Quentin E Hodgson

The 2022 National Defense Strategy calls for "integrated deterrence" in how the U.S. military uses its cyberspace forces to address the strategic challenges posed by revisionist powers, such as China. The authors apply the concept of selective overmatch to reevaluate current U.S. cyber operations in light of competition and possible conflict with China and show how this framework can provide a roadmap for U.S. Cyber Command's future operations.

Systems and operations have become more dependent on interconnected electronics and data. As that dependence grows, so does the need for mission assurance in the face of adversarial cyber operations. The authors offer ways to help wings assure their missions despite cyber attacks, focusing on how wings can maintain situational awareness, defend their systems, and respond to and recover from attacks to survive and operate when under cyber attack.

The Air Force has long faced a challenge integrating force design and capability development planning with programming. RAND Project Air Force assisted the Air Force Warfighting Integration Capability (AFWIC) in conceptualizing analytical and other products to support concept development, force design options, and capability development planning. The authors present findings and recommendations for AFWIC's analytical processes and products.

Technological superiority is vital to U.S. national security. New RAND research models and assesses the challenges and gaps in the Department of Defense (DoD) commercial technology pipeline, from concept to fielding. To better harness commercial technologies, DoD needs policies that incentivize and improve information sharing, coordination, and collaboration between defense innovation organizations and traditional acquisition stakeholders.

The United States has a long history of preparing for and responding to large-scale incidents affecting public safety and homeland security. However, it does not have comparable experience in responding to cyber incidents. This report examines U.S. processes for non-cyber emergency management and whether U.S. officials can learn from these events to help public and private sector stakeholders improve preparations for response to cyber attacks.

The authors of this report examine cases from Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea to understand whether and how states use cyber operations to coerce other states or actors, and highlight the challenges of identifying cyber coercion. They also propose ways to develop a deeper understanding of cyber coercion and how to counter it.