Thomas Donnelly

The book you hold in your hands is not my fault. Writing is hard work, and I have spent a lifetime trying to avoid all forms of hard work. I blame it on all those people who have been reading my column for many years and have asked for the book to send to friends, thereby cutting down on the time spent on Christmas presents for distant relatives. I blame this book on Sweet Nancy, who let me know I owed her for numerous infractions through the years. "It should be fun and strengthen our marriage if we rewrote all the columns," I remember her saying early one morning before I was fully awake. We hope, as you read, you will laugh, view life with more hope, and occasionally be touched by the stories of the people who allowed me to share their journey. I hope in our story you will be reminded of a story of your own and want to share it. Each and every story needs a teller and a listener. It works so much better if you take turns. It is in this joy-filled experience that life is richer and worth living.

As the guarantor of international security, the United States must commit to a long-term military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan. But what are the tools necessary to succeed on the new battlefields of the Long War? In this volume, a group of the foremost U.S. military officials and national security experts analyze the American experience in Iraq and Afghanistan thus far in order to map a way forward—not only for the military, but for diplomats, elected officials, and the American public. Thomas Donnelly, Frederick W. Kagan, and their coauthors offer several core lessons for success in The Long War. They argue that decentralizing command is the key to efficient operations on an ever-changing battlefield; that air power is the unsung hero of counterinsurgency warfare; that public opinion can influence crucial military decisions; and that the military should minimize its role in domestic affairs. Finally, although the battlefields have changed over the last fifty years, the authors contend that America's long-held counterinsurgency strategy—to foster political support at home, employ diplomacy overseas, and extend military assistance to allies—remains effective. The Long War will not soon be over. But, in the words of retired Army special forces officer Colonel Robert Killebrew, the United States already has "the tools it needs in order to prevail in the wars of the twenty-first century."

The limitations of America's land forces remain a fundamental constraint on U.S. military strategy. The cutbacks of the Clinton years and the Bush administration's failure to foresee the need for larger ground forces in the wake of 9/11 have undercut America's ability to fight the Long War. Resolving the stark divergence between America's military ends and meansin terms of force size, training, and modernizationwill be a crucial challenge for the next administration. In Ground Truth: The Future of U.S. Land Power, Thomas Donnelly and Frederick W. Kagan pose five urgent questions for policymakers: What is the strategic role of American ground forces? What missions will these forces undertake in the future? What is the nature of land warfare in the twenty-first century? What qualities are necessary to succeed on the battlefields of the Long War? What is the ideal size and configuration of the forceand how much will it cost? Answers to such questions are long overdue. The stresses of prolonged operations in the Middle East have strained the U.S. Army and Marine Corps; if the United States is to maintain its status as the sole superpower, American land power must be restructured to confront unprecedented challenges. Only a dedicated, bipartisan effort can create a ground force that is not only larger and more flexible, but retrained and reequipped. Donnelly and Kagan provide a plan of action for policymakers to begin that vital rebuilding.