Michael J Mazarr

As part of a series of reports in which RAND researchers examine the established concepts of deterrence and develop a framework for evaluating the strength of deterrent relationships, this report explores two ongoing examples of extended deterrence. In particular, RAND researchers apply the established framework to U.S. efforts to deter North Korean aggression against South Korea and U.S. efforts to deter Chinese aggression against Taiwan.

In this report, RAND researchers identify eight common characteristics of gray zone aggression, develop a framework for assessing the health of U.S. and partner deterrence in the gray zone, and apply the framework to three case studies: China's actions in the Senkaku Islands, Russia's actions in the Baltic states, and North Korea's actions in South Korea.

Desert Storm aims to examine the lessons of the Gulf War from a high-level, strategic defense perspective. It opens up an informed debate concerning the true military and geopolitical lessons of the conflict.

From Saddam Hussein's first bold threats in 1990 to the stunning ground phase of Desert Storm in early 1991, the crisis in the Gulf captured the world's attention. This high-tech, low-cost war was televised nightly from beginning to end, accompanied by on-the-spot interpretations of strategy and its implications. But what did we learn from this crisis? Did the United States bungle its attempts at discouraging Saddam's aggressive actions, or is deterrence simply not a reliable foreign policy tool? Are chemical weapons truly the "poor man's atom bomb"? Does the war represent a good model for future crises, or did circumstances make this war more of an anomaly than a precedent? How did the ail-volunteer U.S. force perform? By combining exciting, detailed vignettes of the crisis with insightful discussions of its consequences, this book opens up an informed debate concerning the true military and geopolitical lessons of the conflict. Representing a distillation of the best thinking on defense and foreign policy in Washington, Desert Storm also incorporates the testimony of the inside players during the crisis—the people who actually planned and fought the war. Combining academic rigor and in-depth military expertise, the authors challenge the complacency of the emerging conventional wisdom regarding the conflict, taking us beyond mere chronicling and instant analysis to a riveting reenactment of the war and the serious consideration of its long-term implications.

Leap of Faith is the first comprehensive and objective history of the decision to invade Iraq. Based on nine years of research, over 100 interviews with participants in the drama, and information from hundreds of U.S. and British declassified documents, Mike Mazarr shows how the most impressive and experienced foreign policy team made the greatest strategic folly of the century.Mazarr reveals that a combination of messianic certainty, cultural deference, and administrative infighting and incompetence allowed the decision to be made without any examination of the ways in which it could unravel. So when it did, no one had any answers.Leap of Faith is a parable of how good intentions can go wrong, and a cautionary tale about any international entanglement.

The challenge of deterring territorial aggression is taking on renewed importance, yet discussion of it has lagged in U.S. military and strategy circles. The authors aim to provide a fresh look, with two primary purposes: to review established concepts about deterrence, and to provide a framework for evaluating the strength of deterrent relationships. They focus on a specific type of deterrence: extended deterrence of interstate aggression.

Since 1945, the United States has pursued its interests through the creation and maintenance of international economic institutions, global organizations, bilateral and regional security organizations, and liberal political norms that collectively are often referred to as the international order. This report evaluates the order's value, assessing its role in promoting U.S. goals and interests, as well as shared global objectives.

As part of a larger study on the future of the post-World War II liberal international order, RAND researchers analyze the health of the existing order and offer implications for future U.S. policy. The study's overall conclusion is that the postwar order continues to enjoy many elements of stability but is increasingly threatened by major geopolitical and domestic socioeconomic trends that call into question the order's fundamental assumptions.

Since 1945, the United States has pursued its global interests through creating and maintaining international economic institutions, bilateral and regional security organizations, and liberal political norms; these ordering mechanisms are often collectively referred to as the international order. This report examines options for future U.S. policies with respect to the order.

This book examines the role of risk management in the recent financial crisis and applies lessons from there to the national security realm. It rethinks the way risk contributes to strategy, with insights relevant to practitioners and scholars in national security as well as business. Over the past few years, the concept of risk has become one of the most commonly discussed issues in national security planning. And yet the experiences of the 2007-2008 financial crisis demonstrated critical limitations in institutional efforts to control risk. The most elaborate and complex risk procedures could not cure skewed incentives, cognitive biases, groupthink, and a dozen other human factors that led companies to take excessive risk. By embracing risk management, the national security enterprise may be turning to a discipline just as it has been discredited.

This book examines the role of risk management in the recent financial crisis and applies lessons from there to the national security realm. It rethinks the way risk contributes to strategy, with insights relevant to practitioners and scholars in national security as well as business. Over the past few years, the concept of risk has become one of the most commonly discussed issues in national security planning. And yet the experiences of the 2007-2008 financial crisis demonstrated critical limitations in institutional efforts to control risk. The most elaborate and complex risk procedures could not cure skewed incentives, cognitive biases, groupthink, and a dozen other human factors that led companies to take excessive risk. By embracing risk management, the national security enterprise may be turning to a discipline just as it has been discredited.

Increased use of the reserve component, particularly since September 11, 2001, and an expectation that this role will continue and possibly increase in the future has renewed interest in the question of the appropriate number of reserve component general and flag officers (RC G/FOs). RAND researchers conducted a review of requirements and authorized strength for RC G/FOs.

This manuscript examines the increasingly important form of rivalry and statecraft that has become known as "gray zone strategies." In regions from Eastern Europe to the South China Sea, such tactics in the hands of ambitious regional powers pose a growing challenge to U.S. and allied interests. This monograph aims to provide a broad introduction to the issue to help leaders in the U.S. Army and the wider joint Department of Defense and national security community better understand this challenge. Dr. Michael Mazarr, a Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation and Associate Program Director of the Army's Arroyo Center there, defines the issue, examines the most notable current cases of gray zone strategies, offers several hypotheses about the nature of this form of conflict, and suggests a number of policy responses. The monograph emphasizes that many gray zone tools and techniques have been employed for centuries.

A sense of malaise and uncertainty surrounds the so-called war on terror. This volume offers a bold rethinking of the central challenge in that conflict: the rise of radical Islamism. Mazarr argues that this movement represents the latest in a series of anti-modern political and philosophical rebellions: in its causes, the shape of its ideology, and its social consequences, the movement shares much in common with German fascism, Russian revolutionary doctrines, and Japanese imperialist nationalism. The book builds a model of how anti-modern movements arise and suggests broader truths about the changing character of world politics and the psychological basis of national security in a globalized world. It concludes with a critique of the war on terror as currently pursued and a wide-ranging proposal for a strikingly different approach to the challenge of this latest challenge to modernity.

A sense of malaise and uncertainty surrounds the so-called war on terror. This volume offers a bold rethinking of the central challenge in that conflict: the rise of radical Islamism. Mazarr argues that this movement represents the latest in a series of anti-modern political and philosophical rebellions: in its causes, the shape of its ideology, and its social consequences, the movement shares much in common with German fascism, Russian revolutionary doctrines, and Japanese imperialist nationalism. The book builds a model of how anti-modern movements arise and suggests broader truths about the changing character of world politics and the psychological basis of national security in a globalized world. It concludes with a critique of the war on terror as currently pursued and a wide-ranging proposal for a strikingly different approach to the challenge of this latest challenge to modernity.

This unique collection of essays explores the intricacies of how the Internet has changed the way we currently approach international security, civil society, and economic development. The contributors move past the conventional wisdom, tapping new and original sources to investigate new and unexpected developments. One essay explores how wiring Russia's nuclear scientists into the Internet increases the threat of weapons proliferation. Another looks at Internet-enabled development projects and, despite early success stories in Bangalore, India, explains why they will fail. Together the essays in this collection try to bring a dose of reality to the rose-colored futures many have predicted for world politics in the Information Age.