarkable reputation quickly acquired by its graduates, educated in a pre-World War II horse cavalry stable at Fort Leavenworth. It is also the story of the doctrinal revolution in which SAMS played an important role—a doctrinal shift that energized how the U.S. Army thought about and fought its wars. It may be claimed that the combination of a new, offensively oriented doctrine and educated practitioners significantly raised the level of tactical and operational understanding in the U.S. Army from 1983 to 1994. The book explores the interrelationship between the School of Advanced Military Studies, the introduction of operational art into U.S. Army doctrine, and how graduates of the school sought to translate education and doctrine into action. It begins with the decisions that led to the founding of SAMS and reviews the conditions at the end of the Vietnam War and the challenges the Army faced at that time. It then examines the development of operational-level war as the essential bridge between tactical actions on the battlefield and strategic objectives derived from national security policy. The narrative continues with a close look at the school in the years leading up to Operations Just Cause and Desert Shield/Storm, and how it was evolving to meet emerging demands. It then analyzes how SAMS graduates approached these early combat operations, using operational-level doctrine to frame and guide the conduct of war. The story also includes three key events from the turbulent period following Operation Desert Storm, as graduates applied doctrine in an era shaped by the collapse of the Soviet Union and shifting global realities. The book concludes with a study of how the school changed in response to both internal dynamics and external pressures, particularly those arising from combat operations and missions other than war. It contrasts the visions of the school’s first and sixth directors to illuminate how SAMS adapted over its first decade. Central to the narrative is the argument that, despite these changes, the school’s fundamental purpose remained constant—and understanding why offers insight into how SAMS and its graduates contributed to the Army’s evolution in tactical and operational thought.

Given the length of time the United States spent in Iraq, there is a perception that there was no consideration before the war of what should be done after coalition forces arrived in Baghdad and removed Saddam Hussein. However as this unofficial history reveals, there was a great deal of planning to address how to achieve the policy objectives for Iraq set by the Bush administration. Kevin Benson—director of plans for the United States Third Army, the ground forces command headquarters for GEN Franks’ Central Command, at the start of the war—details the development of the invasion plan and its subsequent execution from D-Day in March 2003 until the change of command of operations in Iraq and the departure of Third Army in June 2003.He addresses the persistent trope that “the Army did no planning” for “Phase IV,” revealing that extensive plans were proposed, and were met with very little interest in Washington. The book covers the difficulties encountered in dealing with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, from getting his approval on the number of forces requested to conducting the campaign to find the “smoking gun” of WMD; the instructions given to Army, Marine and coalition forces; and the daily secure video teleconferences with Central Command and the Pentagon, and the rather remarkable conversations and guidance that came from these meetings.