Kirjojen hintavertailu. Mukana 12 574 056 kirjaa ja 12 kauppaa.

Kirjailija

Madison V. Schramm

Kirjat ja teokset yhdessä paikassa: 2 kirjaa, julkaisuja vuodelta 2025, suosituimpien joukossa Tip-toeing through the Tulips with Congress. Vertaile teosten hintoja ja tarkista saatavuus suomalaisista kirjakaupoista.

2 kirjaa

Tip-toeing through the Tulips with Congress

Tip-toeing through the Tulips with Congress

Dani Kaufmann Nedal; Madison V. Schramm

Cambridge University Press
2025
pokkari
Over the years, the US has intervened covertly in many countries to remove dictators, subvert elected leaders, and support coups. Explanations for this focus on characteristics of target countries or strategic incentives to pursue regime change. This Element provides an account of domestic political factors constraining US presidents' authorization of covert foreign-imposed regime change operations (FIRCs), arguing that congressional attention to covert action alters the Executive's calculus by increasing the political costs associated with this secretive policy instrument. It shows that congressional attention is the result of institutional battles over abuses of executive authority and has a significant constraining effect independent of codified rules and partisan disputes. These propositions are tested using content analysis of the Congressional Record, statistical analysis of Cold War covert FIRCs, and causal-process evidence relating to covert interventions in Chile, Angola, Central America, Afghanistan, etc.
Tip-toeing through the Tulips with Congress

Tip-toeing through the Tulips with Congress

Dani Kaufmann Nedal; Madison V. Schramm

Cambridge University Press
2025
sidottu
Over the years, the US has intervened covertly in many countries to remove dictators, subvert elected leaders, and support coups. Explanations for this focus on characteristics of target countries or strategic incentives to pursue regime change. This Element provides an account of domestic political factors constraining US presidents' authorization of covert foreign-imposed regime change operations (FIRCs), arguing that congressional attention to covert action alters the Executive's calculus by increasing the political costs associated with this secretive policy instrument. It shows that congressional attention is the result of institutional battles over abuses of executive authority and has a significant constraining effect independent of codified rules and partisan disputes. These propositions are tested using content analysis of the Congressional Record, statistical analysis of Cold War covert FIRCs, and causal-process evidence relating to covert interventions in Chile, Angola, Central America, Afghanistan, etc.