Ramesh Karri

This book provides readers with a valuable guide to understanding security and the interplay of computer science, microfluidics, and biochemistry in a biochip cyberphysical system (CPS). The authors uncover new, potential threat and trust-issues to address, as this emerging technology is poised to be adapted at a large scale. Readers will learn how to secure biochip CPS by leveraging the available resources in different application contexts, as well as how to ensure intellectual property (IP) is protected against theft and counterfeits. This book enables secure biochip CPS design by helping bridge the knowledge gap at the intersection of the multi-disciplinary technology that drives biochip CPS.

This book provides readers with a valuable guide to understanding security and the interplay of computer science, microfluidics, and biochemistry in a biochip cyberphysical system (CPS). The authors uncover new, potential threat and trust-issues to address, as this emerging technology is poised to be adapted at a large scale. Readers will learn how to secure biochip CPS by leveraging the available resources in different application contexts, as well as how to ensure intellectual property (IP) is protected against theft and counterfeits. This book enables secure biochip CPS design by helping bridge the knowledge gap at the intersection of the multi-disciplinary technology that drives biochip CPS.

This book explores C-based design, implementation, and analysis of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms for signature generation and verification. The authors investigate NIST round 2 PQC algorithms for signature generation and signature verification from a hardware implementation perspective, especially focusing on C-based design, power-performance-area-security (PPAS) trade-offs and design flows targeting FPGAs and ASICs.Describes a comprehensive set of synthesizable c code base as well as the hardware implementations for the different types of PQC algorithms including lattice-based, code-based, and multivariate-based;Demonstrates the hardware (FPGA and ASIC) and hardware-software optimizations and trade-offs of the NIST round 2 signature-based PQC algorithms;Enables designers to build hardware implementations that are resilient to a variety of side-channels.

This book explores C-based design, implementation, and analysis of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms for signature generation and verification. The authors investigate NIST round 2 PQC algorithms for signature generation and signature verification from a hardware implementation perspective, especially focusing on C-based design, power-performance-area-security (PPAS) trade-offs and design flows targeting FPGAs and ASICs.Describes a comprehensive set of synthesizable c code base as well as the hardware implementations for the different types of PQC algorithms including lattice-based, code-based, and multivariate-based;Demonstrates the hardware (FPGA and ASIC) and hardware-software optimizations and trade-offs of the NIST round 2 signature-based PQC algorithms;Enables designers to build hardware implementations that are resilient to a variety of side-channels.

This book describes novel hardware security and microfluidic biochip design methodologies to protect against tampering attacks in cyberphysical microfluidic biochips (CPMBs). It also provides a general overview of this nascent area of research, which will prove to be a vital resource for practitioners in the field.This book shows how hardware-based countermeasures and design innovations can be a simple and effective last line of defense, demonstrating that it is no longer justifiable to ignore security and trust in the design phase of biochips.

This book describes novel hardware security and microfluidic biochip design methodologies to protect against tampering attacks in cyberphysical microfluidic biochips (CPMBs). It also provides a general overview of this nascent area of research, which will prove to be a vital resource for practitioners in the field.This book shows how hardware-based countermeasures and design innovations can be a simple and effective last line of defense, demonstrating that it is no longer justifiable to ignore security and trust in the design phase of biochips.