Leon A. Petrosyan

William Jevons (1866 and 1871) established a ground-breaking milestone with 'A General Mathematical Theory of Political Economy' for economic analysis. Jevons' work was praised as the start of the mathematical method in the discipline of economics, which is inherently a subject involved with mathematics and quantities. This book focuses on the most fast-evolving and encompassing area in political economy — the dynamic global political economy. Under the high level of globalization currently, intertemporal and cross-boundary interactive elements are present in political-economic encounters. Indeed, almost all studies in the political economy may fall into the study of dynamic global political economy. Since the world has changed significantly, new mathematics developed by the authors of this book is used to formulate a general mathematical theory for the dynamic global political economy nowadays. A distinctive feature of the current book is that it combines advanced mathematics, game-theoretic concepts, and economics to develop a general mathematical theory supporting the study of the dynamic global political economy.The book covers mathematical theory for different areas of the dynamic global political economy. In addition, it explicates the application of the mathematical theory in real-world scenarios, including (i) environmental degradation under an uncoordinated interaction scenario, (ii) global climate accords with collaboration and cooperation, (iii) trade network involving the Belt-Road Initiative (BRI) and Build Back Better World (B3W) Initiative, and (iv) random termination of international joint ventures.

Durable strategies that have prolonged effects are prevalent in real-world situations. Revenue-generating investments, toxic waste disposal, long-lived goods, regulatory measures, coalition agreements, diffusion of knowledge, advertisement and investments to accumulate physical capital are concrete and common examples of durable strategies. This book provides an augmentation of dynamic game theory and advances a new game paradigm with durable strategies in decision-making schemes. It covers theories, solution techniques, and the applications of a general class of dynamic games with multiple durable strategies. Non-cooperative equilibria and cooperative solutions are derived, along with advanced topics including random termination, asynchronous game horizons, and stochastic analysis. The techniques presented here will enable readers to solve numerous practical dynamic interactive problems with durable strategies. This book not only expands the scope of applied dynamic game theory, but also provides a solid foundation for further theoretical and technical advancements. As such, it will appeal to scholars and students of quantitative economics, game theory, operations research, and computational mathematics."Not too many new concepts have been introduced in dynamic games since their inception. The introduction of the concept of durable strategies changes this trend and yields important contributions to environmental and business applications." Dušan M Stipanovic, Professor, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign "Before this book, the field simply did not realize that most of our strategies are durable and entail profound effects in the future. Putting them into the mathematical framework of dynamic games is a great innovative effort." Vladimir Turetsky, Professor, Ort Braude College “Durable-strategies Dynamic Games is trulya world-leading addition to the field of dynamic games. It is a much needed publication to tackle increasingly crucial problems under the reality of durable strategies.” Vladimir Mazalov, Director of Mathematical Research, Russian Academy of Sciences & President of the International Society of Dynamic Games

Durable strategies that have prolonged effects are prevalent in real-world situations. Revenue-generating investments, toxic waste disposal, long-lived goods, regulatory measures, coalition agreements, diffusion of knowledge, advertisement and investments to accumulate physical capital are concrete and common examples of durable strategies. This book provides an augmentation of dynamic game theory and advances a new game paradigm with durable strategies in decision-making schemes. It covers theories, solution techniques, and the applications of a general class of dynamic games with multiple durable strategies. Non-cooperative equilibria and cooperative solutions are derived, along with advanced topics including random termination, asynchronous game horizons, and stochastic analysis. The techniques presented here will enable readers to solve numerous practical dynamic interactive problems with durable strategies. This book not only expands the scope of applied dynamic game theory, but also provides a solid foundation for further theoretical and technical advancements. As such, it will appeal to scholars and students of quantitative economics, game theory, operations research, and computational mathematics."Not too many new concepts have been introduced in dynamic games since their inception. The introduction of the concept of durable strategies changes this trend and yields important contributions to environmental and business applications." Dušan M Stipanovic, Professor, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign "Before this book, the field simply did not realize that most of our strategies are durable and entail profound effects in the future. Putting them into the mathematical framework of dynamic games is a great innovative effort." Vladimir Turetsky, Professor, Ort Braude College “Durable-strategies Dynamic Games is trulya world-leading addition to the field of dynamic games. It is a much needed publication to tackle increasingly crucial problems under the reality of durable strategies.” Vladimir Mazalov, Director of Mathematical Research, Russian Academy of Sciences & President of the International Society of Dynamic Games

Strategic behavior in the human and social world has been increasingly recognized in theory and practice. It is well known that non-cooperative behavior could lead to suboptimal or even highly undesirable outcomes. Cooperation suggests the possibility of obtaining socially optimal solutions and the calls for cooperation are prevalent in real-life problems. Dynamic cooperation cannot be sustainable if there is no guarantee that the agreed upon optimality principle at the beginning is maintained throughout the cooperation duration. It is due to the lack of this kind of guarantees that cooperative schemes fail to last till its end or even fail to get started. The property of subgame consistency in cooperative dynamic games and the corresponding solution mechanism resolve this “classic” problem in game theory. This book is a comprehensive treatise on subgame consistent dynamic cooperation covering the up-to-date state of the art analyses in this important topic. It sets out to provide the theory, solution techniques and applications of subgame consistent cooperation in a wide spectrum of paradigms for analysis which includes cooperative dynamic game models with stochastic state dynamics, with uncertain future payoffs, with asynchronous players’ horizons, with random cooperation duration, with control spaces switching and with transferable and nontransferable payoffs. The book would be a significant research reference text for researchers in game theory, economists, applied mathematicians, policy-makers, corporate decision-makers, and graduate students in applied mathematics, game theory, decision sciences, economics and management sciences.

Strategic behavior in the human and social world has been increasingly recognized in theory and practice. It is well known that non-cooperative behavior could lead to suboptimal or even highly undesirable outcomes. Cooperation suggests the possibility of obtaining socially optimal solutions and the calls for cooperation are prevalent in real-life problems. Dynamic cooperation cannot be sustainable if there is no guarantee that the agreed upon optimality principle at the beginning is maintained throughout the cooperation duration. It is due to the lack of this kind of guarantees that cooperative schemes fail to last till its end or even fail to get started. The property of subgame consistency in cooperative dynamic games and the corresponding solution mechanism resolve this “classic” problem in game theory. This book is a comprehensive treatise on subgame consistent dynamic cooperation covering the up-to-date state of the art analyses in this important topic. It sets out to provide the theory, solution techniques and applications of subgame consistent cooperation in a wide spectrum of paradigms for analysis which includes cooperative dynamic game models with stochastic state dynamics, with uncertain future payoffs, with asynchronous players’ horizons, with random cooperation duration, with control spaces switching and with transferable and nontransferable payoffs. The book would be a significant research reference text for researchers in game theory, economists, applied mathematicians, policy-makers, corporate decision-makers, and graduate students in applied mathematics, game theory, decision sciences, economics and management sciences.

Game theory is a branch of modern applied mathematics that aims to analyse various problems of conflict between parties that have opposed similar or simply different interests.Games are grouped into several classes according to some important features. In Game Theory (2nd Edition), Petrosyan and Zenkevich consider zero-sum two-person games, strategic N-person games in normal form, cooperative games, games in extensive form with complete and incomplete information, differential pursuit games and differential cooperative, and non-cooperative N-person games. The 2nd edition updates heavily from the 1st edition published in 1996.

Various imperfections in existing market systems prevent the free market from serving as a truly efficient allocation mechanism, but optimization of economic activities provides an effective remedial measure. Cooperative optimization claims that socially optimal and individually rational solutions to decision problems involving strategic action over time exist. To ensure that cooperation will last throughout the agreement period, however, the stringent condition of subgame consistency is required.This textbook presents a study of subgame consistent economic optimization, developing game-theoretic optimization techniques to establish the foundation for an effective policy menu to tackle the suboptimal behavior that the conventional market mechanism fails to resolve.

The classical optimal control theory deals with the determination of an optimal control that optimizes the criterion subjects to the dynamic constraint expressing the evolution of the system state under the influence of control variables. If this is extended to the case of multiple controllers (also called players) with different and sometimes conflicting optimization criteria (payoff function) it is possible to begin to explore differential games. Zero-sum differential games, also called differential games of pursuit, constitute the most developed part of differential games and are rigorously investigated. In this book, the full theory of differential games of pursuit with complete and partial information is developed. Numerous concrete pursuit-evasion games are solved (”life-line” games, simple pursuit games, etc.), and new time-consistent optimality principles in the n-person differential game theory are introduced and investigated.