Michael E Linick

The authors explore the concept of strategic readiness, outline a framework for how the U.S. Department of Defense might conduct a strategic readiness assessment (SRA), highlight several analytic tools that could be used within this framework, and apply them to two defense policy issues: munitions procurement and planning modernization schedules across services. The report concludes with recommendations for how an SRA might be implemented.

This report seeks to address how the U.S. Army can most effectively project and employ land power in the Indo-Pacific, during competition and conflict, with a focus on scenarios involving China. The authors developed three concepts to guide the Army's ground force role in the theater, offering the essential architecture of basing, information, relationships, and flexible combat power needed to make the joint force effective.

This report--Phase Two of a three-phase project--describes the current defense planning process used by the U.S. Department of Defense, with a focus on how scenarios are developed and employed to support defense planning. It examines and critiques how scenarios are used in current planning processes, based on an assessment of unclassified documents and dialogues with current and former participants in the process.

The authors examined the friction between the U.S. Army's People First objectives (which focus on command climate, cohesive teams, career goals, and work-life balance) and Regionally Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model objectives (which focus on mission readiness) and developed strategies to mitigate this friction.

This Executive Summary highlights findings from a comparative historical analysis of the four Quadrennial Defense Reviews conducted after 1997 (in 2001, 2006, 2010, and 2014), identifying trends, implications, and recommendations for the Army and Defense Department in order to shape the conduct of and improve future reviews.

The authors of this report explore a more expansive approach to readiness assessments--one that looks beyond the narrow lens of operational readiness more typical of readiness systems in use in the Department of Defense and considers a broader set of dimensions that could affect readiness outcomes. This more expansive perspective can lead to a better understanding of the root cause of readiness shortfalls.

This report presents a comparative historical analysis of the four Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDRs) conducted after 1997 (in 2001, 2006, 2010, and 2014) and identifies trends, implications, and recommendations for the Army and U.S. Department of Defense in order to shape the conduct of and improve future reviews.

Tracing the evolution of the U.S. Army throughout American history, the authors show that there is no such thing as a "traditional" U.S. military policy. Rather, the laws that authorize, empower, and govern the U.S. armed forces emerged from long-standing debates and a series of legislative compromises between 1903 and 1940.