Michael E. O'Hanlon

"Arms control, for decades at the core of the foreign policy consensus, today is among the more contentious issues in American politics. It is pilloried and considered out of mode in many conservative quarters, while being viewed as nearly sacrosanct in many liberal circles. In this new book, Michael Levi and Michael O'Hanlon argue that neither the left nor the right has a correct view of the proper utility of arms control in the age of terror. Arms control in the traditional sense--lengthy treaties to limit nuclear and other military competitions among the great powers--is no longer particularly useful. Nor should arms control be pursued as a means to the end of constraining the power of nations or of promoting global government. It is still a critical tool, though, for controlling dangerous technologies, particularly those that, in the hands of hostile states or terrorist organizations, could cause massive death and destruction. Arms control and coercive action, including military force, must be integrated into an overall strategy for preventing proliferation, now more than ever before. Arms control should be used to gain earlier warning of illicit activities inside dangerous states, allowing the international community to take coercive action in a timely way. The authors propose three new criteria to guide future arms control efforts, designed to respond to today's geopolitical realities. Arms control must focus on the dangers of catastrophic technology, not so much in the hands of major powers as of small states and terrorist groups. Their criteria lead to a natural focus on nuclear and biological technologies. Much tougher measures to prevent countries from gaining nuclear weapons technoloty while purportedly complying with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and procedures for controlling dangerous biological technologies will be most prominent in this framework, while lower priority is giben to efforts such as bilateral nuclear accords and most types of arms control for outer space. This book provides a framework for an effective arms control strategy in a new age of international security."

"Space has been militarized for over four decades. Should it now be weaponized? This incisive and insightful book argues that it should not. Since the cold war, space has come to harbor many tools of the tactical warfighter. Satellites have long been used to provide strategic communication, early warning of missile launch, and arms control verification. The U.S. armed forces increasingly use space assets to locate and strike targets on the battlefield. To date, though, no country deploys destructive weapons in space, for use against space or Earth targets, and no country possesses ground-based weapons designed explicitly to damage objects in space. The line between nonweaponization and weaponization is blurry, to be sure—but it has not yet been crossed. In Ne ither Star Wars nor Sanctuary, Michael E. O'Hanlon makes a forceful case for keeping it this way. The United States, with military space budgets of around $20 billion a year, enjoys a remarkably favorable military advantage in space. Pursuing a policy of space weaponization solely in order to maximize its own military capabilities would needlessly jeopardize this situation by likely hastening development of space weapons in numerous countries. It would also reaffirm the prevalent international image of the United States as a global cowboy of sorts, too quick to reach for the gun. O'Hanlon therefore asserts that U.S. military space policy should focus on delaying any movement toward weaponization, without foreclosing the option of developing space weapons in the future, if necessary. Extreme positions that would either hasten to weaponize space or permanently rule this out are not consistent with technological realities and U.S. security interests. "

"A good deal has been done to improve the safety of Americans on their own soil since the attacks of September 11, 2001. Yet there have been numerous setbacks. The Bush administration and Congress wasted at least six months in 2002 due to partisan disagreement over a new budget for homeland security, and as one consequence, resources were slow to reach first responders across the country. Most improvements in homeland security have focused on ""refighting the last war""—improving defenses against attacks similar to those the country has already suffered. Not enough has been done to anticipate possible new kinds of terrorist actions. Policymakers have also focused too much attention on the creation of a department of homeland security—rather than identifying and addressing the kinds of threats to which the country remains vulnerable. While the creation of a cabinet-level agency focusing on homeland security may have merit, the authors of this study argue that the department will not, in and of itself, make Americans safer. To the contrary, the complexity of merging so many disparate agencies threatens to distract Congress and the administration from other, more urgent security efforts. This second edition of Protecting the American Homeland urges policymakers to focus on filling key gaps that remain in the current homeland security effort: identifying better protection for private infrastructure; using information technology to share intelligence and more effectively ""connect the dots"" that could hold hints to possible terrorist tactics; expanding the capacities of the Coast Guard and Customs Service, as well as airline transportation security; dealing with the possible threat of surface-to-air missiles to airliners; and encouraging better coordination among intelligence agencies. While acknowledging the impossibility of preventing every possible type of terrorist violence, the authors recommend a more systematic approach to homeland security that focuses on preventing attacks that can cause large numbers of casualties, massive economic or societal disruption, or severe political harm to the nation."

Humanitarian military intervention and muscular peace operations have been partially effective in recent years in saving thousands of lives from the Balkans to Haiti to Somalia to Cambodia to Mozambique. However, success has often been mitigated by the international community's unwillingness or inability to quickly send enough forces capable of dealing with a situation decisively. In other cases, the international community has essentially stood aside as massive but possibly preventable humanitarian tragedies took place — for instance, in Angola and Rwanda in the mid-1990s and in Congo as this book goes to press. Sometimes these failures have simply been the result of an insufficient pool of available military and police forces to conduct the needed intervention or stabilization missions. In this timely new book, Michael O'Hanlon presents a blueprint for developing sufficient global intervention capacity to save many more lives with force. He contends, at least for now, that individual countries rather than the United Nations should develop the aggregate capacity to address several crises of varying scale and severity, and that many more countries should share in the effort. The United States' role is twofold: it must make slight redesigns to its own military and, even more important, encourage other nations to join it in this type of intervention, including training and support of troops in countries, such as those in Africa, that are willing to take the necessary steps to prevent humanitarian disaster but lack the resources.

"""The authors provide a sound critique of the standard positions and hyperboles of both advocates and opponents, as well as an accessible primer on the types, advantages, and limitations of various systems and architectures.... Defending America provides as good a 'few years out' unclassified guide as you're likely to find."" - The Washington Times ""Even those readers who have made up their minds should find this book a useful compendium of information and analysis on an old topic."" - Foreign Affairs"

"This updated edition incorporates lessons from the war in Afghanistan, other developemnts since September 11, and a critical assessment of the Bush administration's defense strategy and budget plan, both of which were formulated and publicly unveiled after the release of the book's first edition. ""O'Hanlon has insightfully separated what the nation needs to maintain an adequate defense from what the military and its suppliers want, crafting a realistic and affordable proposal for defense spending for the coming decade."" --Robert D. Reischauer, President, Urban Institute ""The best unclassified study to date of the military implications of a China-Taiwan conflict for the United States. His sobering analysis makes a compelling case for a cautious arms sales policy toward Taiwan as well as prudent U.S. military planning."" --Mike Mochizuki, George Washington University"

"After eleven weeks of bombing in the spring of 1999, the United States and NATO ultimately won the war in Kosovo. Serbian troops were forced to withdraw, enabling an international military and political presence to take charge in the region. But was this war inevitable or was it the product of failed western diplomacy prior to the conflict? And once it became necessary to use force, did NATO adopt a sound strategy to achieve its aims of stabilizing Kosovo? In this first in-depth study of the Kosovo crisis, Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon answer these and other questions about the causes, conduct, and consequences of the war. Based on interviews with many of the key participants, they conclude that notwithstanding important diplomatic mistakes before the conflict, it would have been difficult to avoid the Kosovo war. That being the case, U.S. and NATO conduct of the war left much to be desired. For more than four weeks, the Serbs succeeded where NATO failed, forcefully changing Kosovo's ethnic balance by forcing 1.5 million Albanians from their home and more than 800,000 from the country. Had they chosen to massacre more of their victims, NATO would have been powerless to stop them. In the end, NATO won the war by increasing the scope and intensity of bombing, making serious plans for a ground invasion, and moving diplomacy into full gear in order to convince Belgrade that this was a war Serbia would never win. The Kosovo crisis is a cautionary tale for those who believe force can be used easily and in limited increments to stop genocide, mass killing, and the forceful expulsion of entire populations. Daalder and O'Hanlon conclude that the crisis holds important diplomatic and military lessons that must be learned so that others in the future might avoid the mistakes that were made in this case."

"This latest study in the Brookings series on U.S. defense strategy and the defense budget reviews current American military capabilities and offers suggestions for the new administration and Congress. Michael O'Hanlon makes sense of the hot political topic of military readiness, questions the continued relevance of the current two-war framework for structuring most conventional combat forces, and challenges the wisdom of current plans for the procurement of advanced jet fighters, helicopters, and submarines. The book also focuses on missile defense, other means of homeland defense, the so-called revolution in military affairs, and possible conflicts between Taiwan and China that could involve U.S. forces. Throughout, the author looks for ways to close the gap between the cost of projected U.S. defense forces and the budget actually available to the Pentagon."

"In light of the spectacular performance of American high-technology weapons in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, as well as the phenomenal pace of innovation in the modern computer industry, many defense analysts have posited that we are on the threshold of a revolution in military affairs (RMA). The issue has more than semantic importance. Many RMA proponents have begun to argue for major changes in Pentagon budgetary priorities and even in American foreign policy more generally to free up resources to pursue a transformed U.S. military—and to make sure that other countries do not take advantage of the purported RMA before we do. This book takes a more measured perspective. Beginning with a survey of various types of defense technologies, it argues that while important developments are indeed under way, most impressively in electronics and computer systems, the overall thrust of contemporary military innovation is probably not of a revolutionary magnitude. Some reorientation of U.S. defense dollars is appropriate, largely to improve homeland defense and to take advantage of the promise of modern electronics systems and precision-guided munitions. But radical shifts in U.S. security policy and Pentagon budget priorities appear unwarranted—especially if those shifts would come at the expense of American military engagement in overseas defense missions from Korea to Iraq to Bosnia. "

Two important events in 1997--the balanced-budget deal and the completion of the Pentagon's Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)--promise to shape U.S. military policy for the next several years. Unfortunately, they are at odds with each other. The balanced budget accord will result in a real level of defense spending that is 8 percent lower in 2002 than in 1998. But the proportionate cuts in personnel and weaponry that the QDR calls for are only about half that size. Moreover, the U.S. military is near the end of its so-called "procurement holiday" and will soon have to buy more equipment. In this study, Michael O'Hanlon suggests a way out of this budgetary fix. In contrast to the current U.S. military posture, built around a requirement to fight two Desert-Storm like wars at once, he offers an alternative force structure organized around the concept of a "Desert Storm plus Desert Shield plus Bosnia/IFOR" requirement. O'Hanlon also suggests that naval operations be conducted more efficiently by leaving ships on forward station for longer periods of time and rotating crews by airlift. Finally, he argues for a number of selected economies in weapons modernization programs, together with some increases in areas like strategic airlift, sealift, and transport helicopters. The resulting force would save over $10 billion a year.

"Military analyst Michael O'Hanlon shows how outside forces could successfully intervene to stop an ongoing cycle of warfare in a country whose government has collapsed or come under severe internal challenge.Based largely on recent U.S. experiences in Panama, Somalia, Bosnia, and elsewhere, as well as on U.S. military doctrine and information from the Pentagon's training and simulation centers, the book discusses the steps in an intervention and estimates likely casualties and costs. O'Hanlon shows that modern Western militaries are capable of executing these types of operations with high proficiency. While conditions are unlikely to resemble those of Desert Storm, which allowed the U.S. and allies to take full advantage of modern technology, top-notch militaries have advantages in infantry combat situations—night-vision equipment, attack and transport helicopters, counterartillery radars—that would enable them to establish order and prevail in any firefights.O'Hanlon warns that operations as casualty-free as those in Haiti and, to date, in Bosnia would be unlikely. Moreover, the political framework that outside powers would attempt to employ in establishing a new order would be critical: if intervening forces are seen as taking sides or occupying territory without legitimacy, they could meet protracted guerrilla-style resistance of the types witnessed in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Somalia.Part of the Studies in Foreign Affairs series"

Spending on U.S. foreign affairs, which constitutes only about one percent of the federal budget, is being sharply reduced. Under the President's 1996 budget plan, it will decline by just as great a percentage as defense between 1990 and 2002?and by substantially more than defense over the 1980-2002 period. No other major category of federal spending will undergo a real cut over either time period. The shrinking budget, totaling about $19 billion in 1997, will still have to fund the State Department, international broadcasting and educational exchanges, trade subsidies and investment guarantees for U.S. business overseas; United Nations operations including peacekeeping, and all types of foreign assistance.In this book, O'Hanlon and Graham focus primarily on this last component of international spending. Specifically, they analyze U.S. official development assistance (ODA) to poor countries. The authors place U.S. ODA in a broad historical, international, and economic perspective. They then recommend an alternative approach to ODA for the United States as well as other donors. They favor continuing to provide humanitarian and grass-roots aid to most poor countries, but providing ODA to promote macroeconomic growth only to those countries that maintain coherent, market-oriented economic policy frameworks. The authors argue that to provide effective aid, as well as to maintain U.S. leadership in world affairs, net resources for ODA and the international account need to increase only modestly.